A Cognitive Theory of ConsciousnessConscious experience is one of the most difficult and thorny problems in psychological science. Its study has been neglected for many years, either because it was thought to be too difficult, or because the relevant evidence was thought to be poor. Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena - such as stimulus representations known to be attended, perceptual, and informative - with closely comparable unconscious ones - such as stimulus representations known to be preperceptual, unattended, or habituated. Adducing data to show that consciousness is associated with a kind of global workplace in the nervous system, and that several brain structures are known to behave in accordance with his theory, Baars helps to clarify many difficult problems. |
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Contents
What is to be explained? Some preliminaries | 3 |
11 Some history and a look ahead | 4 |
12 What is to be explained? A first definition of the topic | 13 |
13 Some attempts to understand conscious experience | 28 |
A gathering consensus | 43 |
15 Some common themes in this book | 64 |
16 Chapter summary and a look ahead | 70 |
The basic model | 71 |
65 Further implications | 243 |
66 Chapter summary | 245 |
Model 5 Volition as ideomotor control of thought and action | 246 |
71 Is there a problem of volition? Some contrasts between similar voluntary and involuntary actions | 248 |
72 Voluntary action resembles spontaneous problem solving | 257 |
The ideomotor theory in modern garb | 259 |
74 Evidence bearing on the ideomotor theory | 267 |
75 Explaining the voluntaryinvoluntary contrasts | 273 |
Model 1 Conscious representations are internally consistent and globally distributed | 73 |
21 Contrasting the capabilities of conscious and unconscious processes | 74 |
A global workspace blackboard in a distributed system of intelligent information processors | 86 |
23 How the theoretical metaphor fits the evidence of Table 21 | 89 |
24 Input properties of the global workspace | 96 |
How global is global? | 99 |
26 Further considerations | 104 |
27 Testable predictions and counterarguments | 108 |
28 Chapter summary | 117 |
The neural basis of conscious experience | 119 |
31 The neurophysiological fit with Model 1 | 121 |
32 Extensions suggested by the neurophysiology | 128 |
33 Recent refinements of the neurophysiological evidence | 131 |
34 Chapter summary | 134 |
The fundamental role of context | 135 |
Model 2 Unconscious contexts shape conscious experience | 137 |
41 Sources of evidence on contexts | 139 |
42 Several kinds of contexts | 151 |
43 Modeling contextual knowledge | 161 |
44 Some plausible properties of contexts | 166 |
45 Implications for empirical testing | 173 |
46 Chapter summary | 176 |
Model 3 Conscious experience is informative it always demands some degree of adaptation | 177 |
Any learnable task goes from contextcreation to conscious information to redundancy | 184 |
52 Human beings also seek information at many levels | 199 |
Interpreting informativeness in the theory | 203 |
Is informativeness a necessary condition for conscious experience? | 208 |
55 Implications for learning | 213 |
56 Some experimental predictions | 219 |
57 Other implications | 220 |
58 Chapter summary | 221 |
Goals and voluntary control | 223 |
Model 4 Goal contexts spontaneous problem solving and the stream of consciousness | 225 |
61 The tipofthetongue state as a goal context or intention | 226 |
62 The consciousunconsciousconscious CUC triad | 233 |
63 Empirical assessment of goal contexts | 239 |
64 Goal contexts and the stream of consciousness | 240 |
76 Wider implications | 279 |
77 Absorption and hypnosis as ideomotor events | 287 |
78 Conflicts between goals | 292 |
79 Chapter summary | 296 |
Attention self and conscious selfmonitoring | 299 |
Model 6 Attention as control of access to consciousness | 301 |
81 Voluntary and automatic control of access to consciousness | 305 |
82 Modeling voluntary and automatic access control | 307 |
83 Directing attention toward something | 314 |
Suppression repression and emotional conflict | 317 |
85 Further implications | 321 |
86 Chapter summary | 324 |
Model 7 Self as the dominant context of experience and action | 325 |
91 Contrasting self and notself experiences | 331 |
92 Modeling self and selfconcept | 336 |
93 Further questions to explore | 341 |
94 Chapter summary | 344 |
Consciousness is functional | 345 |
The functions of consciousness | 347 |
101 Definitional and Contextsetting Function | 350 |
102 Adaptation and Learning Function | 351 |
104 Recruiting and Control Function | 352 |
106 Decisionmaking or Executive Function | 353 |
108 Metacognitive or Selfmonitoring Function | 354 |
109 Autoprogramming and Selfmaintenance Function | 355 |
1010 Chapter summary | 356 |
Conclusion | 357 |
A summary and some future directions | 359 |
112 A brief review of the models | 360 |
113 What are the necessary conditions for conscious experience? | 362 |
114 Some practical implications of GW theory | 364 |
The mindbody problem revisited | 365 |
Glossary and guide to theoretical claims | 367 |
| 393 | |
Name index | 411 |
| 416 | |
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Common terms and phrases
able abstract action activation adaptation alternatives ambiguity attention automatic become conscious broadcast called capacity Chapter classical conditioning compete components concepts conscious contents conscious events conscious experience consistent contrasts course create defined developed difficult discussed Dominant editing Effects errors evidence example execution existence expectations fact Figure functions Further global workspace goal contexts goal-image habituation Hierarchy idea ideomotor images input intentions interpretation involves kind knowledge learning levels limited meaning memory mental Model nervous system normal object observe one's operate Options perceptual person possible practice predictable problem processes processors psychology question reason repeated representation requires seems sense sentence shape significant simply single slips solving sources specialized specialized processors speech stimulus subjects suggests surprise task tend theory things thought unconscious violated visual voluntary control
Bibliographic information
| Title | A Cognitive Theory of Consciousness |
| Author | Bernard J. Baars |
| Edition | illustrated, reprint |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press, 1993 |
| ISBN | 0521427436, 9780521427432 |
| Length | 424 pages |
| Subjects | › › Medical / Neuroscience Psychology / Cognitive Psychology & Cognition Science / Life Sciences / Neuroscience |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |