tion was afterwards annulled, and the whole proceeding set aside as unlawful and void, the whole constitutes but one subject of complaint, and entitles the plaintiff to maintain this action. It has been said that any man has a right to petition for an adjudication, and to bring his petition to a court of competent jurisdiction, provided he submits his case to the court truly and fairly. But this was not done by the defendant. He founded his petition upon an alleged act of bankruptcy of the 5th April, being the nonpayment of the debt claimed within seven days of the service of the debtor's summons; and he claimed to support it upon an act of bankruptcy, alleged to have been committed on the 21st April, by reason of the non-execution of the bond on or before the 20th. But whatever may have been the precise form and nature of the entire proceeding, or of any part of it, if the proceeding itself was originally instituted, and afterwards carried on, unlawfully and without reasonable and probable cause, the action lies. Where, before the abolition of arrest on mesne process, a man arrested an alleged debtor without reasonable and probable cause, and proceeded with his action to trial, and even obtained a verdict and judgment, if the judgment and the proceedings from the beginning were set aside, an action for the malicious arrest was maintainable, notwithstanding that the plaintiff in the first action had proceeded to trial, and, as before supposed, had obtained a verdict and judgment. The having commenced an action with an arrest maliciously, and without probable cause, and which at last is held to be not maintainable, is sufficient to entitle the party aggrieved to maintain his action for damages. Å doubt has been suggested, whether the declaration contains a substantive charge that the defendant maliciously, and without probable cause, procured the appointment of a receiver, and caused the property of the plaintiff to be seized; but I think that the charge as alleged is partible, and is, first, that the defendants filed a petition; secondly, caused and procured the plaintiff to be adjudged a bankrupt; and, thirdly, caused his real and personal estate, goods, and effects to be seized and taken from him; and that, therefore, if it were necessary to sever these three complaints, either one or the other, or all, are sufficiently charged. Then, was there evidence of malice? And upon this point it may be enough to say that, as the verdict of the jury established that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause, that alone was evidence from which they were at liberty to infer malice. But there were also a great many facts appearing, almost throughout the trial, which support the verdict of the jury on this question. At the meeting of the 12th April, when the defendant knew that his imperious client was determined to compel the plaintiff, if he could, to admit the debt, it was sworn that the plaintiff offered security for the debt, in case it should be established, upon property in the hands of Sir R. Harvey, to five times the amount of the debt. And though the defendant denied that he had been consulted, or had influenced his client to reject this offer, there was ample evidence for the jury to find this denial untrue, and that he had advised and encouraged Sir R. Harvey to the harsh and severe course which he pursued. It was also for the jury to consider whether, when he introduced into the order the clause requiring [Ex. the plaintiff to execute the bond within seven days, he was not well aware that, if an order with a limitation of time was to be made at all, it should have been for the giving notice of the sureties within the seven days, and not for the execution of the bond. It was this unauthorised requirement, not that the notice of the sureties should be given, but that the bond should be executed by the plaintiff within that time, that afforded him the means of perplexing and misleading the regis trar and the judge of the County Court, when the matter came before them. But it was his extraordinary letters of the 18th and 19th April, which I think afforded the strongest evidence of an unworthy and unjustifiable feeling in the defendant in the proceedings to carry into effect the order of the 12th April. To form a correct judgment upon these letters, it is necessary to consider the position of the parties, and the stage of the proceedings at which they had arrived. The plaintiff had, as so often observed, served the notices in strict conformity to the rule, and they had been received, and he had no more to do but to await an appointment by the registrar, and then to justify his sureties and execute the bond. The defendant, on the other hand, having received the notice, was not called upon, and had no reason or occasion whatever, to write to Mr. Hand at all. He had only to await the appointment to be made by the registrar, and as, by the rule, the notice of the appointment would have called upon him to give notice to the other parties that he should object to the sureties, it was at that time, after receiving the appointment, that whatever objection he might have to the sureties should have been notified to the parties, and made at the meeting to be appointed. What then was his motive for writing to Mr. Hand at all, but still more, for writing to him in the terms of the letter of the 18th? He knew that the seven days expired upon the 20th, and seeing that on the 21st he had petitioned and obtained the appointment of a receiver, and caused the plaintiff's whole property to be seized between twelve o'clock in the day and six in the evening, the jury may well have