in anything that really matters. Nevertheless, we gather from a recently published White Paper, narrating the happily abortive negotiations between our Foreign Minister and the ephemeral Prime Minister of Egypt, that the British Government is prepared to constitute the Geneva League of Nations the final arbiter upon our future status in a country we have rescued from bankruptcy, spoliation, and misery. All that will be necessary for Germany to do-and with so many vulnerable neighbours she will, with the aid of her Russian confederate, have little difficulty in doing it-will be to work up a demand at Geneva for Great Britain to clear out of the Nile Valley-on the principle of "self-determination"-in order that she, or one of her nominees, may replace us as Suzerain. The Egyptian effendi (the equivalent of the Bengali babu) are so manifestly unfitted to rule the fellahin (the equivalent of the Indian ryot) that if Great Britain is ready to be squeezed out we suggest that Signor Mussolini should be invited to replace us. "Govern or go should be our watchword.

ALTHOUGH the Entente Cordiale between France and Great Britain has lasted for nearly a quarter of a century, and

At Cross-
Purposes

has survived many perils, the two countries are frequently at cross-purposes, and the policies of their Governments are marked by cross-currents. This is partly from the misunderstandings inevitable between two communities of such different psychology, temperament, and outlook, partly because there is rarely an explicit exchange of views by their representatives coram publico. What Sir Austen Chamberlain may whisper to Monsieur Briand or Monsieur Briand murmur to Sir Austen remains wrapped in profound mystery, and therefore does nothing to clear the air. Consequently such an article as Monsieur Jacques Seydoux, the former AssistantDirector of Political and Commercial Affairs in the French Foreign Office, lately contributed to The Times (March 15th), is useful as expressing the views of knowledgeable and responsible Frenchmen upon Anglo-French relations. His topic was "France and Germany "as a necessary Entente,"

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which had been effected by the inability of Great Britain and France to co-operate during the years succeeding the Great War. The United States had withdrawn from European affairs and declined to accept the Treaty of Versailles. France and Great Britain alone stood upright amid the general chaos. France, despite "her ruins and the increasing gravity of her financial position, possessed considerable material and moral strength," supporting Poland and a Little Entente, and seeking "the security of her frontiers and the payment of the Reparations due to her." Great Britain, on the other hand, was financially powerful and, "in the absence of the United States, could relieve the sufferings of Europe. She laid down formulas, which she applied with admirable courage, for the reconstruction of finance and the exchanges. At the League of Nations she controlled the Financial Committee, and nothing could be done without the consent of Mr. Montagu Norman." As our French critic reminds us, whenever the heads of the French and British Governments were agreed, the other States "accepted their decision without hesitation, and whenever Paris and London spoke to Berlin in one voice the Reich submitted without delay."

UNFORTUNATELY this agreement, according to Mr. Jacques Seydoux, was only too rare; there was often-in fact, nearly always-some difference between the Entente

The Balance Powers:

of Power

Great Britain failed to understand that this phase of European history would be of limited duration; she was always haunted by the old preoccupation of the balance of Power,' and in her mind the strong nation then was France, the weak nation Germany. France, for her part, held to the principle which had guided her during her history, and, not finding in the signature of Great Britain and the United States the guarantee which she desired, she tried to set up against Germany, with the help of new allies, the barrier in the East which had formerly been the

mainspring of her policy in the struggle against the Royal House of Austria."

As this able French commentator observes:

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This is why the Franco-British combination neither led nor reconstructed Europe as it might have done. It allowed an unparalleled opportunity to pass; and in history opportunities come but once. Its turn is gone; the re-entry of Germany into the political arena has changed the whole position."

That is undeniably the accepted explanation in competent French circles of the deplorable rift in the Entente in the early years of peace. For that breach we have always frankly acknowledged that Downing Street was infinitely more to blame than the Quai d'Orsay. There was nothing the France of Clemenceau and Poincaré would have liked better than to continue and strengthen after the war the combination which had, with the aid of its European Allies and its American Associate, protected Civilization from catastrophe. Great Britain did not reciprocate this sentiment nor respond to the French effort, though hardly for the reason advanced by our critic. Foreign commentators on British Foreign Policy, conspicuously the French and the Americans, flatter British vanity by crediting us with an astuteness to which we can lay small claim. They cannot conceive our adopting any attitude that is not inspired by a far-sighted solicitude for British interests, which they conceive to be the sleeping and waking thought of British Statesmen.

