statute 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1. That enactment creates a new offence, one which did not exist at common law. It does not say that the offence shall be a felony, and the indictment is bad for using the word "feloniously." [LUSH, J. If the offence

created by 31 & 32 Vict. c. 116, s. 1 is not a felony what is it?] There are offences of stealing which are not felonies, such as dog stealing, and unless the statute makes the stealing a felony, the introduction of the word " feloniously" which is a term of art (Reg. v. Gray, 9 Cox C. C. 417; L. & C. 365) vitiates the indictment. [LUSH, J.-The 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 3 says, that a bailee fraudulently converting property “ shall be guilty of larceny"this statute says that a partner who shall steal property of the co-partnership "shall be dealt with and tried, and convicted and punished as if he was not a partner."] The indictment should have been for a common law larceny.

66

Reg. v. Jesse Smith, 39 L. J. 112, M. C.; 11 Cox
Č. C. 511.

The judgment of Willes, J. was also referred to.
Addison for the prosecution, was not called upon.
KELLY, C. B.—The objection to the indictment is
really not arguable. The statute expressly enacts
that a partner who steals property of the co-
partnership" shall be liable to be dealt with, tried,
convicted, and punished as if such person had not
been, or was not a member of the co-partnership."
That is what has been done in this case.
The rest of the Court concurring,

Conviction affirmed.

Saturday, Nov. 11, 1871.

(Before KELLY, C.B., BYLES, J., PIGOT, B., Lush, J., and HANNEN, J.)

REG. v. JAMES KING.

Larceny Property--Evidence. Prisoner was charged with stealing a mare, the property of E. The evidence was that prosecutor, in presence of the prisoner, agreed to buy of W. a mare for 51., and that W. assented to take a cheque for the 51. The prosecutor afterwards sent prisoner to W. with the cheque, and directions to take the mare to Bramshot Farm. On the next day prisoner sold a mare to S., which he said he had bought for 51. Before the magistrate he said he sold the mare to S., with the intention of giving the money to E., but that he got drunk:

Held, that that was sufficient evidence on which a jury might find that the mare sold to S. was the property of E.

CASE reserved for the decision of this Court at the General Quarter Session of the peace for the county of Surrey on Tuesday, the 17th Oct. 1871.

James King was tried on an indictment charging him with feloniously stealing a mare, of the property of William Ellis, upon the following evidence. William Ellis, of 92, West-street, Bermondsey, corn sampler, on his oath said:

On Friday, 22nd Sept., I saw the prisoner on the Corn Market, in Mark-lane. He told me that he knew where there was a good-bred mare for sale, which would suit the purpose I wanted for breeding. I went to the place, Wilkinson's, St. Mary Axe, and saw the owner of the mare. I agreed to purchase the mare for 5l. Prisoner was present. Prisoner came back with me to Mark lane. I had previously asked Wilkinson if he would take my master's cheque, and he said he would. I gave the prisoner my master's cheque for 5l. He was to give the cheque for the mare, and take the mare to my father's farm. I told him the direction

[C. CAS. R.

on a paper, "Thomas Ellis, Bramshot Farm." Prisoner left me with the cheque. I did not see him till Monday following. On Tuesday the 26th I went to Winkley and Shaw, Green-street, Blackfriars, horse slaughterers. I gave information to the police at Stones End. I found this mare at Winkley and Shaw's. On the following day Shaw gave me this mare. On the evening before I saw the prisoner in custody. I did not give the prisoner any authority to go to Winkley and Shaw. The mare was suffering from an injury; she went slightly lame. Cross-examined:

I don't think that I should have blamed him if he had found the horse lame and he had brought back the cheque or the money. I knew him two or three months before this transaction. I was told he came to my house on the Tuesday. On the 26th Sept., in the evening, I went with two detectives to the prisoner's house. When I saw the mare at Winkley and Shaw's she did not go more lame.

Re-examined:

I did not give the prisoner any authority to sell the mare to the horse slaughterer. He never told me what he had done with the mare, nor did he give me any money. George William Shaw, on his oath, said:

I am the firm of Winkley and Shaw. I am a horse slaughterer. I have known the prisoner some time. On a Saturday afternoon in September he brought a horse to my place. The horse was very lame and had a very large wound. He said he bought it on speculation, and found it to be useless. I purchased it. I think he said that he had given 5. for the horse. He asked me to give the most I could for it. I gave him 4. This was on the 23rd Sept., Saturday. On Tuesday following, the 27th, prosecutor called on me. I offered to give up the horse. The horse was taken to the police court. The prisoner was quite sober at the time he sold the horse.

