i. 5. and therefore must suppose some free constitution of his will.

This then rightly considered, do I affirm to be effected with the merit of Christ; there I place the procuring efficacy thereof, whence it is that all the fruits of it are made out unto us. But this in due order.

The first thing of immediate concernment hereunto, is the covenant of the Father with the Son; the free engagement of God, to do such and such things for Christ, upon the performance of such other things to him appointed. This is the foundation of the merit of Christ as was before declared. Hence his distributive justice ascribed to God, as to this thing. It is righteous with him being engaged by his own free purpose and promise, to make out those things which he appointed to be the fruit and procurement of the death of Christ. And from thence it is, that all the things purchased by the death of Christ, become due to those for whom he died; even from the equity attending this justice of God.

[4.] Herein also his truth hath a share; by his truth I understand his fidelity and veracity, in the performance of all his engagements. This immediately attends every obligation that by any free act of his will, God is pleased in his wisdom to put upon himself; and is naturally under consideration before that distributive justice, whereby he is inclined to the performance itself of them.

This then is that I say;

God by free purpose and compact, making way for the merit of Christ, which absolutely could be none, is obliged from the veracity and justice which attends all his engagements, to make out as in his infinite wisdom shall seem meet, all those things which he hath set, appointed, and proposed as the fruit and purchase of his death, unto all them for whom he died. And in this rests the merit of Christ.

Here two things may be observed;

1. What we ascribe to the merit of Christ; viz. The accomplishment of that condition, which God required to make way, that the obligation which he had freely put upon him

e Nulla justitia proprie esse potest, ubi nulla intercedit obligatio; Deus autem nulla obligatione tenetur, antequam ipse fidem suam astringat; ergo ante promissionem nulla justitia etiam distributiva in Deo reperitur. Vaș. n. 1. q. 21. a. 1. disp. 86.

self, might be in actual force. And so much (how rightly I leave to himself to consider) doth Mr. Baxter assign to our own works; Thess. 26. p. 140.

2. The mistake of those who wind up the merit of Christ, as affecting God, if I may so speak, unto a conditional engagement, viz. That we shall be made partakers of the fruits of it, upon such and such conditions, to be by us fulfilled. For,

(1.) All such conditions (if spiritual blessings) are part of the purchase of the death of Christ; and if not, are no way fit to be conditions of such an attainment.

(2.) It cannot be made apparent how any such conditional stipulation can be ascribed unto God. That God should engage upon the death of Christ, to make out grace and glory, liberty and beauty, unto those for whom he died, upon condition they do so or so,

1st. Leaves no proper place for the merit of Christ.

2dly. Is very improperly ascribed unto God. Lawyers tell us, that all stipulations about things future, are either sub conditione or sub termino. Stipulations or engagements upon condition that are properly so, do suppose him that makes the engagement to be altogether uncertain of the event thereof. Stipulations sub termino are absolute, to make out the things engaged about at such a season. Upon the very instant of such a stipulation as this, an obligation follows as to the thing, though no action be allowed to him to whom it is made, until the term and time appointed be

come.

In those stipulations that are under condition, no obligation ariseth at all from them, it being wholly uncertain whether the condition will be fulfilled or no. Only in two cases doth such an engagement bring on an immediate obligation.

1. If the condition required be in things necessary and unalterable; as if Caius should engage himself unto Tilius to give him a hundred pounds for his house on the morrow if the sun shine; here ariseth an immediate obligation, and it is the same as if it had been conceived only sub termino, without condition at all.

2. If by any means he that makes the stipulation, knows infallibly that the condition will be fulfilled, though he to whom it is made knows it not. In this respect also the sti

pulation sub conditione, introduceth an immediate obligation, and in that regard is coincident with that which is only sub termino.

Whether an engagement upon condition properly, without the former respects, that is a stipulation to an event dubious and uncertain, can be ascribed unto God, is easy to determine. To assert it oppugns the whole nature of the Deity, and overthrows the properties thereof, immediately and directly. All other stipulations under condition are coincident, as I said before, with that which is sub termino only, from whence ariseth an immediate obligation for the performance of the thing stipulated about; though there be not an immediate action granted him unto whom it is made.

Surely they are wide, if not very wild, who affirm that all the stipulations on the part of God upon the death of Christ, are upon a condition, which he himself knows to be impossible for them to perform to whom they are made, which amongst wise men are always accounted nugatory and null.