THEY make no allowance for our national idiosyncrasies -namely, forgetfulness, thoughtlessness, ignorance, facile optimism, and sheer stupidity. Those are Idiosyncrasies the hall-marks of British Policy throughout the post-war period. Directly the "Cease Fire Cease Fire" sounded on November 11, 1918, and acute anxiety was relieved, our heedless politicians, headed by Mr. Lloyd George-who had acquired an unwholesome ascendancy through the accident of being in office at the time of the Armistice-rapidly

reverted to type. They banished 1914-1918 as an evil dream, revived their pre-war prejudices, and resumed their pre-war attitude. Frenchmen cognizant of the anxieties and difficulties of preserving the Entente from 1909 to 1914 should be able to appreciate what they had to deal with once peace was restored. "The Balance of Power" loomed no larger in Downing Street from 1919 to 1925 than it had at the earlier epoch, when it was virtually impossible to persuade the Lloyd Georges and other Responsible Statesmen that we were threatened by German ambitions. France, as an invaded and occupied country for four terrible years, cannot conceive the war passing from the mind of any Ally. But uninvaded England, inhabited by a population with relatively little memory, could far more readily discard the nightmare. It was this very detachment of the British public that permitted the politicians to make their unholy mess not only abroad but at home. There is another element in the English character which foreigners never have, never can, and never will appreciate-namely, the light-hearted, sporting instinct which pervades all classes, whether they are playing cricket or watching football. This was a big factor during the war-not always a bad one, as it helped us through dark days-and when Peace came a "Boat Race feeling" supervened, with a disposition "to let bygones be bygones" and to deal generously even with so ungenerous and unchivalrous a foe as the Germans. After the annual Oxford and Cambridge Boat Race, which is one of our most popular events, the two crews dine together, and this practice affects more serious affairs. It was vain to remind our people that victorious Germany would have skinned them alive after bleeding them white, as they had shown in the Treaty of Bucharest, dictated from Berlin to defeated Rumania in the spring of 1918.

THIS amiable sentimentalism, though a pronounced British trait which unamiable people know how to exploit, has never been recognized either by foreign friends or foes, who seek every other explanation of the enigma of British Policy. There

Pro-German
Slogans

is yet another and by no means attractive aspect of the attitude of the Coalition Government towards France and

Germany. Pro-German influences were so powerful in

Politics and Finance on the eve of the war that it was a toss-up whether we drifted in or stayed out and sat on the fence until the issue had been decided. At the twelfth hour that faction which had dominated Downing Street was overcome-on August 2, 1914-and henceforward, and until the autumn of 1918, our pro-German elements, though frequently mischievous and occasionally paralytic, were constrained and controlled by the national danger, many pro-Germans demonstrating a desire for the downfall of the Fatherland that was probably spurious. The second the fighting was over there was a general mobilization of all pro-Germans in Lombard Street, Fleet Street, and Downing Street, who invented various slogans to beguile the unwary that were only too successful, because the patriotism that had won the war took one of those "easies" by which too often the fruits of victory are frittered away. "The Balance of Power," to which Monsieur Seydoux ascribes our vagaries, "cut no ice" whatsoever. It was neither mentioned nor thought of. We doubt whether many of those in charge of our destinies at this time had even heard of it. "The Balance of Power" is naught to the Bank of England, whose Governor can see nothing beyond the circle of Exchanges, and who, as "a Worshipper of Par," regards the ratio of the sovereign to other currencies as the beginning and end of economic wisdom. Neither did the " Balance of Power" animate the noble army of British Bagmen who descended upon Germany to burn their fingers in mark or other speculations, any more than it inspired the genius who invented the legend "British Prosperity depends on German Prosperity," and "Unless we are kind to poor dear Germany she will turn Bolshevist and infect all Europe with that poison." There were perfectly serious people on this side of the Channel who swallowed this slosh and communicated it to the Government of the day, which was singularly receptive of any ideas and impressions that were sufficiently foolish.

VOL. XCI

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