AGE QUALIFICATION.

363

government about to be established should consist of a supreme legislative,1 executive2 and judiciary.3 A national legislature should consist of two branches.* The members of the first, elected by the people of the several States for a term of three years, should receive a fixed compensation for their services to be paid out of the national treasury. During their term of service, they should be ineligible to offices established by the States or by the general government, excepting to those belonging to the function of the legislature. For a year after the expiration of their terms, they should be ineligible to any office under the United States.7

6

Members of the second branch should be thirty years of ages at least, should be chosen by the assemblies for seven years, and should receive the same compensation as members of the first branch.10 Laws might originate in either house. The legislative rights of the Congress of the Confederation should be vested in the new legislature, which should be empowered to make laws in all cases in which the individual States were incompetent, or in which the harmony of the Union might be interrupted by the exercise of State legislation; also, to negative all State laws conflicting with the Constitution, or treaties made under its authority.11 The right of suffrage in the first

1 Constitution, Article I, Section 1, Clause 1.

2 Id. Article II, Section 1, Clause 1.

3 Id. Article III, Section 1, Clause 1; the grant of power in each case is generally an affirmative, though in none verbally declared to be supreme.

4 Article I, Section 1, Clause 1. Article I, Section 2, Clause 1. • Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. Article I, Section 6, Clause 2. 8 Article I, Section 3, Clause 3. • Article I, Section 3, Clause 1. 10 Article I, Section 6, Clause 1.

11 See as to treaties, Article VI, Clause 2.

branch should not follow the rule established in the Articles, but should be according to some equitable ratio of representation, namely in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, including those bound to servitude for a number of years and three-fifths of all other persons, excepting Indians not taxed. A like rule of suffrage should apply in the second branch.

The national executive should consist of one person." chosen by the national legislature for seven years, with power to carry the national laws into effect,3 and he should appoint to office in cases not otherwise provided for. He should be ineligible to a second term, and be removable on impeachment and conviction of malfeasance or neglect of duty." He should receive a fixed compensation to be paid out of the national treasury, which should not be increased or diminished so as to affect him. He should have the right to negative any act of the legislature, but a bill might be passed over his veto by a two-thirds vote in each branch."

The national judiciary should consist of one supreme tribunal, whose judges, appointed by the second branch of the national legislature, should hold their offices during good behavior and receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, which should not be increased or diminished during their tenure of office." The legislature might appoint inferior tribunals.10

1 Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.

2 Article II, Section 1, Clause 1.

3 Modified in Article II, Section 1, Clause 8.

4 Article II, Section 2, Clauses 2 and 3.

Article II, Section 4.

6 Article II, Section 1, Clause 7.

7 Article I, Section 7, Clause 2.

8 Article III, Section 1, Clause 1. Article III, Section 1, Clause 1. 10 Id.

The jurisdiction of the judiciary should extend to all cases affecting the collection of national revenue, the impeachment of national officers, and national peace and harmony.

Provision should be made for the admission of new States1 lawfully arising within the limits of the United States whether from the voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of the national legislature. The old Congress should continue with all its privileges and authority until a given day after the new plan had been adopted. To each State the United States should guarantee its existing laws and a republican constitution.2 Provision should be made for amendments to the Articles of Union whenever necessary. The legislative, executive and judiciary of the States were to be bound by oath to support the new plan. Any amendments which the Convention might offer to the Articles of Confederation, when they had received the approbation of Congress, should be submitted for ratification to conventions, recommended by the State legislatures, and expressly chosen by the people."

This draft of a plan of government was objectionable to the delegates from the smaller States because it was national, not federal in character, but its three-fold division of functions was acceptable to all. Opposition was chiefly to its administrative provisions and to its sub

1 Article IV, Section 3, Clause 1.

2 "Republican form of government;" Article IV, Section 4. 3 Article V.

• Article VI, Clause 2, in practice, all State and local officers now take oath to support the laws and the Constitution, both of the State and of the United States.

5 Applied in Article V. Thus twenty-five provisions of the amended Virginia plan as reported by the Committee of the Whole were ultimately adopted in the Constitution.

ordination of the authority of the States to the authority of the nation. The objections to the Virginia plan were serious, indeed so serious that a rival plan was submitted by the delegates from the small States.

CHAPTER III.

THE NEW JERSEY PLAN AND HAMILTON'S SKETCH.

The members from Connecticut, New York and Delaware, joined probably by Martin, from Maryland, having meanwhile made common cause with those from New Jersey, had met and practically agreed upon a plan of government, though for different reasons. Patterson had asked for time to report a purely federal plan. Connecticut and New York were opposed to any departure from the principles of the Confederation, and wished to add a few powers to Congress, but not to substitute a national government. New Jersey and Delaware were opposed to a national government, because its advocates based it on proportional representation. It was the eagerness of this opposition to a national system,-springing from these different motives, which now began to cause serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. As Dickinson expressed it to Madison, it was the consequence of pushing things too far. Some members from the small States wished for two branches in the legislature, and were friends to a good national government, but they would sooner submit to a foreign power than be deprived of an equality of suffrage in both branches, and thus be thrown under the dominion of the larger States.

1 June 15. This Chapter, June 14 to part of June 19, is based on Madison's Notes in the Documentary History, III, 123162; in Elliot, V, 191-212; The Journal, Documentary History, I, 64-67; 224-225. See also the record of votes following: Elliot, I, 175-180; Yates's Minutes (IV), 410-427; The Albany Edition, 1821, 121-142; Madison's Works (Gilpin), Vol. II, 862-893; Scott's Edition of the Madison Papers, 163-187.