3 $ efforts to bring matters to an immediate crifis on the other fide of the Danube, as it was the only means by which they could change the nature of the war, and preserve their best troops from mouldering away in an ineffectual fervice. On the other hand it must be acknowledged, that the Grand Vizir, by not foregoing any of the advantages, and by making the best use of the means that were in his power; by preferving the grand army whole, and by wifely abstaining from a general engagement, though frequently urged to it, at the fame time, that by repeatedly pouring_detachments upon them, he kept the Ruffians in hot and continued action, has undoubtedly performed in this campaign, the part of a great captain. As the Turks give no detail of their military transactions, and the Ruffians only fuch a one as is fuited to the meridian of their own people, and calculated for certain purposes, no regular account of this campaign is to be expected, untill fome future Manftein, among their foreign officers, fhall get free from the fhackles of power, and give an account of things as they really were. In the prefent circumstances we can do little more, than to judge of particular tranfactions by their general confequences. It appears upon the whole, that the kind of war which we have already noticed, began to grow very warm upon the Danube, immediately after the breaking up of the conferences at Buchareft. Every day, and almost every night, produced fome small action, or gave an opportunity for fome furprize, in most of which the Ruffians are faid to have been very fuccessful, and to have deftroyed great numbers of the enemy. As forage grew more plenty, the grand army approached closer to the Danube, and matters became more serious. We are not however to imagine that the Turks were entirely on the defenfive; on the contrary, they made repeated attempts upon the Ruffian fide of the river, and in one, to furprize the fortrefs of Giurgewo, are faid to have loft a confiderable number of men. In one of thefe conflicts (which were frequently very fevere, and attended with various fuccefs) one of the Princes Repnin, with a confiderable number of Ruffians, were taken prifoners on the Danube, and being sent to Constantinople, were with the other prifoners who had been formerly taken, amounting in September, 1774. the whole to about three thousand, led in cavalcade through the ftreets of that city; exhibiting by this means a kind of political triumph, calculated to flatter national vanity, and to keep up the spirits of the people. The Ruffian army was commanded by Count Romanzow, and was computed at the opening of the compaign to confift of about 87000 men, of which near one third was cavalry. About the middle of June preparations were made for its paffing the Danube, and carrying the war into Bulgaria with effect, for which purpofe it was intended to force the city of Siliftria, and make it a place of arms, by which means a communication would have been kept between the posts on the Danube, and the grand army, as it penetrated farther into the country. As the Turks have been uncommonly alert in their pofts during this campaign, the paffage was not effected without danger, and a confiderable lofs on both fides. The Generals Weifman and Potemkin, firft croffed the river near Brahilow, in the night between the 18th and 19th of June, at the head of a body of about 15000 men, soon after which they had a bloody engagement with a body of the enemy, in which the Ruffian horse was defeated by the Turkish cavalry, and driven back upon their own foot; but being well fupported by the infantry, and returning to the charge, the main body of the enemy did not think proper to renew the engagement, and quitted the field. The two generals then marched up the river, and covered the passage of the grand army, which was not compleated till the 24th of the fame month, when it marched in large divifions towards Siliftria. Among the various accounts that have been given of the fucceeding_transactions, which, though from the same quarter, are generally contradictory, even as to dates and names, we can venture only to give what feems to be the general result of the whole. It need fcarcely be observed, that the immenfe tract of mountains, anciently called Hemus, and now known by the barbarous term of Balkan, encircle Romania in such a manner, as to form almoft an infuperable barrier between it and Bulgaria, as well as the neighbouring country of Macedonia. The vast branches of this mountain, run every where deep into Bulgaria, and make the country in a very Ttt great great degree rough and impracticable, even to the confines of the Danube, which feparates it on the lower fide, from the countries of Wallachia and Beffarabia to the Black-Sea. The Grand Vizir was encamped towards the foot of the mountains, from whence he commanded the lower country, into which he could pour his troops like a torrent as he faw occafion; at the fame time that the enemy could not force him to an engagement, except under fuch difadvantages of ground, as it was not probable any general would run the hazard of, and the mountains at his back afforded a fure protection, in cafe of the worst misfortune that could follow. Upon the march to Siliftria, the Ruffians found themselves continually harraffed, furrounded, and attacked by great bodies of the Turkish horfe, the Grand Vizir having detached 27000 of his best cavalry for that purpose. It was to little purpose that thefe troops were frequently repulfed; they were ftill relieved by fresh detachments, and their attacks as continually renewed; while the Ruffians found it impoffible to procure forage, and could fcarcely obtain time for a moment's