Cross-examined:

I have known him for several years. I believe him to be honest in his position. I have had transactions with him before, He made some remark that he was afraid the society would be at him for taking such a horse about the streets.

Robert Pether, detective M, on his oath, said:

On Sept. 26 I took prisoner into custody. I said I wanted him for stealing a horse. He said he got drunk, met with an accident, and sold the horse to Shaw for 4l. 1s.

Cross-examined:

I have known the prisoner for years; he is a respectable man.

The prisoner's statement before the committing magistrate was read as follows:

I plead guilty. I found she was too injured, and sold her to Mr. Shaw with the intention of giving the money to Mr. Ellis, but unfortunately I got drunk.

The prisoner's counsel contended that there was not sufficient proof of the indictment; that there was no proof that the prisoner had got the mare from Wilkinson's in exchange for the cheque; and that it was not proved that the mare in question ever became the property of William Ellis.

The court, however, left the case to the jury, but reserved the question for the decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, whether there was sufficient proof that the mare was the property of William Ellis.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the court respited judgment until the decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved.

E. RICHARDS ADAMS, Chairman. Horace Browne for the prisoner.-The indictment charges the prisoner with stealing a mare, the property of William Ellis, but the evidence does not support that allegation. There was no proof that the mare which Ellis saw and contracted for was the same as that which the prisoner took

HOMERTON AND ANOTHER v. HEWETT. Will not forthcoming-Presumption of revocation -Dependent relative revocation.

A testator executed his will at his solicitor's office, and took it away with him. It was never seen afterwards, and could not be found after his death in his repositories. He had made declarations inconsistent with his testamentary depositions shortly before his death, but the court held that he being the last custodian of the will, and it not being forthcoming, the presumption of revocation arose and was not rebutted.

The court will not apply the principle of dependent relative revocation except there is proof of the actual destruction of the instrument.

JOHN HARRUP HOMERTON, late of Henley, in the county of Oxford, died Jan. 1871. He had been for forty years apothecary of St. George's Hospital, Hyde Park Corner. In 1866 he retired on a pension of 2001. a year. On 21st June, 1870, he duly executed a will by which he bequeathed to the hospital a sum of money equal to the aggregate amount of pension which he should have received from the hospital, and after several other legacies he appointed his nephew, Mr. Prescott Hewett, his residuary legatee, and he revoked all other wills.

After his death his will could not be found. The executor and the residuary legatee had been cited by the next of kin to propound a draft in the custody of the deceased's solicitors, but declined, and the draft was now propounded by the defendant, who is the Treasurer of St. George's Hospital. The case was tried by the court without a jury, and, in support of the presumption of revocation, it was proved that the will was executed at the deceased's solicitors', that after the execution it was put into an envelope and handed to him, and that he carried it away with him. Evidence was also given of a careful and complete search through all his repositories after his death, including a drawer in which he usually kept his papers, and in which were found some old testamentary papers, mortgages, &c., and the key of which he always kept under his pillow. A niece who was with him during his last illness deposed to a conversation with him the day before his death, in which he stated that he had left all his property to an elder brother for life, and that after his death it was to be divided among all his relations. A disposition of this character had been made by a revoked codicil of March 1867. On the other hand,

[PROB.

a conversation with another niece, in Dec. 1870, was proved, in which he spoke of the bequest to the hospital; and a memorandum was produced, purporting to be a second codicil to a will of July, 1870, which was not found.

Dr. Spinks, Q.C. and Inderwick, for the trustees of the hospital.

Dr. Deane, Q.C., and Dr. Tristram, for the plaintiff, cited

Powell v. Powell, 35 L. J. 100, P. & M.; 13 L. T. Rep.
N.S. 566;

In the goods of Weston, 38 L. J. 53, P. & M.; 20 L. T.
Rep. N.S. 330.