asked themselves whether he did not intend, when he wrote this letter of the 18th, to execute his purpose, and to take these ruinous steps against the plaintiff on the 21st. And, if he did so intend, what was the course he ought to have pursued? Common humanity would have suggested that, if he wrote at all to the plaintiff, he should have warned him that in two days more the seven days would have elapsed, and that he would be liable to be made a bankrupt. Instead of this, he writes to him a letter, silent as to the approaching lapse of the seven days, and as to any proceedings to be taken on the 21st, but telling him that his sureties would be objected to; of which the natural consequence was that he would look about him for another surety, and thus, thrown off his guard, allow the 20th to elapse without taking any steps to avert the ruinous proceedings of which the defendant had given him no intimation, but against which, if he had been warned, he might possibly have provided. On the other hand, he made no communication to the registrar, to whom any objection to the sureties ought to have been addressed. And might not the jury believe that this was, because any intimation to that effect to the registrar would have called his attention to rule 162, and induced him immediately to make some order which would have enabled himself to make the appointment, and so prevent the proceedings of the 21st? Then we come to the strange and unfounded statement in the letter, that the registrar would not, upon principle, accept an attorney as surety. The registrar proved, beyond all question, that he had never come to any such determination, and, of course, had never authorised any one to say that he had; that, on the contrary, he had expressed his willingness, at the meeting of the 12th, to accept Mr. Hand as surety, and declared upon oath at the trial that he would have accepted him if the meeting had taken place, and he had offered himself, as he had done before. What then is the real secret of this extraordinary statement? The defendant swore that he had been so told by Bullard, and Bullard confirmed him by swearing that he had made that statement. Bullard, therefore, must have stated that which was untrue, even if the defendant had written what he believed to be true; and Bullard neither gave nor attempted to give any explanation whatever of his having made this extraordinary statement. But, considering with attention the whole body of the evidence at the trial concerning Mr. Bullard, that, although he was an officer of the court, and ought to have acted impartially between all litigant parties, he was constantly in communication with Sir R. Harvey and the defendant; that he took upon himself the duties of the registrar; that he proposed himself as receiver, and was readily accepted by the defendant; that he aided and supported the defendant in the cruel and ruinous proceeding of the 21st to seize the whole property, and stop the trade and resources of the plaintiff, and acted throughout, even to the final annulling of the adjudication, first as receiver, and afterwards as trustee of the plaintiff's estate in bankruptcy; and considering also the merciless rapidity with which all these proceedings were hurried on, one after the other, to their completion, and that throughout them all Bullard and the defendant constantly and invariably acted together; might not the jury believe that this tale about the resolution of the registrar not to accept Mr Hand as surety was concerted between them, and that Bullard came forward as a witness at the trial to save the defendant, if he could, from a verdict, by taking upon himself the authorship of this story? I thought much at the trial, and have anxiously considered since, the whole of the evidence bearing upon this part of the case, and I am utterly unable to conceive any motive which could have induced the defendant, even if the statement had really been made to him by Bullard, and he had believed it, to write in those terms to Hand, and to maintain a perfect silence to the registrar, unless that he might prevent Mr. Hand from suspecting the blow which was to fall upon the plaintiff on the 21st, and the registrar from remembering the provisions of the rule which required him to make the appointment. The result was, that neither he nor Mr. Hand had the smallest idea of what was impending; and that the series of proceedings, which accomplished the ruin of the plaintiff, took place without any possibility of opposition or opportunity of resistance. It may be as well to add, in this place, that the mode in which the purposes of the defendant were effected on the 21st April is involved in some degree of mystery. The statute and the rules require, not merely the affidavit of the act of bankruptcy and the petition, but, that before seal [Ex. ing the copies of the petition for service, its statements should be carefully investigated (Rule 32). By whom this was done, or whether it was done, does not appear. Then, under sect. 13, after the presentation of a petition, the court may appoint a receiver, and may direct immediate possession to be taken of the property or business of the bankrupt. We have the affidavit which was used for this purpose, and which merely states that it was important that a receiver should be appointed. Why important, does not appear. By whom this affidavit was considered, and who was the real party granting the order, though it bears the signature of the registrar, again we are not told. The whole of this proceeding took place ex parte; but when we look to rule 50 we find reason to think that notice of this ought to have been given