comprehend all demurrage, whether incurred before or after the signing of the bill of lading. Supposing that by the words "demurrage if any should be incurred," no lien for the demurrage anterior to the bill of lading would be given, I think it would be given by the words "all other conditions." I think those words, for the reason I have given, would suffice without express mention of demurrage, and I think that express mention does not lessen their effect. In conclusion, I think the plaintiff entitled to a lien for the demurrage, and the dead freight or damages for short loading; and that the judgment should be affirmed as to the former, and reversed as to the latter. But I speak with great doubt, seeing the state of the authorities, and knowing the different opinions entertained on the questions, and considering what they are-viz., what meaning is to be put on loose and careless expressions? But I cannot help thinking that if we decide against the plaintiff, he will lose a benefit he clearly means to have, and the charterers intended he should have. The questions ought to have no importance except to the parties interested, and except as a warning to others not to let them arise again. WILLES, J.-I entirely concur with the judgment delivered by my brother Brett-a judgment written with such fresh and accurate acquaintance with the mercantile and maritime law applicable to the subject, that I will not attempt to add anything. 66 KELLY, C.B.-Three questions arise upon this appeal. One, and the most important, for it governs the entire case, is whether the words interlined in the bill of lading, so far incorporate into that instrument the conditions in the charter party as to entitle the plaintiff to a lien upon the cargo, of which the defendants have become the owners under the indorsement of the bill of lading. The first point is as to demurrage in respect of the ten days, from the 8th to the 18th Dec., amounting to 801. Under the bill of lading the cargo was to be consigned "as per charter party," and the cargo is to be delivered as per charter party unto order or assigns, he or they paying freight and all other conditions" [these words being interlined in writing in the printed bill of lading], “or demurrage, if any should be incurred for the said goods, as per the aforesaid charter party." This must be read as paying freight and demurrage, if any; and the question is, how much of the charter party is imported into the bill of lading by the words interlined in the bill of lading, "and all other conditions ?" These words must be read "performing all other conditions" to make them intelligible and sensible. When we look to the charter party we find, after the provision for the payment of the freight on unloading, and for fifty lay days from the 15th Oct. and ten days on demurrage at 81. per day, the charter party proceeds thus: "The owners to have an absolute lien on the cargo for all freight, dead freight, demurrage, and average, and the charterer's responsibility to cease upon shipment of the cargo, provided it be of sufficient value to cover the freight and the charges upon arrival at the port of discharge." And the question is, Whether this condition is binding upon the defendants under the words "and all other conditions" interlined as before mentioned ? I think it is. First, because the words cannot be treated as words of form and superfluous, or as having no 66 [Ex. Cн. meaning or effect, seeing that they are introduced expressly and in writing by interlineation in the printed bill of lading, and must therefore point to something intended and distinctly agreed upon between the parties, and I see no other condition to which they can apply, but the very important one that the owner was to have a lien upon the cargo for all freight, dead freight, and demurrage. It has been contended that the words apply only to any condition touching these goods, the freight payable under the bill of lading being the freight only for this shipment; but I think the reasonable interpretation is, that any and every condition is imported which affects in any way the interests of the owner or of the defendants in relation to the cargo thus consigned. I do not say that notice of the contents of the charter party would have bound the defendants by this condition, but assuming the words to mean 'performing all other conditions," I think the only reasonable effect to be given to them is to preserve to the owner the lien for which he had stipulated upon the cargo consigned to the defendants, which otherwise they would not have been liable to satisfy. It is unnecessary to determine whether, upon the shipment of this cargo, the liability of the charterer and the lien of the owner altogether ceased, as well in respect of demurrage already incurred, as of any species of liability that might afterwards arise, for, whether such liability wholly or in part continued or ceased, the owner might claim the benefit of his lien against the consignee of the cargo, either as a substituted or an additional or collateral security for the freight and demurrage. No case has been decided in which the question has turned upon words like this. We must, therefore, decide this case according to what we believe to have been the intention of the parties, to be collected from the language of the two instruments taken together. It is true that, had the two constituted but one contract between the owner and the consignees, it is most unlikely that the consignees would have allowed their cargo to stand as a security for demurrage already incurred, and not by reason of any act or default of theirs; but we must remember that the charter party was entered into between the owner and the charterer before it could be known what compensation the owner would