Probability and the Art of JudgmentRichard Jeffrey is beyond dispute one of the most distinguished and influential philosophers working in the field of decision theory and the theory of knowledge. His work is distinctive in showing the interplay of epistemological concerns with probability and utility theory. Not only has he made use of standard probabilistic and decision theoretic tools to clarify concepts of evidential support and informed choice, he has also proposed significant modifications of the standard Bayesian position in order that it provide a better fit with actual human experience. Probability logic is viewed not as a source of judgment but as a framework for explaining the implications of probabilistic judgments and their mutual compatability This collection of essays spans a period of some 35 years and includes what have become some of the classic works in the literature. There is also one completely new piece, while in many instances Jeffrey includes afterthoughts on the older essays. |
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Contents
| 1 | |
| 14 | |
| 30 | |
| 44 | |
| 77 | |
Alias Smith and Jones The testimony of the senses | 108 |
Conditioning kinematics and exchangeability | 117 |
Preference among preferences | 154 |
Remarks on interpersonal utility theory | 182 |
Mises redux | 192 |
Statistical explanation vs statistical inference | 203 |
New foundations for Bayesian decision theory | 213 |
Frameworks for preference | 226 |
Axiomatizing the logic of decision | 232 |
A note on the kinematics of preference | 238 |
On interpersonal utility theory | 170 |
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Common terms and phrases
accept agent applied assign Bayes Bayesian cell choice complete condition confirmation consequences consider corresponding decision defined definite degree of belief desirability determined distribution effect equal evidence example exchangeability expectation experience explanation expressed fact false finite frequency function gamble give given head hold hypothesis implies individual inference infinite Jeffrey judgment kinematics knowledge less logic matter means measure mind nature notion numbers observation odds option outcome particular positive possible practical pref preference ranking present Press prior prob proba probabilistic probability problem Proof propositions prospects question ratio reason relation relative relevant represent rule Science sense sentences sequence sort space statistical success sufficient suppose sure theorem theory things thought tion toss trials true truth University utility values various weights
Popular passages
Page 173 - The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the community then is— what? The sum of the interests of the several members who compose it.
Page 19 - Some things I have said of which I am not altogether confident. But that we shall be better and braver and less helpless if we think that we ought to enquire, than we should have been if we indulged in the idle fancy that there was no knowing and no use in seeking to know what we do not know; — that is a theme upon which I am ready to fight, in word and deed, to the utmost of my power.
Page 39 - Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, as it were above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or 'given' base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground.
Page 49 - From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty, or such as are thought so, where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen ; if the result of examination be, that there appears upon the whole any the lowest presumption on one side, and none on the other, or a greater presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater, this determines the question, even in matters of speculation ; and in matters of practice, will lay us under an 'absolute and formal obligation,...
Page 39 - Popper, . . . the decision to accept a basic statement, and to be satisfied with it, is causally connected with our experiences - especially with our perceptual experiences. But we do not attempt to justify basic statements by these experiences. Experiences can motivate a decision, and hence an acceptance or a rejection of a statement, but a basic statement cannot be justified by them - no more than by thumping the table.
Page 50 - ... it is necessary to consider not only the good or harm in itself, but also the probability that it will or will not occur, and to view geometrically the proportion all these things have when taken together.
Page 1 - The first was never to accept anything as true if I did not have evident knowledge of its truth: that is, carefully to avoid precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it.
Page 47 - AI can see why the Pyrrhonian philosophers cannot express their general conception in any manner of speaking; for they would need a new language.
Page 19 - And how will you inquire, Socrates, into that which you know not ? What will you put forth as the subject of inquiry ? And if you find what you want, how will you ever know that this is what you did not know ? Soc.
Page 205 - It's no go my honey love, it's no go my poppet; Work your hands from day to day, the winds will blow the profit. The glass is falling hour by hour, the glass will fall for ever, But if you break the bloody glass you won't hold up the weather.
References to this book
Reason Without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity David J. Owens No preview available - 2000 |
Truth or Consequences: Essays in Honor of Nuel Belnap M. Dunn,Krister Segerberg,Anil Gupta Limited preview - 1990 |



