Opinion. out? It is shown by the record, that L. R. Dickinson was, on the 11th day of March, 1880, and had been for many years previous thereto, a citizen of the State of Virginia, residing with his own family, upon his own property, in Henrico county, near the city of Richmond. That he owned, beside the property upon which he lived, real and personal property in Richmond, where he conducted business. He was hopelessly insolvent, and was compelled and impelled by the sudden exposure of his long concealed crimes of forgery and fraud, to flee beyond the reach of the criminal process of the State. He collected and raised all the money that he could by forgery, falsehood or otherwise, obtaining at least $1,050.00; and on the 11th of March, the very morning of the day he fled, he endeavored to obtain a suit of clothing from E. B. Spence, to be paid for in advertisements in his (Dickinson's) paper. On the same day he applied to several brokers, and endeavored to obtain money from them upon forged paper, and applied to others to swap checks with him, when he had no credit balance in bank; and the record shows that it was a known fact that he did take away with him $100 in money. We think that the appellee, Scott, had reasonable grounds and probable cause for believing that said Dickinson had removed, intended to remove, and would remove, his effects out of the State of Virginia, so that there would not probably be left therein sufficient effects of his, Dickinson, the debtor, to satisfy the debt due to or the claim of him, Scott, the creditor, when judgment should be obtained therefor, should only the ordinary process of law be used to obtain such judgment. The evidence of the record shows "the existence of the state of facts in which it (the law) allows the extraordinary remedy of attachment." Claflin v. Steinbock & Co., 18 Gratt. 861. On the 11th of March, 1880, L. R. Dickinson was a resident of the State of Virginia, and on that day he secretly VOL. LXXVIII-24 Opinion. and suddenly left the State, leaving his home and family, and making no provision for their removal. Exposed to the heavy penalties of the violated law of the State, and the accusations of his own guilty conscience, he was a fugitive and an unknown wanderer, who could not stay, or intend to stay, in any place, or acquire any abode or residence as contradistinguished from a mere locality of existence. Long v. Ryan, 30 Gratt. 731. And the facts of the case do not afford any evidence of a change of residence by him. But while it is true that an attachment cannot become a lien upon the property of a non-resident defendant, who has never been a resident of this State, it is, we think, equally true that an attachment, under § 3, ch. 148, of the Code, may be sued out and become a lien upon the property of a non-resident of this State who has but lately removed or absconded from the State; that such an attachmen is expressly within the meaning and intent of the statute, which has expressly provided that such attachment shall be returned to the next term of the circuit, county or corporation court in which the debtor last resided. § 6, ch. 148, Code 1873; Barton's Law Practice, p. 306; Daniel's Attachments, p. 58. The instructions given by the court to the jury were appropriate to the facts of the case in evidence; and they were substantially right; and we do not think the court erred in refusing to give the instructions asked for by the appellant. And from the whole record in the case, we think it clear that, even under the instructions asked for by the appellant, a different verdict could not have been rightly found. Danville Bank v. Waddill, 27 Gratt. 451. He who alleges a change of residence must prove such change of residence. Philson's Trustee v. Bushong, &c., 29 Gratt. 240; Lindsay v. Murphy, 76 Va. 430. And, in this connection, it may be remarked that the learned counsel for the appellant, Starke, insisted, on the trial in the court Opinion. below, that the attachment of the appellee, Scott, was invalid, for the reason that said L. R. Dickinson was not a non-resident of this State on the 15th of March, 1880, the day on which the appellee Scott's attachment was levied. Upon the whole case, we think the judgments complained of were right, and that they must be affirmed. LEWIS, P., and HINTON, J., dissented. JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. Syllabus-Statement. Richmond. STOVALL V. BORDER GRANGE BANK. December 13th, 1883. 1. PRACTICE IN CHANCERY-Parties.-All interested in relief sought by bill should be made parties—either plaintiffs or defendants. 2. IDEM—Enforcing judgment lien.—Judgment creditor need not exhaust his remedies at law, before going into chancery, to subject his debtor's land. Code 1873, ch. 182, 9; Price v. Thrash, 30 Gratt. 515. 3. IDEM-Principal and surety.-In suit to enforce judgment lien on lands of principal debtor and his sureties, principal's lands should be exhausted before subjecting that of sureties. Horton v. Bond, 28 Gratt. 815. 4. IDEM-Idem-Idem-Receiver.-In such suit a receiver should not be appointed of the lands of one surety before subjecting the lands of principal and before taking any steps against the lands of the cosurety. 5. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY-Co-sureties-Contribution.-Negotiable note ran thus: "Sixty days after date, we, W & Co., principal, and S & L, securities, promise to pay," &c.; the note was signed by L after the other parties had signed it, without the knowledge of S, and W & Co. agreed with L, also without the knowledge of S, "that there should be no trouble about the note, that W & Co. and S would take care of it," HELD: 1. This is a joint promise. L is bound as co-surety with S, and bound to contribute. 2. When successive endorsers all endorse for accommodation of maker, though at different times and without mutual agreement, they are co-sureties and in equity liable to contribution. Hence S's ignorance that L signed the note did not affect their relation as co-sureties. Appeal from decree of corporation court of Danville, pronounced in the chancery cause of the Border Grange Statement. Bank and Thomas J. Lee against J. T. Stovall and A. P. Whitfield. The bank obtained a judgment against said Stovall, Whitfield and Lee for $1,500; and Lee obtained a judgment against Stovall and Whitfield for $5,880.40. Execution was issued on the first on 13th January, 1881. On this the sergeant made return on 7th March, 1881, "not executed by order of the plaintiffs' counsel," and that counsel endorsed the execution with a direction that it should not be levied as to any of the parties. Whereupon the bank and Lee filed their bill against Stovall and Whitfield to subject the lands of Stovall to payment of the judgments, alleging that Whitfield had conveyed his property to secure Stovall as his surety; that Stovall owned large landed property, consisting of many valuable lots in Danville with improvements and other large tracts in different localities; alleging that Stovall and Whitfield should on oath give a full inventory of all property owned by them liable to said judgments and executions, and to state where and in whose possession the same was, in order that it might be sold to pay their debts, and praying that a receiver might be appointed to take charge thereof. Stovall demurred to the bill for want of proper parties defendants, and filed a plea to same effect, and answered with inventory of property, real and personal, estimated at over $60,000, yielding an income of over $3,000. Testimony was taken, the depositions filed, and the cause coming on to be heard, the court overruled the demurrer and the plea; decided that Stovall was not entitled to contribution from Lee on the first judgment; directed an account of the real estate of Whitfield and of the liens thereon; also an account of the real estate of Stovall and the liens, and an inquiry whether the rents and profits of such estates, respectively, would in five years pay the liens, and appointed a receiver to collect the rents on the estate of Sto |