The foregoing historical survey seems to us to shed an important light upon the cause of the decline of Infant Baptism, especially among the orthodox Congregational churches of our Eastern States. It belongs to a system of doctrines which has no affinity with their evangelical sentiments. It is part and parcel of a religion of ritual observances and sacramental grace. So long as it remains in connection with those congenial doctrines which gave it birth, it has a sure support. In those countries and communions where the sacraments are held to be the chief channels of remission, sanctification, and salvation, we hear nothing of the decline of Infant Baptism. There, rooted in its native soil, and growing in its native air, it lives and thrives. But the air and soil of evangelical principles are uncongenial to its life. Nay, it cannot be transplanted thither without cutting off its tap-root. No wonder, then, that after all the diligent watering of its surface roots, it withers and threatens to die. No wonder that it has to be propped up, first on this side, and then on that, to keep it from falling.

It is a troublesome and unsightly tree, which disfigures the fair garden of the Lord. They would do well to cut it down. Seriously, we think they will have to choose ere long, whether they will renounce the practice, or accept the doctrine in which it originated. It is an orphaned and pining institution among them, and they must either contrive to resuscitate its parent, or else let it die and be decently buried. The milk of its foster parent, the Abrahamic covenant, will not keep it alive much longer. It must have stronger meat than that. Some of our Pedobaptist brethren appear to be aware of the alternative before them; and in some quarters we see with sorrow and surprise a disposition to accept that doctrine of sacramental grace, which the decaying institution so manifestly needs for its support. But of the majority we hope better things; and we hail, in the growing neglect of this unscriptural practice, the removal of an obstruction to the highest prosperity and usefulness of one of the most excellent of the tribes of our spiritual Israel, and the breaking down of the wall of partition which separates us from those whom we esteem so highly, and love so well.

ARTICLE III-THE SENSIBILITIES.*

THE human mind, in its nature, is obviously simple. There is no reason to suppose it composed or constituted of parts, as organized substances are. Of such composition there is not the slightest indication. It is not possible to conceive of the soul as an organism. We can form a distinct idea of matter as composed of parts, and of these parts as holding a definite relation to each other. If there be in mind anything analogous to this, we can form no idea of it. The Deity, though everywhere present, is not so by diffusion. He is not one portion at one point and another portion at another, and thus infinitely extended. He is at the same time in every place, the undivided, undiminished, infinite mind, incapable of division or of being, in his essential substance, attenuated, as the term spirit by which He is designated, might imply. He is not invisible because a subtle element, like some of the impalpable agencies of matter. God is mind, and as such has none of the properties of matter. The human mind in this respect resembles Him; is

* This Analysis was begun about thirty years since, on the writer's entering the ministry. Its design was to secure an accurate knowledge of those feelings so frequently brought under notice of the pastor in the preparation of religious instruction; and in being called upon to decide upon the genuineness of religious affections. It had its origin in "meeting for inquirers." In these first efforts at an analysis, the purpose was confirmed by the study of Edwards on the Affections. While some of the views there presented could not be adopted, they opened a vast field for inquiry. To determine what sensibilities have in them a religious element, and what are the relations of these to such as have not; that is, to those which are constitutional, or instinctive, and do not necessarily imply moral character, is both interesting and necessary to skilful religious teaching. At first, little was done except to distinguish between moral feelings which are the natural result of our moral constitution, and those which are the fruit of divine of grace. Gradually the effort assumed its present form, and is published with the hope it may induce those entering the ministry to some similar, but better method.

his image: like Him in nature, not in degree. It is finite and limited in its presence and powers, but no more organic than He is.

Yet there is one view in which mind, human or divine, is susceptible of analysis. Every mind, of which we have any knowledge, may be divided into the understanding, the feelings or the susceptibilities, and the will. Under this general analysis there may be minor divisions, classes of energies, to arrange and describe which, and to show their relation to each other, is the object of the science of psychology, or of mental philosophy.

Of these three general divisions or states of the mind, the intellect, the sensibilities, and the will-different manifestations of the same central spiritual energy-I have selected the second. The design is a simple analysis, and not a

treatise.