H. T. Cole, Q.C. and Beresford, for the heir-atlaw.

Lord PENZANCE.-The testator in this case executed a will in June 1870, and that will is not forthcoming. Those who were with him in his house when he died have searched his repositories and did not find any such will. The attorney who made it knows nothing of it; all the places where it was likely to be found have been searched, and it is not to be found. Thereupon, those interested in an intestacy relying upon the presumption assert that it was revoked by the deceased himself, destroyed by him animo revocandi. Whether it was so or not is the question. I have on many former occasions said that this presumption of law is one which often operates harshly and unjustly when it has to be applied to the various cases which arise. Though the presumption always arises, it is always open to be rebutted; but, though open to be rebutted, it is always to be drawn when the facts properly give rise to it. It would be a great misfortune if the court were to say anything to weaken the force or reason of that presumption, or to shrink from applying the rule of law in its fulness because of the consequences which may ensue in its working out and application. The first question is, what is the presumption and what are the circumstances necessary to be proved in order to raise it? I have before me the case of Brown v. Brown, which was decided in the Queen's Bench (8 Ell. & Bl. 881). In that case the testator executed two wills, the second containing a clause revoking the first. When the second will was executed, it was put into an envelope and given to the testator, and he took it away, saying that he should leave it at his bankers. But nobody ever saw it, and after his death it never could be found. In that case Lord Campbell said, "the evidence leaves no doubt on my mind. After execution, the will was delivered to the testator, and it is never seen in any other custody. The testator said he should take it to his banker's, but he never did so, and on his death, though it has been searched for, it has never been found. It must, therefore, be considered as destroyed, and I think the presumption is that the testator destroyed it." That is a reasonable presumption, as he had the last custody of it and it is not forthcoming. Whether this is a presumption of fact or a presumption of law, liable to be rebutted, is not material. These facts give rise to a presumption shifting the onus of proof. As early as 1754, in Helyar v. Helyar (1 Lee, 472), we find a great judge, Sir George Lee, laying down these principles, and acting on them, nor have they ever been doubted since. In Welch v. Phillips (1 Moore, P. C. 299), another very great judge, Lord Wensleydale lays down the principle that this is a presumption of fact to prevail unless rebutted, and the same doctrine is laid down in Cutto v. Gilbert (9 Moore,

P.C.131), by Dr. Lushington, than whom no one has had more experience in such cases." There is a definite statement of the presumption of law, and the grounds on which it is raised. The facts coincide very much with this case. A will is executed and delivered to the testator-it is never seen afterwards. It is never shown to have been out of his possession. As Lord Campbell says, he had the last custody of it. It seems to me unnecessary, in order to raise this presumption, to show that the will was kept in some particular place where the testator could destroy it. It is enough to show that he had possession of it, unless it can be shown that it was in some place where he could not get at it to destroy it. That being so, is the case also open to the presumption that the will was destroyed animo revocandi? This same case of Brown v. Brown is also an authority for this second proposition. It has been shown that the repositories of the deceased were carefully searched, and on the whole it seems to me that I am bound to hold that the presumption arises that the will was destroyed by the testator animo revcoandi. Then comes the question, is it rebutted, as it is open to be rebutted, by evidence in the case? The conversation with Mrs. Hewitt negatives the presumption that it was destroyed up to December; but then comes the conversation with Mrs. Hewitt on the Sunday before he died, to the effect that he had left everything to his brother Thomas for life, and after his death his property was to be divided among all his relations. But first it is said that would be very improbable, because nothing had occurred to change his determination. By a former codicil he had benefited his brother, but his brother was SO many years his senior that when he made his testamentary dispositions in 1868 and 1870 it may be that he assumed he would not survive him. On the other hand it may be that when he found himself so ill in December 1870 he altered his mind, and desired somehow to revive the former codicil in his brother's favour. Whether he had actually made some disposition to benefit his brother, or not correctly apprehending the legal effect of what had passed before, he thought the original disposition in his brother's favour had been revived, or whether he chose to make the statement with some collateral object, I cannot say. But the statement amounts to this, that he did not consider the will of 1870 in force, and so far as it goes it is a statement or declaration by deceased, not rebutting the presumption of law. If that is so is there any other declaration rebutting the presumption? Is the will shown to be in existence later than 13th Dec.? Is there any single fact which the court can lay hold of to destroy the legal effect of that presumption? But then it is said that if this will has been destroyed it was for the purpose of setting up the codicil, and the case therefore comes within the principle of dependent relative revocation. But the force of that is destroyed by this remark, that the court has never been in the habit of applying that doctrine to any case in which there was not proof of the destruction of the document. Here there is no proof of the fact of destruction. It is merely a surmise of law, and we do not know when the testator destroyed it, or what he said or did when he destroyed it. It would be a dangerous thing to surmise a transaction, and build upon it some theory by which the effect of revocation could practically be destroyed. In both the cases cited there was evidence of