become entitled to, whether in respect of freight or demurrage or any other incident of the adventure. I think, therefore, that the verdict for the plaintiff for 801. ought to stand, and the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench upon this point should be affirmed. The next question is, whether the lien extends to the compensation claimed for the detention of the ship after the lapse of ten days on demurrage. Now the words are " freight, dead freight, demurrage, and average; and it seems to me impossible that this claim should come within either of these words. I think, therefore, the judgment below must also be affirmed upon this point. It remains to be considered whether the claim to unliquidated damages for the not having shipped a complete cargo can be claimed as dead freight, and so brought within the lien to which the owner was entitled. Now, inasmuch as we have no means of ascertaining the amount of these damages, except by consent or by verdict of a jury, they cannot be brought within the strict legal meaning of the term "dead freight," which must be a sum ascertained or ascertainable by the charter party itself, as where a complete cargo is agreed to be 1000 tons at a specific sum as 20s. per ton, and therefore the term "dead freight" in this condition must mean the unliquidated damages for not shipping a full cargo, or it has no meaning at all with reference to the whole effect of this charter party. But we often find words in these printed instruments which are so framed and introduced as to be applicable to a great variety of different cases which have no application at all, and therefore no meaning and effect whatever in the particular case in which such a question as this arises. I am far from saying that a different construction is to be put upon words in print and words in writing, but it may be in an instrument of either character, but more especially where it is in a printed form, that a word or term of this description must be read with the implied addition of the words "if any." After all, we are in this case to draw our own inferences as to the meaning of the parties in the use of these words, and if they are doubtful, and there be no evidence on the one side or the other of their bearing a particular meaning among commercial men, we must put such a construction upon them as we think calculated to give effect to the real intention of the parties; and if they are of a doubtful import they should have a reasonable interpretation; and it certainly does not seem reasonable that these parties should have agreed upon a lien like this, the effect of which would be that, whenever the cargo becomes deliverable upon the arrival of the ship it will be impossible for the consignees to satisfy the lien and to obtain possession of their property, unless by agreement between the parties, as to the amount of damages claimed by reason of the deficiency of the cargo, a matter upon which they are very unlikely to agree, or by means of the verdict of a jury or the award of an arbitrator, which might not be obtained for months, or even for years, after the arrival of the vessel. I may add, that if we are to put a strictly literal construction upon these words, a claim to damages by reason of the shipment of a deficient cargo cannot be brought within the true meaning of the word "freight," which imports a sum certain to be paid in respect of the conveyance of goods in a ship, and therefore the term "dead freight," as well observed by Lord Ellenborough, in the case of Phillips v. Rodie (sup.), cannot be properly used as designating the unliquidated damages recoverable by reason of the breach of contract to ship a full and complete cargo. And this view of the question last raised being supported by the case of Pearson v. Goschen, I think the plaintiff cannot be entitled to a lien for a short shipment, as in this case, under the term "dead freight." I have, indeed, great difficulty in understanding how a lien can exist for a sum of money not ascertained at the time when the goods upon which the lien is supposed to attach are deliverable according to the contract, nor capable of being ascertained but by the award of an arbitrator or the verdict of a jury. But since this case was argued we have been informed of the judgment delivered by the House of Lords in a case of McLean v. Fleming (sup.), in which it was held that damages by reason of the shipment of less than a full cargo might be recovered as dead freight, and we are no doubt bound by that decision. In that case, however, the amount of the damages was capable of being at once ascertained, inasmuch as the short shipment was of the specific quantity of 210 tons of [CHAN. bones, the stipulated freight being 358. per ton. This is in the nature of dead freight, strictly so called, and is thus distinguishable from the case now before the court. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Attorneys for the plaintiff, Shum and Crossman. Attorneys for the defendants, Thomas and Hollams. Equity Courts. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Reported by THOMAS BROOKSBANK and E. STEWART ROCHE, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. -- Nov. 15 and 25, 1870. