in War complacency of his caste. He could thus be easily persuaded that any Government chosen by himself was infallible and indispensable. This foible was a potent factor Mr. Asquith in the downfall of the First Coalition in December 1916. He could not, and would not, realize that he and his colleagues were aimlessly drifting towards disaster through a lack of grip on the situation, and the development of Defeatism in certain Cabinet Ministers who had been unnerved by the responsibility and anxiety of tackling a titanic problem that was completely beyond their ken and with which Parliamentary psychology was unfitted to cope. The Prime Minister himself had not lost hope, but a War Government demanded something more of its head than Mr. Asquith could supply, though his successor unfortunately lacked qualities that the outgoing Prime Minister possessed in an eminent degree. And as our great and ever-growing Army realized the extent to which our strategy was threatened by any amateur of that art who could momentarily attract the attention of Mr. Lloyd George, Sir Douglas Haig and G.H.Q. who bore the heat and burden of the day in the field looked wistfully back on the time when at least they knew they enjoyed the confidence of the Home Government and were free from the alarums and excursions of 1917 and 1918. Mr. Asquith observed the golden rule that a Government must be loyal to its servants, especially in war, which so immensely increased the strain of service. He was amateur strategist who thought that clever politicians should dictate campaigns to stupid soldiers. He was likewise an admirable consultant on any difficult problem, and his lucidity was a valuable aid to those who were anxious to clear their minds; and if he had only had the necessary drive and determination he would have excelled as a War Prime Minister. Unfortunately ever since he succeeded Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman as Head of a Cabinet the majority of whose members were out of sympathy with his standpoint, he had adopted the position of an impartial Chairman who should not lean too far in either direction. This attitude is not always successful in Peace. It is of course hopeless in War, but then Mr. Asquith could not develop a war mind or appreciate the vastly different atmosphere created by such a portent as the Great War or the spirit needed to ride the whirlwind and direct the storm. Shabby He was shabbily treated by several colleagues-not only Liberals-at the crisis of December 1916, when the Second Coalition emerged on the ruins of the first. He was also badly advised by his entourage who were-after the manner of entouragesconvinced that the fall of his Government was "unthinkable." He shared their illusion, but when he was disappointed and the impossible happened-as so frequentlyhe bowed to his fate like the gentleman he was, and from that day until the close of the War not one factious remark dropped from his lips. There was abundant opportunity for criticism, but the ex-Prime Minister was a patriot who was incapable of exploiting any national danger to the Party advantage. His record had been equally free from that Liberal weakness during the South African War, and it was his patriotism that had caused many fellow Liberals to view him askance. Another attractive trait was his consistent refusal to participate in any of those Press intrigues which have become incident to our political system, and of which he was a constant victim. If anything went wrong in the Liberal Party, or if the Liberal Party did anything newspapers disliked, it was always the fault of Mr. Asquith, never of Mr. Lloyd George, who has certainly a genius for ingratiating himself with the Fourth Estate. All the return Mr. Asquith received for his sedulous refusal to make difficulties for his successors was "the coupon election " after the Armistice-one of the most impudent manifestations of cynicism in the history of politics. There was no shade of a shadow of a pretext for a Dissolution at that moment, though the electorate were deceived by Mr. Lloyd George's slogans of "Making Germany Pay" and "Hang the Kaiser." The object of this manoeuvre was to obliterate Asquith Liberalism and to establish the personal dictatorship of the Welsh Wizard, with the assistance of Conservatives who were so enchanted at finding themselves unexpectedly in office that there was no dirt they were not prepared to eat out of Mr. Lloyd George's hand. AN odious régime ensued, including the loss of the Peace at the Paris Conference, the disruption of the United Kingdom, the betrayal of those who had trusted us and to An Odious whom we were under obligations, the abanRégime donment of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the patronage of Bolshevism, etc., etc. Mr. Asquith remained unbesmirched during this "South American era of scandal and corruption that will make the word "Coalition" stink in British nostrils for many a long day, but unfortunately his political associations precluded his leadership of what was then most needed, viz. a Patriotic Opposition that would attack the Government for its wanton sacrifice of British interests in every direction. When at last, thanks to the Morning Post and the Diehards, to Sir George Younger and Mr. Bonar Law the Conservative Party escaped from thraldom, Mr. Asquith shared in the general débâcle of Liberalism, but