This being then so vain, I say that the merit of Christ flowing from the free purpose and compact of God, resteth on his justice thence also arising, fixing thereon an obligation to make out all the fruits of it, unto them for whom he died, sub termino only; whereby a present right is granted them thereunto, though they cannot plead for present enjoyment.

CHAP. XI.

More particularly of the state and right of them for whom
Christ died, before believing.

THE former assertions about the death of Christ, being in some measure cleared, we may hence have light into the state and condition of those for whom Christ died, in their several generations before believing.

To make this the more fully appear, we must distinguish between their present state or possession, and their present right. Their state is not changed, because all the procurements of the death of Christ, are to be made out unto them by virtue of a stipulation sub termino, that term or season

being not come. So that still in present actual state, I leave them as before, not justified, not sanctified, not entered into

covenant.

Right also is twofold.

1. In re, as the father hath a right to his estate. And this jus in re, holds though the estate be unjustly or forcibly detained from him,

2. Ad rem, so son hath a right to the estate of his father, being to enjoy it at his death.

The first right is presently actionable upon any detainment; the latter not so. The first we do not ascribe to the elect in this condition, viz. that which is in re, and instantly actionable; but that which is ad rem and sub termino.

This being that which I aimed at, and being by Mr. Baxter opposed, I will farther consider it, that it may appear whether any thing in this assertion be justly blamable.

I said that by the death of Christ, we have actual right to the good things purchased by that death. That right which is not actual (to speak a word to that term) is not. The contradistinct affection hereunto is potential. And this is totally destructive to the nature of a right; all right is actual or not at all.

To evince the main assertion; I shall,

1. Shew the nature and quality of this right.

2. The bottom or foundation of it; and,

3. Prove the thesis.

(1.) By right I understand jus in general, now 'jus est, quod justum est,' Aug. in Psal. cxliv. sub. fin. That is right which it is just should be.' And 'quiquid rectum est, justum est,' Ansel. de verit. cap. 13. It is just all that should be, which hath a rectitude in itself. Farther; what this justum is, Aquinas tells you, 22. æ. q. 57. a. 1. c. Justum est quod respondet secundum aliquam æqualitatem alteri.' Then a thing is just when it stands in some equality unto those things whereunto it relates. And this equality or adequation of things is twofold.

First, That which ariseth from the nature of the things themselves; as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, &c.

Secondly, That which ariseth from a proportion condescended unto, by condict, agreement, covenant, or common consent. Dupliciter est aliquid adæquatum; uno modo ex

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natura ipsius rei ; alio modo cum est commensuratum ex condicto sive ex communi placito,' Aquin.

In the first sense as to a right that should accrue unto the creatures in respect of God, from the commensuration of the things themselves, we shewed before that it cannot be. It must be from some grant, compact, covenant, or the like, from whence a right in reference to the faithfulness or righteousness of God may arise. The right then whereof we speak, which they for whom Christ died, have to the things which by his death are procured, consists in that equity, proportion, and equality, which upon the free compact, constitution, and consent of God the Father, is between the death of Christ, and their enjoyment of the fruits of that death. It is just and equal, that they should enjoy the fruits of his death in due time. Neither is the right of any man, to any thing any more, but such a frame and order of things that is just, either from the nature of the things themselves, or from common consent and agreement, that he should enjoy that thing. This is the right whereof we speak; which in their sense the very Socinians grant. Christus jus quoddam ad obtinendam remissionem peccatorum et salutem (morte sua) nobis dedit,' Crellius adv. Groti. cap. 1.

2. For the foundation of this right, seeing that before the consideration of the death of Christ (as was declared) it is not, from thence it must needs be, nothing of any likelihood to be such a foundation being coincident therewithal.

Now whereas in the death of Christ two things are considered; (1.) The satisfaction; and, (2.) The merit thereof; it may be inquired after, under whither respect this right relates thereunto.

(1.) The satisfaction of Christ tends in all that it is, to the honour and reparation of the justice of God. This then in its utmost extent and efficacy, cannot give ground to build such a right upon. The ultimate effect of satisfaction, may be accomplished, and yet not the least right to any good thing communicated to them, for whom this satisfaction is made. The good things attending the death of Christ may be referred unto two heads; the amotion of evil, and the collation of good. For the first, the amotion of evil, the taking that from us that it may not grieve us, and subducting us from the power and presence thereof, it is immediately