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley). Will-Power-Default of appointment. T. L., by his will, gave the residue of his estate amongst his daughters, and directed that each daughter should have the dividends on her share for her separate use, with power to dispose of the principal among her children; and if any daughter left no child, her share was to fall into the residue. S. G., one of his daughters, by her will, after reciting her father's will, gave the sum of money which she had power over under the will of her father, amongst her children, giving nominal sums to some of them, and giving a specified sum of 60001. Consols to one, on his covenanting to pay the interest to two of his sisters. The testatric then gave certain legacies, and directed her just debts to be paid, and gave the residue of her personal estate and effects to her son, J. E. G. A question arose whether the will of S. G. operated as an appointment of the remainder of the share of T. L.'s estate, or whether it went to her children equally in default of appointment. The question having been brought before the court by a special case, Malins, V.C., decided that J. E. G. took the remainder, either under the appointment by the will as a valid appointment under the power, or as a gift of what became part of the testatrix's estate in default of appointment. Held (reversing the decree of the Vice-Chancellor), that under the first will S. G. had a life interest, with a power of appointment amongst her children, and that, if she did not exercise that power, equity would imply a gift in default. Upon the construction of the will the testatrix did not intend this money to go amongst the residue of her personal estate. It remained unappointed, and could be divided amongst the children. THIS was an appeal from a decree of Malins, V.C., under the following circumstances: Thomas Lewis by his will, executed in May 1816, after reciting that he had a power of disposition over the property of a deceased son, made several pecuniary bequests, and then proceeded: The rest of his (the son's) property to fall into my residuum, or an account kept separate for the same, and both sums, whether consolidated or kept separate, to be equally divided, share and share alike, among all my children who are now or were then living. My will is that a trust fund may be formed as soon as possible, and invest the money as it comes in on the Three per Cent. Consols, in the names of trustees (whom he named). And when the fund accumulates to a sum sufficient to divide 500. to each of my children, my will is, that the same be invested in the Three per Cent. Consols, in the names of each of those of my son George and Mr. William Kirkpatrick, the dividends for each of my children's own use during their respective lives, and if they have a child or children born in wedlock, then the principal to be at the disposal of the parent by will to such child or children; but should either or any of my children die unmarried, or if married have no child or children, or any that does not attain the age of twenty-one years, then my will is that the share of the residuum fund belonging to such of my children who die may revert back into the residuum for the benefit of the survivors; and my will is that my daughter's share of the residuum thus directed to be from time to time invested in the Three per Cents. in each of their names, together with those of my son George and Mr. William Kirkpatrick, be for their sole use and benefit, not subject to the debts or control of any husband they have or may intermarry with, the dividends for their own use, and their own receipts for the same to be a sufficient discharge, with full power to dispose of the principal among any child or children in such shares and proportions as they by a will direct. At the death of the testator there were eight surviving children. Sarah Gray, one of the children, made her will in August 1845, and after reciting her power to dispose by will of her share, proceeded as follows: Now, in exercise of the said power created by the said will, and of every other power enabling me in that behalf, I do by this my will appoint and dispose of the said sum of 70641. 8s. 9d., 31. per Cent. Consolidated Annuities, and all other the trust moneys, stocks, funds, and securities which by any change or changes of investment may be substituted for the same or for any part or parts thereof, and all other the trust moneys, stocks, funds, and securities which may hereafter form part of or be in any way comprised in the share or shares which by virtue of the said will of my said late father I have power to appoint or dispose of, by this my will, among all my said children in the shares and proportions following. The testatrix then gave a legacy of 20l. out of the trust funds to her four daughters, and proceeded as follows: And as to the sum of 60001. 31. per Cent. Consols, further part thereof to my son the said John Edward Gray, he covenanting within one month from the period of the said 60001. being paid to him, that he, his heirs, &c., will pay the dividends thereof to the said Rebecca Gray and B. S. Gray (two of the daughters), under the conditions therein mentioned. The testatrix then gave certain legacies to persons who were not objects of the power, and continued: I direct that all my just debts and funeral and testamentary expenses, and the several pecuniary legacies hereinbefore given, or which I may give by my codicil hereto, shall in the first instance be fully paid, and after payment thereof I give all the residue of my personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, not therein before specifically bequeathed, which shall belong to me at the time of my decease, or which by virtue of any general power I am able to dispose of by this my will, unto my son the said John Edward Gray, his executors, administrators, and assigns. In the court below, the Vice-Chancellor, in deciding in favour of the defendant, said: "Now, on the part of the plaintiff, two objections are made to this will, operating on the residuary portion, that is, the fund ultra the 60001. stock, and 801. sterling. First, it is said that it cannot pass because there is a charge of debts. But that is unimportant, because what is said is all just debts, and funeral and testamentary expenses are, in