[PROB.

destruction, and in all cases before it applies the principle of dependent relative revocation the court must have some such evidence. The court therefore is bound to pronounce against the will, but there will be no order as to costs.

Attorney for plaintiff, Bell.

Attorneys for defendant, Palmer and Co.
Attorneys for heir-at-law, Few and Co.

Tuesday, Jan. 16.

In the Goods of SIDEBOTTOM. Will-Residuary bequest - Substituted trust Failure of first trust when ascertained.

One

A testator left his residue in trust to his two brothers for the benefit of any children living at the time of his death or born within due time after, with a gift over to two brothers on the failure of such trust being ascertained. There was no child living at the time of the testator's death, and it turned out that the widow was not enceinte. of the brothers died a fortnight after the testator. The court held that the failure of the first trust was ascertained at the death of the testator, and granted administration of his estate with the will annexed to the executors of the deceased trustee, the survivor having renounced.

THOMAS HADFIELD SIDEBOTTOM, late of Staley, in the county of Chester, died 30th Jan. 1871, having duly executed a will dated 5th Nov. 1870, of which he appointed his brothers Walter and James Sidebottom, executors. The will contained the following residuary clause:

As to the rest of my real and personal property whatsoever, which may belong to me at the time of my death, I devise the same to my brothers Walter and James, upon trust for such child or children of mine as may be living at the time of my death, or may be born within due time afterwards, in equal shares on attaining the age of twenty-one, and in case of the failure of such trusts upon trust for such of my said brothers as may be living at the time of the failure of the said trust being ascertained.

Testator left no children, and it turned out that his wife was not enceinte. James Sidebottom survived his brother, but died within a fortnight after him, on 14th Feb. 1871, leaving a will of which his wife Margaret Sidebottom, and Otho Hulme were the executors. The question was whether his share in his brother's residue vested in him. The other executor and residuary legatee renounced, and

C. A. Middleton now moved that a grant of administration, with the will annexed, of the estate of T. H. Sidebottom, be made to Margaret Sidebottom and Otho Hulme, the executors of James Sidebottom. He submitted that the gift over vested at the death of the testator, because it was then ascertained that the trust had failed. It might not be known to all the world when the testator died, that the widow was not enceinte, but it "made certain that she was not at that moment, and this, he contended, was the primary meaning of the word ascertained. If "ascertained" meant that somebody must know it, who was that person to be? No one had been named in the will. Suppose the testator had had a son, and he had lived till the age of 18 years, and then gone abroad and died there. The fact might not have been known here for ten years, and yet it could not be said that the legacy did not exist at the moment of

was

Div.]

his death, and not at the time when his death became known here. He cited 1 Jarm. Wills, 797, 3rd edit.

Lord PENZANCE.-I think the case is strong enough to warrant the court in making the grant. If, as is truly said, ascertained is used in reference to knowledge, it must be to the knowledge of somebody. The knowledge of everybody would not coincide. It must be to the knowledge of some individual, but no individual is named, nor can any individual be predicated whose knowledge would be the turning-point. The argument drawn from the other branch of probabilities or possibilities also inclines in the same direction. Suppose a child had been born, and lived for some years, and then died under 21, the same set of questions would arise-are you to wait until the death is known to everybody, or to what individual is it to be known? Therefore, it seems to me that the only reasonable way of dealing with the case is to ascribe to the word ascertained the meaning which the learned counsel has put on it. The grant may go as prayed.

Proctor, Ayrton.

COURT FOR DIVORCE AND MATRIMONIAL CAUSES. Reported by W. LEYCESTER, Esq., Barrister-at-Law.

Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1871.

(Before LORD PENZANCE, J.O.)
LOUIS v. Louis.

Judicial separation-Permanent alimony-Increase of husband's faculties-Motion for increase of alimony-Notice to husband's solicitors--Order for payment of arrears.