rest, or to take the bit out of their horfes mouths. In the mean time, the army fuffered greatly for want of water, and were expofed without cover to the night rains, and to the cold and winds which fell upon them from the mountains, and which, notwithstanding the feafon of the year, they found to be very fevere. The badnefs of the roads, and the number of defiles, alfo made the carriage of the artillery and baggage extremely difficult; while the alertnefs of the enemy, who watched every advantage, and laid ambufcades in every defile, kept the foldiers conftantly under arms, and wore them down wirh continual fatigue. The generals Weifman and Potemkin, having at length arrived with the vanguard at Siliftria, found it ftrongly defended by three Bafhas at the head of a numerous body of troops, amounting in the whole to about 24000 men. The greater part of thefe troops, formed a trong encampment on the top of a hill, which was adjoining to, and commanded the town. The Ruffian generals June 28th. having made the neceffary difpofitions upon their arrival marched early the next morning to attack the Turkish camp, In their way to the entrenchments, they were furiously affaulted by the Turkifli fpahis, or horfe, who lay in wait for them, and when these were disperf ed by the artillery, they found the janiffaries well prepared to receive them at their entrenchments, which they defended with the greatest bravery. A warm and bloody engagement then enfued, in which the Ruffians were thrown into great disorder, and the Turks, hurried by their impetuofity, and the hopes of a compleat victory, quitted their trenches, and purfued them with great flaughter to the bottom of the hill. This injudicious measure being quickly perceived by General Weifman, he imme diately made the proper advantage of it, and fome Ruflian regiments having marched up the hill in another quarter, became mafters of the trenches without oppofition. The Turks now perceived too late, the error which they had committed, and as it was impoffible to regain the ground which they had loft, were obliged to retire into Siliftria. The main body of the Ruffian army having arrived before the town on the following day, General Romanzow made preparations for a general assault; but the continual and vigorous fallies made by the Turks, prevented the neceffary difpofitions from taking place, and rendered the defign impracticable. In the mean time the General received intelligence, that the Grand Vizir had detached 50000 men to the affiftance of the befieged, and was himself in perfon taking measures to cut off the retreat of the Ruffians. In thefe untoward circumftances a retreat became abfolutely neceffary; but was not eafily effected in the fight of fo alert an enemy. Marfhal Romanzow, the better to cover his defign, feemed to renew the preparations for his attacks, and keeping up a continual fire on the town, decamped filently in the night, and began his retreat in as good order as the prefent circumstances would admit. Uninformed though we are of particulars, fome judgment may be made of the nature of fuch a retreat, by recollecting the numberlefs obftacles that impeded their progrefs, upon their advancing triumphantly as invaders into the country. In this retreat, General Weif man who commanded the van, found a defile, through which the army muft of neceffity pafs, ftrongly poffeffed by a body body of 13000 Turks; a defperate engagement enfued, in which the Ruffians were very roughly handled, and that brave general, in endeavouring to rally his broken troops, and lead them on to another charge, was fhot dead on the fpot. Some fresh regiments however coming up, and attacking the Turks in flank, they feem, unneceffarily, but happily for the Ruffians, to have given up the advantages they had gained, and to have abandoned their ftrong poft. The army having paffed this defile, gained the banks of the Danube, which they repaffed, on the 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th of July, and on the 7th fung Te Deum for their fuccess. Some other actions happened in the course of this expedition, of which we are not able to give the particulars; among these, General Soltikoff, who commanded a detached body, is faid to have defeated and killed the Batha Fifula Sara. Upon the whole, it feems evident, as well from the immediate and fubfequent confequences, as from a confideration of the nature of the fervice, and country, that this expedition was very ruinous to the Ruffian army, and that the cavalry in particular, must have suffered extremely. Some of the first letters from the Ruffian camp, computed their lofs at about 10000 men, and the writers confoled themselves with the hopes, that the Turks had loft as many. This number, however, is reduced to 1200, in the account which was publifhed by authority at Petersburg; a number which feems totally incompatible with the acknowledged feverity and danger of the fervice, and the final event of the expedition. Thefe fevere conflicts, and repeated trials of skill and courage, greatly cooled the ardour of the combatants on both fides, and the Danube became, till near the end of the campaign, a fufficient rampart to their hoftilities. Sickness, the confequence of exceffive fatigue, of the fcarcity and badnefs of provifions, the heat of the weather, and the unhealthy marshes of the Danube, made great progrefs in the Ruffian camp, and obliged General Romanzow to retire from the confines of the river, and to poft the army in the neighbourhood of Jaffi, and the higher countries. There seems but little room to doubt, that the Turks had fuffered very feverely in the late actions, as well as their enemies; nor could it otherwise be