Truth and Progress: Philosophical PapersThis eagerly awaited book complements two highly successful previously published volumes of Richard Rorty's philosophical papers: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. In this new, provocative collection, Rorty continues to defend a pragmatist view of truth and deny that truth is a goal of inquiry. In these dynamic essays, Rorty also engages with the work of many of today's most innovative thinkers including Robert Brandom, Donald Davidson, Daniel Dennett, Jacques Derrida, JÜrgen Habermas, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, John Searle, and Charles Taylor. The collection also touches on problems in contemporary feminism raised by Annette Baier, Marilyn Frye, and Catherine MacKinnon, and considers issues connected with human rights and cultural differences. Challenging, stimulating and controversial, this book will appeal to thoughtful readers around the world. Richard Rorty was an undergraduate at the University of Chicago, completed his graduate work at Yale, and taught at Princeton from 1961 until 1982. His first ground-breaking book, an attack on traditional epistemology, was Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). His previous books with Cambridge have been Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989), a book that sold over 46,000 copies since publication and has been translated into seventeen different languages, and two volumes of philosophical papers: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, and Essays on Heidegger and Others. A recipient of a MacArthur Foundation grant, Rorty has lectured throughout the world. Also available Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers: Volume 1 0-521-35877-9 Paperback Essays on Heidegger and Others: Philosophical Papers: Volume 2 0-521-35878-7 Paperback |
Contents
IS TRUTH A GOAL OF INQUIRY? DONALD DAVIDSON VERSUS CRISPIN WRIGHT | 19 |
HILARY PUTNAM AND THE RELATIVIST MENACE | 43 |
JOHN SEARLE ON REALISM AND RELATIVISM | 63 |
CHARLES TAYLOR ON TRUTH | 84 |
DANIEL DENNETT ON INTRINSICALITY | 98 |
ROBERT BRANDOM ON SOCIAL PRACTICES AND REPRESENTATIONS | 122 |
THE VERY IDEA OF HUMAN ANSWERABILITY TO THE WORLD JOHN McDOWELLS VERSION OF EMPIRICISM | 138 |
ANTISKEPTICAL WEAPONS MICHAEL WILLIAMS VERSUS DONALD DAVIDSON | 153 |
FEMINISM AND PRAGMATISM | 202 |
THE END OF LENINISM HAVEL AND SOCIAL HOPE | 228 |
THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN PROGRESS | 245 |
THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY FOUR GENRES | 247 |
THE CONTINGENCY OF PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS MICHAEL AYERS ON LOCKE | 274 |
DEWEY BETWEEN HEGEL AND DARWIN | 290 |
HABERMAS DERRIDA AND THE FUNCTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY | 307 |
DERRIDA AND THE PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION | 327 |
Common terms and phrases
agree answer argue argument attempt Ayers behavior beliefs Bennington better Brandom called causal claim concept consciousness Consciousness Explained contemporary criticism culture Daniel Dennett Darwin Dennett Derrida describe Dewey's difference discourse distinction Donald Davidson doxography empiricism epistemological essay example explain fact feminism feminists Habermas Hegel Heidegger Hilary Putnam history of philosophy hope Ibid idea intellectual Intentional Stance intrinsic intuitions Jacques Derrida John Dewey John Searle justified Kant knowledge language linguistic matter McDowell mean metaphors metaphysical mind moral Nagel nature Nietzsche nominalist norms notion object one's ourselves philoso Plato political possible practices pragmatism pragmatists problems Putnam qualia question rational realism reality reason reconstructions relation Relativism representation rhetoric Robert Brandom Rorty Searle seems Sellars sense skepticism social sort suggestion talk Taylor theory of truth things thought tion tradition transcendence transcendental true trying University Press warranted assertibility Williams Wittgenstein