to say one word to our readers, whether soldiers or civilians. Having got a Generalissimo there is only one thing to be done with him, namely, to trust him implicitly, all the more because he is accountable to the French Prime Minister, who happens to be a man in whom we may place unstinted confidence. M. Clemenceau's personality makes him the natural leader of the Entente. French FROM all accounts M. Clemenceau has been splendid throughout this terrible crisis, inspiring every one by his indomitable and infectious courage and irresistible humour. He is the first politician to secure the confidence of the French Army, and he is entitled to ours, because his whole heart and being are absorbed in the war regardless of past, present, or future parliamentary exigencies, which are the obsession of most civilian Ministers. Our French Allies handsomely acknowledge our considerable concession in placing General Foch in command of the British Armies. They realize what is so far hardly realized in London, that as General Foch is the servant of his Government it puts the British Army at the disposal of foreign civilians as well as foreign soldiers. This will inspire no anxiety so long as M. Clemenceau remains where he is. On the contrary. But it does give us a big stake in the French Premiership, which we trust may be recognized in Paris, because Englishmen cannot consent to allow the British Government to wash their hands of all responsibility for the British Army in France, supposing there came into power in Paris some statesman or combination who might be tempted to treat Armies less as instruments of victory than as pawns in some political manœuvre. If we may say so, our French friends should cherish M. Clemenceau as the apple of their eye, and carefully consider the wishes and interests of their Allies in any future changes of Government that may occur during the war. Ar the actual moment of going to press there is a pause--which may be momentary--during which both sides are consolidating their positions and preparing for the future. The German General Staff is estimated by experts to be willing to invest "--such is the cold-blooded Boche term -a given number of casualties in the present operations to obtain Speculation 66 a given objective, which is understood to be the separation of the Allied armies, to be followed by a decision "--not that Great Britain would for a moment accept as such any disaster on land, however overwhelming. We are We are primarily a sea-Power, as Mr. Cope Cornford opportunely reminds us in his remarkable article, "The Return to the Sea." If the worst came to the worst on land we should transfer the conflict to the element on which we have won all our historic triumphs, and back to back with the United States the British Empire could and would fight Hohenzollernism if need be for twenty years. We are only on land because it is more convenient to destroy Prussian militarism there. For the present we are concerned with the military situation, remembering always that the Army is but the second string to our bow, and that the first is as always the Navy-never mightier than to-day, intact and irresistible, as is proved by the enemy's resort to the submarine, which, however damaging, is at best a "Defeatist " weapon. We have no idea whether the Germans are satisfied with the past month's frightful fighting, because we know neither their anticipations nor their calculations of probable losses, any more than we can guess at their actual casualties, which on a conservative estimate cannot be far short of 400,000, and may be 500,000 by May 1. They were supposed to have lost 500,000 men in failing to get Verdun. Falkenhayn was a notorious gambler and a courtier in whose eyes German life had no value as compared with the whims of the Crown Prince. Hindenburg is said to be neither a courtier nor a gambler, and if so he would abandon his plan rather than sacrifice German man-power on an unobtainable objective, as soon as failure was writ sufficiently large. On this hypothesis his casualties would have to amount to, say, 750,000 before he afforded Diplomacy another innings, for which the way is being paved by various "revelations" in part designed to induce ingenuous Britonsof whom there is never any lack-to co-operate with von Kühlmann in converting Germany's military check into a political victory, such as would preserve the Hohenzollerns, and enable them to complete the Western programme of Pan-Germanism when they had consolidated their Eastern successes. That is the more "optimistic" view of the present situation, the soundness of which may be shortly proved or disproved. In the alternative it is alleged by "pessimists," who aver that so far we have only had the preliminaries of the German offensive, that though Hindenburg may be the nominal Ludendorff Chief of the Great General Staff, Ludendorff is not only the brains of the concern but the de facto ruler of Germany, whose orders Hindenburg is obliged to take, because Ludendorff has momentarily hypnotized the Kaiser into believing that he alone can pull the Fatherland through and save the Dynasty. Ludendorff is described as being as daring a gambler as Falkenhayn, though infinitely more capable and still more coldblooded. He is alleged to be prepared to sacrifice 1,500,000 men, who count for nothing in his eyes, to achieve " a German Peace," and it is noteworthy that whereas Verdun was called " the Crown Prince's battle," the present struggle was from the first advertised as "the Kaiser-battle," particular pains being taken to signalize the All-Highest's presence at various points of the Front. With the personal prestige of the Sovereign thus committed as irretrievably as that of the General Staff, who are exploiting the Emperor as he has not hitherto been exploited, we refuse to believe that arithmetic as to waning German man-power will restrain these homicidal