well accounted for, that they attempted to make no advantage of the fubfequent weak state of the Ruffian army; unless it fhould be imagined, that a thorough knowledge of the advantages of his fituation, together with the prudence and caution that are characteristic of the prefent Grand Vizir, fhould prevent him from putting any thing to the hazard, where fo great an object was at stake, as the immediate fecurity of the empire. Though the greater part of the troops in Poland, as well as fome others in the neareft provinces, were immediately put in motion to reinforce Marshal Romanzow's army, a perfect filence and tranquillity, notwithstanding, reigned on the Danube, till about the middle of September, when we again find that the contending parties were in motion, and fome fmall actions took place on that river, in which the Ruffians were fuccefsful. Towards the latter end of October, Marshal Romanzow again croffed the river with the whole army, and a hot war was carried on in Bulgaria for above fix weeks. We are more in the dark as to the particulars of this latter campaign, than we are, even as to those of the former; in many inftances, the accounts of both that have been published, bear so near a resemblance, both as to particular actions, and their confequences, that by changing their dates they would ferve equally well for either. It appears, however, that the Ruffian army was divided into two great parts, and that while one, which feems to have been commanded by Count Romanzow, carried on and covered the fiege of Siliftria, the other, under the command of the Generals Ungern, Suwarow, and Prince Dolgorucki, extended their operations towards the coafts of the Black-Sea, Soon after their croffing the Oct. 28th. Danube, thefe generals, attacked near the lake Karaffow, Dageftanly Ali Pacha, whom they defeated, and are faid to have taken his camp, artillery, and baggage, and to have difperfed the body of forces which he commanded. A few days after, they gained another advantage over a body of Turkifh forces near a place called Bazardgic, whom they are faid to have entirely routed. Thefe fucceffes encouraged them to push on their forces to the city of Varna, which lies on the Black-Sea, and has the best port in Bulgaria. Tttz The The conqueft of this place would have been of infinite confequence to the Ruffans, as they would not only thereby have established themfelves in Bulgaria for the winter; but from its vicinity to Romania, it would greatly facilitate any future defigns they might form for the invafion of a country, which comprehends the feat, and it might be faid the life of the empire. It would then be no very difficult matter to build or procure fuch a number of fmall craft, as might tranfport troops and artillery along the fhores, notwithstanding the vigilance of the Turkish fleets; and thus effect an invafion, without hazarding an army in the impracticable defiles of Mount He mus. However eligible the poffeffion of this place might have been, and however well laid the defign, it failed of fuccefs in the execution. The Ruffian accounts fay, that they were misinformed both as to the ftrength of the place and of the garrifon, and that from a confidence of not meeting with any great oppofition, only an inconfiderable number of troops had been detached to make the attempt; that though these found the eneNov. 11th. my much fuperior to themfelves, their bravery induced them to make the affault, which they did with the greatest courage, but that finding all their efforts ineffectual, they retired with a very trifling lofs. On the other hand it is faid, that a principal part of the Ruffian army was prefent at the affair of Varna; that their greatest effort was made on the day which we have mentioned, when ten regiments of foot (which, if full, fhould amount to 2000 men each) attacked the Turkish entrenchments with great fury, and gained fome confiderable advantage in the beginning; but that after a long and bloody engagement they were obliged to retire with great loss, and in fuch diforder as to abandon their cannon. The fame accounts fay, that upon their retreat, the Ruffians were met by the Bostangi Bafchi of Adrianople, who was marching to the relief of Varna, and who again routed them with a great flaughter. The Grand Vizir upon finding the danger that threatened Varna, quitted his camp at Chiumla, to march to its relief; but returned thither, as foon as he was informed of the event. He fill invariably purfued the wife fyftem which he had adopted at the beginning of the campaign, of avoiding a general engagement, carrying on the war by detachments, and waiting the enemy by a continual repetition of fmall actions, while he cautiously fuperintended the whole, and kept his principal force entire. The fiege of Siliftria was carried on for feveral weeks, and the garrison fhewed the most unconquerable perseverance and bravery. It feems, by the accounts that have been published, to have been a continued interchange of fallies and affaults. We have no regular detail of this fiege; but by the Ruffian accounts of particular parts of it, which were publifhed when they feemed to form a certainty of taking the place, the lofs of men must have been prodigious. At length the Ruffians raised the siege, and repaffed the Danube, in the begin ping of December. They fay, that the elements themselves fought against them, and were an invincible obstacle to their operations; that a very fevere cold fet in, alternately with vaft fnows and rains, which made the rivers overflow in fuch a manner as to lay the low countries totally under water; that by this means, the communication between the opposite fhores of the Danube became very