to the plaintiff, so that he might have had the opportunity of showing cause against it; the words of the rule being, that, upon applications of this nature, "in cases in which any other party or parties than the applicant are to be affected by such order, no such order shall be made, unless upon the consent of such person or persons duly shown to the court; or upon proof that notice of the intended motion and copy of the affidavit in support thereof has been served upon the party or parties to be affected thereby four clear days at least before the day named in such notice as the day when such motion is to be made." Nothing of this kind took place; and the proceedings of that day were conducted, from beginning to end, ex parte and unopposed, as before detailed. No point upon this was made at the trial by the learned counsel for the plaintiff; but, when we are considering the question of malice, as well as the nature of the relations subsisting, and the communications which took place, between Bullard and the defendant, it may not be immaterial to observe the mode in which this important part of the proceeding was conducted. It is scarcely necessary, as further evidence of malice, to advert to the harshness and severity with which these proceedings were characterised from beginning to end. I cannot think that there was any want of evidence on this point, or that any intelligent jury could have pronounced any other verdict upon it. I am of opinion also that the personal participation of the defendant, apart from, and independently of, Sir R. Harvey, is evidenced by the writing of the letters of the 18th and 19th April, and by the obtaining of the order to appoint the receiver and the authority to seize the plaintiff's property on the 21st April. There were other circumstances, as to which evidence was given in the course of the trial, which appear to me to have amply justified the verdict of the jury. Upon the grounds, then, that the defendant was perfectly aware that the appli cation to dismiss the debtor's summons upon the 2nd April suspended and stayed the operation of the summons and all proceedings upon it, and that the presenting the petition and the other acts done on the 21st April, and the procuring its adjudication on the 7th May, were unauthorised and unlawful, and that the defendant knew that they were so; I am of opinion that he had no reasonable and probable cause for instituting or carrying them on; and that the jury having found that he was actuated by malice, their verdict is well supported by the evidence, and ought not to be disturbed. The court being thus equally divided, BRAMWELL, B. withdrew his judgment in order to avoid the rule dropping through. The rule, therefore, was discharged, and it was arranged that notice of appeal should be a stay of execution without bail. Rule discharged. Attorney for the plaintiff, Lewis Hand, 22, Coleman-street, E.C. Attorneys for the defendants, Whites, Renard and Floyd, 28, Budge-row, Cannon-street, E.C., agents for Emerson and Sparrow, Norwich. Equity Courts. COURT OF APPEAL IN CHANCERY. Reported by THOMAS BROOKS BANK and E. STEwart Roche, Esqrs., Barristers-at-Law. (Before the LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley.) May 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, and Aug. 2. BETTS v. THOMPSON. Right of common-Suit by freehold tenant against lord of the manor-Right to sue on behalf of freehold tenants of lands formerly demesne of the manor-Misjoinder-Copyholders. A suit for the purpose of establishing a right of common over the wastes of a manor may be sustained on behalf of freehold tenants of lands originally demesne of the manor. Where rights have been exercised from time immemorial, the court is bound, if possible, to find a legal origin for them: Held, that where there were copyholders of the manor as well as freeholders, but none of the copyholders were made parties, a decree could be made in their absence, and that, although there was in fact a misjoinder of plaintiffs, relief could be given, as an amendment might have been ordered at the hearing. THIS was an appeal by the defendant from a decree of the Master of the Rolls. The facts are fully reported 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 427. The suit was instituted against the lord of the manor of Tooting Graveney, in the county of Surrey, by Mr. Betts, who claimed to be a freehold tenant of the manor, and also to be the owner of freehold land within the limits of the manor; and who sued on behalf of himself, and all other owners of freehold lands within the manor who claimed commonable rights, to restrain the lord from interfering with their rights of common, of cutting furze, of digging gravel, and of recreation on Tooting common. The questions raised related to the title of the plaintiff, and the others who claimed as freehold tenants of the manor; and to the right of the plaintiff to sue on behalf of freehold tenants of lands formerly demesne of the manor; and to a case of alleged acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff in an arrangement with the lord respecting the rights of commoners alleged to have been come to in 1865. Jessel, Q.C. and C. T. Simpson, in support of the appeal, maintained that this suit, so far as the class of owners of freehold lands not tenants of the manor, was concerned, was wholly unprecedented. It was incumbent on each such person to prove the existence of the right in his own case. They submitted that the rights of common claimed by the [CHAN. bill never attached to demesne lands, so as to pass with a grant of them, unless mentioned in the conveyance. If they