What the essence of mind is, we do not, and with our present knowledge can not, know. But we do know that it is something which, besides knowing and determining, is also sensitive; that is, susceptible of feeling. This susceptibility to feeling, or this sensitivity, is not a portion of the mind distinct from the intellect; but the same soul in its unity of essence, is capable of knowing and susceptible of feeling. This susceptibility to feeling is sometimes called sensitiveness; at others, the sensitivity; and its exercises are designated feelings or sensibilities. My object is to classify these sensibilities, and show their relations to each other.

These sensibilities have ordinarily for their antecedents something furnished by the understanding. The exceptions are those connected with the body, and will be considered hereafter.

The character of the feeling awakened when the sensitivity is in its normal state, corresponds to the quality of the thought which excites it, whether that thought be real or imaginary, true or false.

The degree of the sensibility, that is the depth and vividness of the feeling, depends on the susceptibility of the sensitivity, and on the vividness of the thought.

It is equally true that the intellect is affected by the character of the sensibilities. In other words, our apprehensions of truth are often modified by our feelings, and even by the condition of the sensitivity, or that underlying susceptibility out of which the feelings are developed as exercises, or as active conditions of the mind. Thus our thoughts and feelings have a reciprocal influence. That which was an effect becomes in turn a cause, throwing back upon its antecedents a modifying influence.

ANALYSIS OF THE SENSIBILITIES.

I. There are sensibilities connected with the body, and others not so connected. These differ not only as to their sources, but as to their nature.

1. Those connected with the body are,

(a.) Sensations or feelings excited when the senses are addressed or impinged by material objects. Some of these give rise to perceptions; as in touch, sight, hearing, tasting and smelling. Others are mere sensations, awakening no other intellectual state except consciousness. These sensations may be either agreeable or disagreeable, or may have some other peculiar character.

When these sensations are the antecedents of knowledge, they are signs of the qualities of external objects-not like them; but such is our mental constitution that they are arbitrarily significant, suggesting to us the notion of material qualities, and often the relation of material objects to each other. Unlike those feelings which have thought as an antecedent, these feelings or sensations, are themselves the antecedents of thought, and have as their own antecedents real objects.

(b). There is another class of feelings connected with the body, as hunger, thirst, etc. These are not produced by objects external to ourselves, but have their origin in the condition of the body. The body, in certain states, which are the result of causes within itself, acts on the mind. This is seen most distinctly in hunger and thirst, but is not confined to these sensations. The sensation is an uneasy feeling, which

is often allayed by obtaining some object which satisfies. The satisfaction is agreeable, but the propension is disagreeable. Following Dr. Reid, we have called this class of feelings sensations. He says, "sensation is most commonly used to signify those feelings which we have by our external senses and bodily appetites, and all our bodily pains and pleasures." 2. But there are nobler sensibilities which are independent of the body, which might be excited in pure spirit. Dugald Stewart has divided these into the following classes: the desires, the affections, self-love, and the moral feelings.

(a.) The desires are subdivided into desire of society, desire of esteem, curiosity, or desire of knowledge, etc. Any propension not arising from its connection with the body, like the appetites, but terminating, as they do, on some particular and appropriate object, is called a desire. These propensions have no regard either to ourselves, as in self love, nor to others, as in benevolence, pity, etc., but look exclusively to an object of desire without and beyond the subject. As a sensibility, it not only has a spiritual or mental origin unlike the appetites, but the object it craves is more material.

(b.) The affections, like the appetites and desires, terminate exclusively on some given object, but have an additional element. While they seek the object of the affection, the desire for the happiness or suffering of the object is concomitant. They are here designated by different terms: as benevolent and malevolent affections. The benevolent affections are love -either as simple benevolence, or modified by approbation and a peculiar sentiment that the object desires to be made happy, which is called the love of complacency, pity, forgiveness, etc; love of kindred in all its forms, friendship, patriotism, gratitude, reverence, etc. In all these, besides the fact that the heart is drawn out toward some sentient being as an object of affection, there is a collateral sensibility, a desire to see the object happy; it may be to render him so.

The malevolent affections are those which are attended with a desire for the unhappiness of another. Of this class are hate, envy, (not necessarily emulation), revenge, etc. This malevolent element may be seen in comparing hate with con