the first instance to be fully paid.' The meaning of that is, that they are to be paid out of the fund which is applicable to pay them, viz., her own property, over which she had a general power of appointment. These being paid, she had a [CHAN. right to dispose of the rest as she thought fit. In my opinion the first objection fails altogether, and the case of Clogstoun v. Walcott does not apply. The direction as to payment of debts, &c., means that they are to be paid out of the property which is applicable to their payment. The second portion of the will is different, because it says all the residue of her personal estate and effects whatsoever and wheresoever, not thereinbefore specifically bequeathed, which should belong to her at the time of her decease. That means property of her own, or which she was able to dispose of. Now the property in question was property over which she had no general power. The power was a particular power-viz., to appoint to her children. If the words are strictly adhered to, it is clear that these words, over which she had a general power,' would extend the operation of the will. This, in reality, they do. But the difficulty is, you must reconcile every part of the will, if possible. [After referring to the terms of the will down to the bequest of the 201. legacies, the Vice-Chancellor continued:] That is about as clear an intention of giving everything which she had any power over as can well be imagined, and it must be taken that everything passed according to that part of the will. Then as to the shares of the children, two of them are to have 201., and two others 201., the whole family consisting of four daughters and one son; she having expressed a positive intention to give a share to the children of all that she had under her father's will. I can only make the whole of the will consistent by saying that that which was not given to the daughters must be given to the son. The daughters are not to take the 60001. stock, they are to have 801. sterling. The other is not given to the daughters; and inasmuch as it was the intention to give the whole among the children, that which the daughters do not take, I think it necessarily follows the son must, and that I think was the intention of the testatrix. Then, that intention being so clearly expressed by the first part of the will, is there sufficient language in the second part, namely, by the use of the words, over which she has a general power of appointment,' to exclude the son. I think, in order to reconcile the one part of the will with the other, I should rather come to the conclusion, if necessary, that the word 'general' found its way there by some inadvertence, that it was not in accordance with the intention of the testatrix, and that this part of the will shows an intention to give all she could give to the son. But there is another point. The will of the testator, Thomas Lewis, gave the residuary estate among all his children, so that in the first part of the will every child would take an absolute interest. With reference to the daughters in particular, he directs that they shall have it for their separate use for life, with power of disposition among any child or children in such shares or proportions as they by will might direct. does that mean that they are to be tenants for life with remainder to the children? because, if that is the case, the property would go among the children as in default of appointment. I do not think that is the right view of it. The better construction is, that the first part of the will gives the property absolutely, and is cut down only to enable the parents to give it to the children if they think fit. Either the will of Mrs. Gray does exercise the power, or, if not, she herself took her Now, share of the property absolutely, and consequently, if it did not pass by the exercise of the power, it did pass with the residue of her estate, so that in either view of the case I come to that conclusion, and in doing so I am satisfied that I am doing that which is the primary duty of the court, namely, effectuating the intention of the testatrix; because, if the son does not take the property, I am convinced it is opposed to the wishes of the testatrix." The plaintiffs appealed. Cotton, Q. C. and S. P. Butler, in support of the appeal, contended that the will of the testatrix was not a complete exercise of the power of appointment given to her by her father's will, but only an exercise to the extent of the four pecuniary legacies and the 6000l. Consols, and that the residue of the share was divisible among all the children equally. In construing the testatrix's will, it was plain from the context that she was there dealing only with her own property, and not with that over which she had a mere power. C. Hall, for the defendant Gray, contended that the will of Sarah Gray was a complete exercise of the power, and that the defendant, as appointee, was entitled to the residue of the share. Freeling for the trustees. The following cases were cited: Brown v. Higgs 4 Ves. 708,; 5 Ib. 495; 8 Ib. 561; Re Stevens' Will, L. Rep. 6 Eq. 597. The LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley.)