A wife, who had obtained an order for permanent alimony on a decree of judicial separation being pronounced, applied for an increase, on the ground that the husband's faculties had increased. The husband being absent in India, notice of motion was served on the solicitor who had acted for him in the suit. The court

Held this notice to be insufficient, and declined to make the order.

Application was also made for an order on the husband to pay up the arrears of alimony, and, on the representation that the India Office would enforce it in some way on the husband, who was an officer in the Indian army, the court made the order as prayed.

In this case the wife obtained, in 1864,'a decree of udicial separation from her husband, and an allotjment of permanent alimony was then made to her by the court. No alimony, however, was paid to the petitioner after 1866, and the respondent, who was at the time of the allotment a captain in a regiment of Her Majesty's Indian army, was on the 8th Oct last gazetted a major.

Poulter, on behalf of the petitioner, now moved the court to order an increase of alimony in proportion to the higher rate of pay obtained by the respondent since his promotion. He stated that no notice of this motion had been served personally on the respondent, but that the attorneys who acted for him in the suit had been informed that this application would be made.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-The court cannot make any order of this kind behind the husband's back. It is not as if the suit were going on; possibly all

[Div.

connection between the husband and his solicitor may have ceased. Before any order can be made there must be service on some of the husband's relations in this country.

Poulter asked for an order on the husband to pay up the arrears, amounting to 6301.

Lord PENZANCE.-You have an order already for the payment of alimony. What advantage can you gain from a further order?

Poulter. The India Office, it is thought, may take some steps to enforce it if the court makes an order naming the sum due.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-If a further order is of any service to you, you may take it. Solicitor, Hendriks.

Tuesday, Nov. 21, 1871.
(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.)
AUSTIN v. AUSTIN.

Matrimonial suit-Wife's petition-Cruelty-Appli-
cation to add new charges refused.
Cruelty is a matrimonial offence which must essen-
tially be within the wife's knowledge when she files
her petition, and the court, therefore, will not
allow her to add new charges to her petition except
under very special circumstances.

THIS was a wife's suit for judicial separation on the ground of her husband's cruelty. The petition was filed on Nov. 20, 1870, and on Jan. 12, 1871, the respondent filed an answer denying the cruelty. The cause was set down for hearing at the last sittings, but on the application of the wife it was postponed. It stood now for hearing in the list for the present sittings.

Inderwick now moved on behalf of the petitioner to amend the petition by adding new charges of cruelty, and relied on an affidavit setting out that the wife had been precluded by her bad state of health from instructing her solicitor to include these charges in her criginal petition.

Searle for the respondent, contra.

Lord PENZANCE, J.O.-It would be a bad practice for the court to allow a wife to add fresh charges of cruelty except under very special circumstances. Cruelty is essentially a matter which must be within the knowledge of the wife when she files her petition, and she ought to make her charge once for all. The motion is rejected.

Attorney for petitioner, Lewis Hand.
Attorneys for respondent, Moncklin and Co.

Friday, Nov. 24, 1871.

(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.)
JONES v. JONES.

Matrimonial suit-Wife's costs refused-Appeal-
Security for costs of.

In a suit for judicial separation, the wife failed to establish a charge of incestuous adultery which she had brought against her husband, and the court refused to allow her the costs of the hearing, although security for them had been given in the registry. Subsequently, in chambers, an application was refused to cancel the bond given for costs, and the husband was ordered to find security for further costs to enable the wife to prosecute her appeal against the dismissal of her petition.

THIS was a wife's petition for judicial separation on

Div.]

[Div.

the ground of her husband's incestuous adultery with a niece. The husband denied the adultery. The case was tried before the Judge Ordinary without a jury, and after hearing evidence on both sides, the court found the issues in favour of the husband, and dismissed the petition.

Searle, for the wife, applied for an order that she might have the costs paid to her for which the husband had given security in the registry.

Dr. Spinks, Q.C., and Finney for the husband, contra.

a

Lord PENZANCE, J. O.-I think this was trumped-up charge on the part of the wife; and it is just one of those cases where the court ought to refuse to give costs. There will be no order, therefore, as to costs.

Notice of appeal having been given, application was made in chambers on behalf of the husband that the bond which had been given to secure the wife's costs might be cancelled; but the Judge Ordinary refused to make the order, on the ground that an appeal was pending.