the bitterest moment of all--if he was capable of bitterness-must have been when the partial Liberal revival of 1923 was accompanied by Mr. Lloyd George's acquisition of the control of the Party organization, thanks to the mysterious millions which he now possessed as the result of undisclosed transactions in Coalition days. Mr. Asquith's abandonment of the Liberal Leadership was only a question of time, and by the strange irony of fate he ended his days in the House of Lords he was so proud of having emasculated -thanks to a Peerage conferred on the advice of a Conservative Prime Minister. It was both a brilliant and pathetic career, the close of which has naturally made not a few persons uncomfortable, as a sense of ingratitude must always be a painful legacy. It was characteristic of the man to eschew the pomp and vanities of a public funeral, and to enjoin burial in a quiet country churchyard adjoining the house in which if he had suffered much sorrow, he had also enjoyed happiness. Elections WE are somewhat out of the fashion in not contemplating a General Election this year. Japan, France, Germany, and the United States are all due to consult their electorates. Japan is already through the ordeal - her first experience with a democratic franchise-and the result will be watched with sympathetic interest elsewhere, especially in England. It is unlikely to affect her foreign relations, as the Japanese People still leave such high matters to those who are supposed to understand them, though no doubt public opinion will increasingly count in external affairs. The French elections are of exceptional significance and importance, as they will provide an "acid test" of the political stability of post-war France. Even those who most hoped for his failure are constrained to recognize the signal service of M. Poincaré in evolving financial order out of chaos. The process has necessarily been drastic, and it remains to be seen what the electors think about it. The prospect of M. Poincaré's success at the polls is now deemed better than it was, it is very plain to the meanest understanding that his defeat, or even check, would be disastrous to France industrially as well as financially. The constant rumours of the impending collapse of the curious political combination that has made his task possible, have as constantly been falsified, and it seems inconceivable that having held on so long these Radicals and Socialists should shy at the last fence. What we most admire in M. Poincaré's policy is that it has enabled France to work out her own salvation independently of that mighty International Money Power to whose "co-operation nations pay dearly-to wit Great Britain and Germany. In the latter country, a General Election is likewise impending the uneasy Coalition that had long had a precarious existence appears to have broken up, not that this need make material difference to the polling. Foreigners are chiefly interested to note whether the German Republic is stronger or weaker than it was, i.e. whether public opinion in the Fatherland is, as we are told, moving towards the left," in the opposite direction, or remaining as it was. "Will the Hohenzollerns come back?" is the outstanding German 66 problem from the international standpoint. In this the world cannot help being interested because, although the German Republic may be frail bulwark of European Peace, the restoration of any Hohenzollern could only be interpreted abroad as a warning. The Presidential Election in the United States will be the last and, from the foreign standpoint, the least important of the series, because outsiders are unable to understand the issues between the Republican Administration and its opponents, except that one side is "In," where it wishes to remain, and the other is "Out," and hopes to be " In." It is not yet ascertainable who the respective standard-bearers are likely to be. "Ware New York OUR readers cannot be too sceptical concerning American news via New York, which is hardly more in touch with effective American opinion than, say, London. What Liverpool is to the Continent of Europe, that is Manhattan Island to the United States. The average New Yorker knows little or nothing of the vast hinterland on the edge of which he lives, and no journalist moving and living and having his being in New York-which has a peculiarly strong atmosphere of its own-would have a chance of interpreting America to the outside world unless he were a positive genius. It is a misfortune for both Englishspeaking nations that Europe is so frequently handed the wrong end of the stick by those upon whom European editors for the most part rely for their American information. New York correspondents of London newspapers usually content themselves with cabling what they think their London readers will like to hear. They make a business of minimizing every disagreeable manifestation. Thus, if the Mayor of some vast city in the Middle West gains a sensational victory on a campaign of Anglophobia, Our Special Correspondent" obligingly explains that the Mayor in question is but a buffoon." So if American Admirals make offensive attacks on England in order to get up steam for the big Navy, the New Yorker instantly explains that they mean nothing." So when President Coolidge launches a huge programme of naval construction calculated to make VOL. XCI 66 2 |