-Two points arise in this case. The first is the question, What was the interest of Mrs. Gray under her father's will? Was it an absolute interest defeasible only in the event of her dying without leaving any children at all, or without leaving children who, being sons, should attain the age of twenty-one, or, being daughters, should attain that age or marry; or was it a simple life interest with power to distribute among her children, if children she had, and a gift over in the event of there not being children, so as to bring the case within the doctrine laid down by Maddison v. Andrew and Brown v. Higgs, and that class of cases, in which the duty of exercising the power on behalf of the objects of the power was imposed upon the previous tenant for life, and in the event of the power not being fully exercised the objects thereof took as in default of appointment? And the next question is, assuming her interest to have been for her life only, and that there was a power which she was bound, as in Brown v. Higgs, to execute, or which in default of execution would create an interest in the children, has she, by her will, exercised that power with reference to the whole fund? Now the best way, of course, is to ascertain, first, what is the interest she takes under the will of the father. That will, although not very artistically worded, is sufficiently plain to show that her interest was intended only to be a life interest, with a power to appoint among her children, and in default of her having children (not in default of appointment) a gift over to the collateral members of her family. Therefore, in that view of the case, there being this power to appoint among children, it would, if not exercised, bring the case within the doctrine of Brown v. Higgs, and the children would be taken to be direct objects of the original testator's bounty. I confess, on the will of Thomas Lewis, [CHAN. the Vice-Chancellor seems to me to have come to an extraordinary conclusion, that the lady takes an absolute interest in the property, with a power by will of making this disposition amongst the children, but if the power be not exercised, then that the property falls back to her absolutely. No doubt there may be some colour for that construction upon some authorities, some of which were cited, and others of which were not cited before me, which have gone to this extent, that where you find a child, intended as the object of bounty, and a share described as that child's share, and then a simple settlement for the benefit of that child and her family (especially in the case of daughters) by which, it having been described as the share of the child, the child has a life interest given to it, with remainder to other children, and nothing more is said, then, as in the case of Mayer v. Townsend (3 Beav. 443), it has been held that the absolute interest of the child is not by that means recalled, that the child takes an interest, that the settlement is made in the event of there being children, and, if there be no gift over, the child is considered to be entitled to the whole in the event of there being no grandchildren. The arrangements made have reference to the life interest of the child, and are supposed to be only by way of settlement for the benefit of the child's family, but in the event of there being no settlement required, either by there being no marriage or no children, then the absolute interest which is first conferred by the will remains in the child, and would pass to that child's representatives. There is a case of Brook v. Brook (3 Sm. & Giff. 280) which goes a little further than that. I do not think it was cited, and I refer to it only to show that I have not overlooked it. In that case there was a bequest very much like this in some respects, but different from it in other respects of importance. In that case there was a plain absolute gift to a lady for her separate use part of the property was real estate, if not the whole-and then a power to give among children by will, with no limitation over, and nothing at all pointing to a life interest in the property, but simply this power. The Vice-Chancellor held that the circumstance of the power being given did not bring the case within the doctrine of Brown v. Higgs, and that the power was there given, and would probably be given for the purpose of enabling the lady, when under coverture, to dispose by will of the property, and that the absolute right of the lady to the property was not thereby impeached. But here the case is dif ferent in two particulars, each of them of importance. First, the sum is to be invested, the dividends are to be paid to each of the children's own use during their respective lives, and if they leave a child or children born in wedlock, then the principal to be at the disposal of the parent by will to such child or children. Further, there is a gift over in the event of there being no child or children. It seems to me impossible, upon a will so constituted, to hold that the parent intended more than a tenancy for life with this power to appoint among children, which she was bound, according to the decision of Brown v. Higgs, to execute; and if she did not execute it, the interest would remain vested in the child, and not in the parent, and the case is brought within the doctrine of the cases of Maddison v. Andrew and Brown v. Higgs. Now, coming to the will it self, upon which she proposed to exercise the power, it is satisfactory to find that those who advised her took the above view of her interest. She, by her will, recites the power at full length, and then intimates her desire to dispose of everything that she could take. [The Lord Chancellor then referred to the terms of the will, down to the disposition of the 60001. Consols.] She then makes a complete stop as to the appointment. It is remarkable, of course, that apparently she has not even appointed fully the 70641. Consols that she had, because she has only given about 801. sterling, and 6000l. of stock. She expresses, undoubtedly, the intention to dispose of everything amongst the children; but as far as the actual disposition goes, this is all I find in that portion of the will. Then she proceeds to give various legacies to persons who are not objects of the power, not referring in any way to the power. [The Lord Chancellor then read the remainder of the will.] Now, no