were entitled to any commonable rights, it must be to common appurtenant, and in such case it was incumbent on each member of the class to establish his right separately. Sir R. Palmer, Q.C., Joshua Williams, Q.C. and Whateley, supported the decision of the court below. There was no trace in the court rolls of any copyhold tenement having been enfranchised, and the class in question represented the original grantees of parcels of the demesne of the lord granted to them, together with the commonable rights thereto belonging. They contended that although, being owner of the soil of the waste, the lord could not in strictness claim a right of common in respect of his demesne, inasmuch as during the unity of pos session there would be a merger of the right; yet on his granting away parcels of the demesne the right of common passed with the parcels granted, and the evidence in the case proved that that right had been exercised from time immemorial. That being so, the owners of freehold lands within the manor had such a community of interest as would entitle them to maintain the present suit. The following cases were cited: Arundel v. Lord Falmouth, 2 Mau. & Sel. 440; Smith v. Earl Brownlow, 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 739; Warrick v. Queen's College Oxford, 23 L. T. Rep. N.S. Thompson v. Waterlow, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 545; Langley v. Hammond, 19 L. T. Rep. N. S. 858; Watts v. Kelson, 24 L. T. Rep. N. S. 209; L. Rep. 6 Drury v. Moore, 1 Stark. 102; Delacherois v. Delacherois, 10 L. T. Rep. N. S. 884; 11 H. of L. Cas. 62; Pollock v. Lester, 11 Hare, 274; Blewitt v. Tregonning, 3 Add. & Ell. 554; The LORD CHANCELLOR (Hatherley).-The greater part of this case stands in the same position as the case which I have just disposed of, Warrick v. Queen's College, Oxford (ante 254), but there are several not unimportant distinctions with reference to the frame of the suit, and with reference to what has taken place between the plaintiff and the defendant, with regard to an attempted arrangement, which seems to have fallen through. In this case the court rolls go further back than in the former case, for they go back as far as A.D. 1300. I think the plaintiff has made out the extent of interest which it is necessary for him to have in what I may call a right existing in the freeholders. I give the same reasons as I gave in the former case for holding that you must find a legal origin for rights so constantly asserted. He has made out a right upon different parts of the common, including in this case a certain right which is, perhaps, a little too strongly expressed in the decree, namely, a right of digging gravel and sand for certain purposes connected with the tenancies. Those rights are made out by the extracts in this book, which contains various entries, showing what did not exist in the other case, namely, the existence of a considerable quantity of lands ordinarily called lammas lands, or something of that description, held in severalty during a part of the year, and at other times forming part of the common. It is not altogether unimportant to mention that there are copyholds of this ancient manor of Tooting. A controversy is raised as to the title of the plaintiff to be a freeholder at all, but I think it is clearly made out that Mr. Betts is a freeholder, or, in other words, the owner of an ancient freehold of this manor to a considerable extent. On the court rolls, as far as the paper title goes, there is evidence of the pasture of cattle, the carrying away of gravel, and the several other commonable rights which are referred to in the decree which I have before me. The Master of the Rolls, however, has put it "and repairs of lands, houses, and gardens within their tenements;" I prefer, in that respect, leaving it "for necessary consumption on their said lands and houses," without mentioning anything about the gardens, of which I do not find any specific mention in the court rolls. That these things were done from very ancient times on behalf of freeholders, I think is abundantly proved from the entries in this book, subject to the same difficulty which existed in the other case, that "inhabitants' are mentioned, and sometimes "residents," and other words of that kind-"parishioners" are brought in in the same way—but I hold it to be all reducible, in substance, to the original prescriptive grant to the freeholder, which may afterwards have branched out from a variety of circumstances to the tenants of the freeholders exercising the rights which the freeholders possessed, and that having become by degrees something which assumed a more definite shape than if the parishioners themselves claimed any title. We must assign a legal title if it can be shown, and it will not be worse by the fact that other persons have to a certain degree been mixed up in those rights which have been exercised by those freeholders. With the exception that here there is the fact of copyholders introduced, the two cases are alike in that respect. That will easily blend with the strong objections raised by Mr. Jessel, I am bound to say with a great deal of reason, to the frame of the suit, which I shall deal with as one of the principal questions in the case, the other principal question being the alleged compromise. I must confess that the suit is framed in a very singular way. The bill is stated to be by Mr. Betts" on behalf of himself and all other the freehold tenants of the manor of Tooting Graveney, in the county of Surrey, and all other persons being owners of freehold lands and tenements within the ambit or former ambit of the said manor, entitled