difficult, and that between the different bodies of the troops in the interior country, was entirely cut off. That in fuch circumstances, it became impoffible to fubfift the troops in a country fo ruined and totally deftitute of forage as Bulgaria; fo that at length, after having gained many advantages, and having, by the deftruction of their forts and magazines, put it out of the power of the enemy to become troublefome to them in their quarters during the winter, they repaffed the Danube. Such is the Ruffian account of the event of this expedition; which leads us naturally to enquire, where, or in what manner, the celebrated Seraskier Hoffein Bafha, gained fo much honour in this latter campaign, as to be diftinguifhed as the reftorer of the Turkifu glory, and as having renewed the luftre (which had been fo long tarnished) of the Ottoman arms. Of these particulars, the fhort imperfect accounts that are tranfmitted by foreigners from Conftantinople, give little more fatisfaction than thofe published by the Ruffians. We however gather from them, that this commander having come to the re lief of Siliftria, at the head of the Tur- to deserve fome notice. We find that kifh cavalry, he first with great judg- the new Chan of the Tartars, Deules ment and activity cut off the Ruffian Guéray, had been fent from Conftantinoconvoys, and afterwards in repeated en- ple with a confiderable naval force, and gagements, routed, and almoft ruined attended by a great number of the printheir cavalry; fo that from the vigour cipal lords of Tartary, with about two and celerity of his operations, the army thoufand of their followers, either to was obliged to raise the siege of Siliftria, recover, or to take poffeffion of the and to repass the Danube with fuch pre- throne of his ancestors. Though the cipitation, that they not only left the details of this expedition are not to be magazines which they had taken from relied upon; yet it is certain that it failthe Turks, but their own alfo behind; ed of effect, and that the Chan, with and that Hoffein Bafha thus literally the Turkish armament, returned unfucfulfilled the promise which he had made cefsfully. The Turkish accounts fay, to the Grand Signior when he was leav- fimply, that the expedition failed of fucing Conftantinople, that there fhould not cefs; or, that it was foiled through bad be a Ruffian on the right fide of the weather; the Ruffians fay, that this Danube at the winter folftice. prince joined the rebels, and was afterwards totally defeated at the head of a confiderable army, and driven out of the Crimea. As the former of thefe gives an effect without a fufficient cause, and the latter wants all fubfequent marks of confirmation, we are ftill in the dark as to the real caufe of this failure. It does not then feem very improbable to fuppofe, that the new allies, having formed fome separate scheme of government, equally independent of Ruffia and the Porte, might have refused to acknowledge the authority of the new Chan; nor would the impracticability or abfurdity of fuch a defign, be a fufficient argument against its being adopt ed, by fo headstrong and ignorant a people. We have no authority on which to form a judgment on the nature of the war in the Crimea, or of that union which it seems has taken place, between the revolted Ruffians and Coffacks, and their ancient enemies the Tartars. Nor are we informed, whether the infurgents and their new allies, intended to form an independent government, or whether the former, to fecure themselves from the punifliment due to their rebellion, were willing to fubmit to the dominion of the Tartar Chans, under its usual dependence on the Porte. It however appears, that this war and revolt have been extremely troublesome to Ruffia. That the enemy made themfelves masters early in the year of the whole Peninfula, including Bachiseray, the capital, except one or two maritime places that were ftrongly fortified and garrifoned; that the Ruffians have fent different armies under different generals for the recovery of the Crimea, and the chaftifement of the rebels; that though little dependance is to be placed on the contradictory accounts that have been given of thefe tranfactions, it is evident that a number of actions have been fought with various fuccefs, and a brifk war carried on during the whole campaign in that quarter; and that though we have been informed, more than once, of decifive victories obtained over the rebels and their allies, we ftill find affairs there to continue in the fame disorder, and that latter orders have been iffued at Petersburg, for the fending of frefli troops, and the making of extraordinary levies for that service. One circumftance, which ftill adds to the fecurity of the prefent ftate of affairs in the Crimea, feems, however, Some trifling engagements which happened between the hoftile powers on the Black-Sea, anfwered no other purpose than to fhew, that from the badnefs of their veffels, and the wretchednefs of their failors, the one was nearly as ill framed to acquire, as the other was to preferve, the dominion of that boisterous gulph. The Ruffian operations in the Levant, were not this year attended with any great eclat, or productive of any confiderable advantages. Their force, however, at the beginning of the campaign, feems by the accounts of it that have been published, to have been pretty confiderable, and is faid to have confifted, of 17 fhips of the line, of which three were unfit for fervice, 13 ftout frigates, from 22 to 44 guns, three English veffels, which they had purchased, of 20 guns each, and a number of small Ragufan and Duleignot veffels, which with galliots, chebeques and chebequins, amount |