doubt one cannot help having one's suspicions whether or not some mistake has not occurred here, but one sees at once it is impossible to supply it, because we can only construe wills by what we find in them, and if we have suspicions that something was intended to be said, they can only be suspicions and conjectures, and we cannot supply that which the testator or testatrix unfortunately has not supplied. To say that she has left something out of the will is the strongest reason for saying that the court cannot attempt to make out that something. The Vice-Chancellor, however, thought he could from this will spell out a gift to the son, John Edward Gray, of the whole remaining balance of this fund, which she had by her father's will power to appoint. I must, of course, notice the reasoning on which the Vice-Chancellor founds his conclusion, to which I am sorry to say I cannot give my assent. [The Lord Chancellor then referred to the judgment of the Vice-Chancellor down to the following words, "that which was not given to the daughters must be given to the son."] Now, that is a part of the reasoning which I cannot adopt. I really cannot conceive why it cannot as easily be said that the only intelligible meaning is that what she has not given to the son must be given to the daughters. I cannot see a reason for selecting one in preference to the other. It might be a more rational interpretation to say that it should be given rateably, but I do not think the authorities will allow me to do so. I cannot do that which the court was invited to do in the case of Maddison v. Andrew, and which it declined to do-namely, take upon itself the duty of disposing of what the testator has not intended to dispose of. That was not an irrational suggestion at the time it was made, but Lord Hardwicke did not think it proper to do So. He thought, if the disposition was not made, the court, acting as trustee, and acting for children, might make an equitable distribution among the children. Reasons were given why he should not give to one of them as much as was given to another, but he did not adopt that view, and the testator, not having disposed of the fund, all the court could do was to give it equally. So in this case, I confess I can see no possible ground on which I can distribute that which the testatrix has not distributed. Although she has expressed the strongest intention to distribute all, she has not distributed all. She may be taken to have been very desirous that the [CHAN. power should be exercised, and very desirous of conforming to the rule laid down in Brown v. Higgs; but if she has not done so, then all the court can say is, that the portion ought to be disposed of amongst the children, and not having been disposed of by her, it will be distributed equally among them all. I think that the whole of the share of Mrs. Gray in the trust fund, except the four legacies of 201. and the 6000l. Consols, was left unappointed by her will, and that the order of the Vice-Chancellor must be reversed. Solicitors: Beechcroft and Thompson. March 15 and 16. Redemption suit-Joint mortgagees in possession for more than twenty years-Trustees Acknowledgment in writing within twenty years of mortgagor's title, but signed by one mortgagee onlyStatute of Limitations (3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27) s. 28. Two joint mortgagees had been for more than twenty years in possession of the mortgaged property. In the deed by which the mortgage was transferred to them, they were described as trustees, and to this deed the mortgagor was a party. A suit to redeem the property was instituted against them by the mortgagor, who relied upon a written acknowledgment of his title, which had been given within twenty years before the filing of the bill. This acknowledgment, however, was signed by one only of the mortgagees, he being the person who had had the active management of the business connected with the trust: Held (affirming a decision of Malins, V.C.) that the acknowledgment not having been signed by both mortgagees, the right of redemption was barred by sect. 28 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27. THIS was an appeal from a decree of Malins, V. C., dismissing the bill in this suit. The bill was filed by a mortgagor against the joint mortgagees for the redemption of the mortgaged property, of which the mortgagees had been in possession for upwards of twenty years before the filing of the bill, but an acknowledgment in writing of the title of the mortgagor had been given within twenty years before the filing of the bill, signed, however, by one only of the mortgagees. The mortgage money belonged to the mortgagees as trustees, and in the deed, executed in the year 1814, by which the mortgage was transferred to them, they were stated to be trustees. The mortgagor joined in this transfer, and thereby covenanted with the trustees for repayment of the mortgage debt. The defendants entered into possession on receipt of the rents of the estate in the year 1845, and they remained in such possession or receipt up to the filing of the bill, which was in 1867. In the year 1854 an acknowledgment in writing of the title of the mortgagor was signed by Wilson, one of the defendants, who acted in the management of the trust. The Vice-Chancellor held that such an acknowledgment was insufficient within sect. 28 of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, to prevent the mortgagor's right of redemption from being barred by lapse of time, and he therefore dismissed the bill. From this decision the plaintiff appealed. Glasse, Q.C. and Freeman, on behalf of the appellant, contended that two or more mortgagees who were trustees were in effect but one mortgagee. They had no separate interests. The acknowledg |