to the commonable and other rights hereinafter mentioned, except the defendant hereto." I am bound to say that I never saw a suit so framed as this is, but, unless I were absolutely precluded from acting in this suit by the fixed rules and the course of practice of this court, it would clearly be a lamentable thing, when an expensive litigation of this kind had been entered into, if the plaintiff had any right at all which he could sustain, to turn him round upon a mere point of form, and say, "The result of all this must be that your bill shall be dismissed upon the present occasion, but without prejudice to your recommencing, and, in a more correct way, framing your bill." I do not think it necessary to come to that conclusion. Under the new regulations with respect to pleadings, according to the Act for improving our mode [CHAN. of procedure I think we have really arrived at a point at which, in administering justice, we ought to arrive, namely, that every case brought before the court should be determined upon its merits, and that the parties should not be allowed to go away simply with the barren declaration that the form in which they instituted their suit was incorrect, and all the expense incurred on that account was thrown away. It appears to me that the view taken by the Master of the Rolls in this case may be justified. The Master of the Rolls dealt with it in this way-True it is I have a person here, suing on behalf of himself and a number of other persons who I do not think have any rights at all. Is that, after all, more than a misjoinder? Are you not at liberty to say you have brought persons here as co-plaintiffs with you, and you have joined with them in stating a case, and alleging that they are persons interested, but it turns out that they have no interest whatever in the subject matter of the suit? Is it not exactly the same in every case of misjoinder? Certain people sue as plaintiffs, but it may be that you have not averred anything with respect to them in the bill. You show that it is a mere mistake, and that there are others who do not take any interest. Suppose A. and B. joined in a suit, in which A. averred that he and B. were interested, and it turned out that A. had the whole interest, and B. had none; in that case can you say there was anything otherwise than a misjoinder, and that A. could not succeed simply on account of there being nothing to make out that he and B. together had any title? How does this case in substance differ from the point raised in the case of Salter v. Lord Gordon, which was decided a long time ago in the House of Lords. namely, whether or not a receiver had an interest in a suit? It was held that he has not, and that you have no right to join a receiver with another person as co-plaintiff in a suit. Suppose you do not join a receiver as co-plaintiff, and aver nothing except that he is receiver, the joining of the receiver is wrong, and of course the result would be that the bill would be dismissed at the hearing, Happily the Legislature has interfered, and says that no such bill shall be dismissed at the hearing but that the court shall make a decree which can be sustained by the person who has an interest. Does it make any difference that you had or had not averred that the receiver had or had not an interest? Averring it is of no use, unless you show that he has an interest in law. What has happened in the present case is that this gentleman has joined with himself some people who have no interest at all, and suing on their behalf, he has averred that they have an interest. It turns out that they have none, but that he has. In that state of things the Master of the Rolls was quite right in saying, that he might, if he liked, have ordered the bill to be amended at the hearing, subject to any question with regard to the expenses which have been incurred by adding persons who ought not to have been added. Mr. Jessel's distinction is this, Here you make yourself the representative of the whole body; you ought to have some decree at all events; you call this a bill of peace, and you bring your bill in order to quiet the title; therefore what is wanted is, to have the title quieted and ascertained. How do you quiet that? By bringing a bill of peace. You say you will act on behalf of other persons interested, alleging that you have got a or title. It turns out that no title is shown on their behalf, and, consequently, the lord has no decree against them, because they are simply treated as nonentities, and may may not be barred by a subsequent suit. I do not think that that in reality amounts to anything, because the same might be said in every case of misjoinder. It might be said you have badly averred B.'s title; B. may have a very good title, but you have not put it properly in issue, and, not having done so, the court does not deal with it at all; it passes it by under the statute, taking no notice of it at all; it directs that decree which you are entitled to. Of course that other person being dealt with in that way, might hereafter, by a better title than he has shown here, make out that he has got a right, and, on making out that right by a different title from anything which has yet been shown, proceed to bring his own suit. So here from these persons we have got all the evidence that affects the plaintiff's rights. Here the court is of opinion, upon that evidence, that the right of the freeholders is made out, but is not of opinion that any title is made on the part of the inhabitants, who, if they hereafter can make out another and a better title by evidence which they can produce in another proceeding, may