maniacs. It would, therefore, be wisdom in the Allies to anticipate repeated and unheard-of efforts long after our professional optimists have persuaded themselves that Germany has made her "last throw," and that German troops "will no longer come up to the scratch." Also, while we may be entirely content with the damage we have inflicted on the hundred German Divisions that have attacked us between March 21 and April 21, it were rash to surmise that a hammered Division is done for, still more to accept excited correspondents' figures as to the "German dead," which were reckoned at 350,000 before their total casualties had reached that figure. Our Fighting Men are man for man better than the German fighting men, though less highly trained. They can beat the Germans if we at the Back do our part and protect them from every form of folly. THE latest news from Germany, or at any rate the latest news allowed to leak out, leaves the attitude of the enemy in considerable doubt. Somewhat suddenly when the Pan-Germans were at the top of their form and "the death, disaster, and damnation" of England was being Piano proclaimed as the national policy by all the Faithful from the Kaiser downwards, the German War Minister (General Stein) is advertised as making a speech in the Main Committee of the Reichstag striking a less exhilarating note. After declaring that "the world is still under the impression of our great successes in the West," he stated that German troops had been called upon to perform the greatest tasks" that can be demanded from any soldiers." But they had "entered on the attack with enthusiasm and all the old-time German devotion," after which he mentioned casually that "some detachments have lost two-thirds of their company leaders. The losses are quite normal and are in some cases remarkably small." The events in the West were to be regarded as "a great victory." South-west of Arras to La Fère they had broken through the British positions to a depth of 60 kilometres. "About 100,000 prisoners and 1500 guns were our booty there." Afterwards they had driven the French across the Oise-Aisne Canal and defeated the British in the battle of Armentières, taking 20,000 prisoners and 250 guns, and moreover bombarding Paris with our long range guns." General Stein accounted for the pause by the difficulties of rapid pursuit despite the large English supplies which they had captured" as the enemy had again found vantage-points . . . of which he has made use." Therefore "the campaign is still in full swing. Relying on the Chief Army Command, we must patiently await what further successes will be granted to us" (our italics). This is so unusually unboastful, not to say piano, that we ask ourselves what it portends, all the more as it is accompanied by the customary rumours from correspondents at Amsterdam-who for the hundredth time announce that Germany is "losing heart," in support of which the usual German journal is quoted, which was not improbably written for foreign consumption. The policy of throwing us off our guard while preparing some heavy blow has been brought to such a fine art that we cannot tell whether this is another such effort under cover of which another mighty attack will be launched, or whether it is a preliminary to a Peace push with the aid of Lords Lansdowne, Buckmaster, Parmoor, Loreburn, and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald-the Nation and the Manchester Guardian, which appear to be "ground-baiting with a discreet backing of Cocoa lords, Cotton lords, International 66 financiers, and hyphenated Hebrews. The very latest news looks more like a military thrust than a diplomatic campaign, though the latter may be expected whenever the former peters out. The Home As the British always rise to an emergency it is ten thousand pities that they should ever be encouraged to live in a Fool's Paradise, and to imagine the "impending collapse of the enemy." Distrust of the Democracy is, however, ingrained in professing Democrats. Once more the Home Front spontaneously hardened on the bad news from France, our domestic difficulties and dissensions, strikes, etc., vanishing like smoke. It was, however, speedily made manifest to Ministers that it was not " practical politics" to unload upon the Army the blame for their own shortcomings, or to make scapegoats of any soldiers of which some of the Ditto Press showed signs. Governmental utterances were not always happy, including, as they did, messages abroad indicating anything but that calm and steady judgment so necessary in the hour of danger. But at last the long overdue Man-Power Bill, urgent last year the moment Russia began to retire, which would have made the whole difference between danger and safety in the West, was announced, involving the Conscription of Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Welshmen up to fifty, and in the interval has been passed into law. Such a measure could never be popular-war measures per se rarely are, but it became palatable the moment the Government proclaimed their intention of remedying the hideous Irish scandal whereby the only disaffected portion of the United Kingdom was allowed to shirk the war and devote Irish manhood to Sinn-Feinism, while British manhood sacrificed itself for civilization. The monstrosity of this injustice, for which there was never any shadow of an explanation except that FrontBenchers are as cowardly as Front-Trenchers are brave-at last dawned upon Downing Street, and there was a universal sigh of relief when our wabbling War Cabinet declared through Mr. Bonar Law that they would stand or fall by Irish Conscription. Unfortunately they immediately took the edge off their robustness by announcing as an obvious sop that Conscription would be accompanied by Home Rule, which encouraged the Irish to infer that "the base, bloody, and brutal Saxon" was still afraid VOL. LXXI 18 T |