Searle, on behalf of the wife, asked that the husband should be ordered to give security for the wife's costs in prosecuting the appeal, and the court made the order as prayed.

Solicitor for petitioner, Crosse.
Solicitor for respondent, G. P. Lockner.

Tuesday, Dec. 19, 1871.

(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.)
KEANE V. KEANE.

Restitution suit-No answer of respondent-Case tried out of its turn-No notice to respondent— Rehearing-Rules 50 and 116.

In a suit for restitution the wife filed no answer. On the application of the husband the case was tried out of its turn as an undefended cause, with out any notice being given to the wife, and a decree pronounced in his favour.

The wife subsequently applied for a rehearing on an affidavit, which disclosed a substantial defence to the suit, and the court, on the technical ground of want of notice, reversed the decree, and directed the case to be reheard.

THIS was a husband's suit for restitution of con

jugal rights. The citation was served on the respondent on 21st Sept. She entered an appearance but filed no answer. On 21st Oct. directions were taken as to the mode of trial, and on 27th Oct. the cause was set down for trial, and due notice of both these steps was served on the respondent's attorney at the address given by her in the registry. On 7th Nov. an application was made that the case (being a suit for restitution) should be tried out of its turn. No notice of this was given to the respondent, and on 24th Nov. the case was tried, and a decree pronounced ordering

the wife to return to cohabitation.

Dr. Spinks now moved, on behalf of the wife, for a rehearing of the suit, and relied on an affidavit made by her, in which she set out that she had a substantial defence on the merits, and that it was Owing to a misapprehension that the solicitor whom she had consulted had not taken the necessary steps for her. By the 50th and 116th Rules, the wife was entitled to notice that the trial was coming on, for though she had filed no answer, she Vol. XXV., N.S., 63).

could be heard on the question of costs and as to the custody of children."

Tatham, for the husband, contra.-No answer having been filed, the court could hear the cause whenever it was most convenient without giving any notice to the wife.

Lord PENZANCE, J. O.-The respondent appears to have a substantial defence, and I therefore think that advantage should be taken of the technical objection advanced of want of notice. The decree must be reversed, and the cause reheard, the respondent to be allowed a fortnight in which to file an answer.

Attorneys for the petitioner, Prior, Bigg, Church, and Adams.

Attorneys for the respondent, Tippetts and Son.

Tuesday, Dec. 19, 1871.

(Before Lord PENZANCE, J.O.) SANDERSON V. SANDERSON, STEPHENS AND HISCOX. Dissolution suit - Respondent's answer, alleging cruelty-Particulars not corresponding with the charges-Practice-Pleadings.

A wife, in her answer to her husband's petition for dissolution, made certain general charges of cruelty. In obedience to an order of court, she filed particulars, and subsequently she spontaneously filed further particulars, which did not agree with the original charges.

The court treated these further particulars as new charges, and ordered them to be expunged.

THIS was a husband's suit for the dissolution of his

marriage on the ground of his wife's adultery with the co-respondents. The petition was filed on 16th Feb. 1871, and the wife answered on 12th April following, denying the adultery, and charging her husband with adultery and cruelty.

The charge of cruelty was in the following

terms:

6. That petitioner has been guilty of cruelty in this, that, from the month of July, 1858, the petitioner deposed the respondent from her position of mistress of the house, and habitually insulted her in her said home.

In accordance with an order of the court, made on 25th April, the respondent filed on the 12th May the following particulars of the acts of cruelty alleged in the sixth paragraph of her answer: "That from and after 29th Sept. 1862, up to 14th April, 1868, the time at which I ceased to cohabit with the petitioner, the petitioner systematically made use of foul and indecent language towards me, and constantly told me I was an adulteress and common with every one about the place, and threatened to smash me, and habitually refused to allow me to occupy my position as mistress of the house, and degraded me, and instructed his servants to disobey my authority and to refuse to perform my orders, and compelled me to perform menial offices, and refused to allow me to have any control over the household, or to give food to my children, and would not allow me to cook or help myself to food for my own sustenance." The usual affidavit was filed, also stating that the respondent could not give any further or better particulars than these.

On the 30th Nov. the respondent filed in addition to the above certain further particulars