have an opportunity of bringing that suit. Undoubtedly I feel pressed with the difficulty, but I do not feel so pressed as to be obliged to say, that a freeholder coming into this court, and bringing with himself other persons, can be turned round upon a mere point of form because he has alleged that he, as a freeholder, has certain rights, and the other persons whom he has joined with him have also those rights, whereas it turns out that, although he has the rights, the other persons whom he has joined with him have not the rights which he has stated upon the face of his bill that they have, but which the whole of the evidence shows to be wrong. The other objection as to the copyholders not being before the court, I think, only amounts to an objection with reference to the obscurity of the evidence about the inhabitants, residents, and the like, on the court rolls-that is to say, it does appear that there are other persons who have claimed to exercise, and have exercised to a certain extent, rights together with the plaintiff. As regards the inhabitants, from anything that appears in the court rolls, those rights, such as they were, were exercised simply by the freeholder allowing a concurrence or joining of the rights of other persons with his own, without taking any steps to prevent it; and therefore he subjected himself to the difficulty of having his rights mixed up with the rights of others without depriving himself of his rights. I here refer to copyholders. A copyholder has rights together with the freeholders over this waste, but I apprehend that when a person comes here to assert a common right against another person who is a wrongdoer as regards them, he is not obliged to bring everybody who has a similar right, though under a different title, to join with him in a suit as against a wrongdoer; although he may if he pleases so join them. I apprehend it would be perfectly consistent with the proper framing of the suit if these copyholders had been joined, supposing always that the extent of their rights is exactly co-extensive with that of the freeholders. I mean, in other words, this-the copyholders might be possessed of a cus [CHAN. tom which the freeholders might by prescription be entitled to. If the freeholder, on the one hand, is possessed of identically the same rights, which the copyholder on the other hand is possessed of, I think they might well join in a suit against the lord if he should attempt to exclude them. It may appear that the freeholder is not obliged to join them because they have a particular right of their own which the lord has sought to exclude them from the exercise of; or they may not be able to join with them others who have a similar right; but they have the right to sustain a suit against the lord, who is the common enemy of the freeholders, while he may also be the common enemy of the copyholders, taken as a distinct class or body. I take it that a wrongdoer has no right to complain of this, and to say, "Well, I am injuring a certain class of persons claiming under one right, I am injuring another set of persons claiming exactly the same thing under a different right; you shall not attempt to sue me unless you bring all the persons together to sue me at once, although the origin of their rights be different." Take, for instance, this sort of case: Supposing that an ordinary landlord had granted out a quantity of land, introducing certain rights in every grant, and introducing a multiplicity of persons; if he attempted to destroy or interfere with the right of the whole body, this court would allow those persons to bring their suit for the purpose of protecting their right. A bill might be filed on behalf of the whole multitude of persons who are thus interested. But, supposing at the same time that he had granted privileges subordinate to those which he had granted to the original grantees, and, by some act of wrongdoing, interfered with the exercise of those privileges which both parties had an equal right to, I apprehend the first set of lessees whom I have described, and the second set of grantees or lessees might, if they please, join together to redress the common grievance by filing a common bill. I think one large class would be entitled to stand on their right to redress a common grievance, together with another large class. It is just like the illustration which I gave in the case of Warrick v. The Queen's College, Oxford three classes of shareholders in a company who have all got common rights as against a director, who is a wrongdoer, but who are differently affected by the violation of their rights. Each one of the set might file his bill to obtain redress in respect of the violation of his rights, or the whole set, as soon as their common right was invaded by some act of spoliation or declaration against their property, might all join or concur together, if they were so minded, in a common suit against the wrongdoer. This seems to me to be the position in which this case now stands. Here is a freeholder who has made out his title to particular rights of common, but he has asserted certain rights on behalf of other persons who are not freeholders of the manor, and who have not shown any title to exercise those rights. I think, therefore, I can treat them as persons who have been improperly joined as parties with the plaintiff in the suit. Then as regards the copyholders, I may point out that a copyholder may have, and probably has, in most, if not in all cases, the same rights that the plaintiff has. He is standing upon a right having a different origin; he represents all those who like himself stand upon their rights |