crop. Engle v. Engle, 3 W. Va. 246. See the titles DOWER; WILLS. following the sale. In June of the last year of the term it was sold, and in consequence of the threats of the purchasers, one of whom was one of the lessors, to reap any crops that might be sowed, the lessee did not sow any fall crops. It was held, that he was entitled to a deduction from his rent on that account. Mason v. Moyers, 2 Entitled to Growing Crops under Life Estate.-A husband devised his farm to his wife for life, the remainder to his sons in fee, together with all "personal property" thereon at his death. It was held, that crops growing on the land at the testator's death, together with all other personal prop- Rob. 606. See the title LANDLORD erty thereon passed to the wife for life | AND TENANT. with remainder to the those on other land not gether with all moneys, bonds, and choses in action, passed to the execuDunford v. Jackson, 2 Va. Dec. 196. See the title WILLS. tors. sons, while When One Tenant May Recover of devised, to- Another.-A lease for a term of years stipulated that the land should be sown with wheat and timothy the last autumn of the term, which terminated in the spring. At the end of the term the lessee vacated, and they were leased again to another lessee, who harvested the wheat. It was held, that the first lessee was entitled to recover D. UNDER RELATIONSHIP OF At the common law where land is leased for a certain number of years, and the period of its termination is fixed and certain, and the lease is silent as to who shall be entitled to the of the second lessee the value of the wheat. Kelley v. Todd, 1 W. Va. 197. See the title LANDLORD AND TEN ANT. The plaintiff in this suit lived upon growing crops on the land at the end land belonging to his father and by the of the term, the offgoing tenant is not consent of whom he let the land by entitled to the waygoing crop; but written agreement under seal to A for where the lease recognizes the right one year with the privilege of keeping to sow in the last year of the term, it for another year. The further stipuand the tenant is restricted to the cul- lations of the agreement were that the tivation of certain portions of the land plaintiff should find the tools for workand pays an equal annual rental suming the land, the seed sown upon it, for its use, he has a right to reap the and the feed for the horse worked waygoing crop, where the lease is silent as to who is entitled thereto. Kel- upon it, while A should board himself and family at his own expense, do all ley v. Todd, 1 W. Va. 197, citing Ma- the work in the crop, and when the son . Moyers, 2 Rob. 606, distinguishcrop was gathered should give to plaining Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh 632. See tiff one-half of all that was made on the farm; A, after entry, assigned his lease to a second party who bound himself under seal to execute A's part. This second party transferred the lease to still a third party who made a contract with the plaintiff to occupy the premises under like provisions entered into by plaintiff and A. This last party accordingly raised a crop. Subsequent to this entry the father of plaintiff conveyed the land in fee to the last mentioned occupant who in turn conveyed the title LANDLORD AND TENANT. 2. Rights of Tenants. Entitled to Deduction in Rent When Threats of Purchasers Prevented Sowing. While a suit was pending by creditors of a deceased person to subject land to the payment of their debts, it was rented by the owners for three years with the agreement that if it should be sold during the term then the lease should terminate on April 1, it to the defendant with notice of the lease. Defendant gathered the crop and appropriated some to his use. Whilst the crop was being gathered plaintiff demanded his share but defendant refused. This was held, not to be a lease, rendering rent in kind, as the reservation of the one-half crop was not incident to the reversion, and consequently gave no right of distress, but the contract constitutes plaintiff and defendant joint tenants and as such the plaintiff may recover his onehalf share of the crop. Lowe v. Miller, 3 Gratt. 206, 207, 212, 213. What Emblements Pass to Executors of Tenant for Life.-The common law gives to the executors of the tenant for life, such emblements, and such only, as were seeded in his lifetime. As to such crops as are put in after his death, the executors (in a case where the common-law rule governs), should be charged a reasonable rent for the land, to be paid to the persons entitled in reversion or remainder, according to their several rights. Thompson v. Thompson, 6 Munf. 514. 3. When Cropper Is Not Tenant. Where a land owner contracts with land as agent, and reaps the crop of wheat; the ward then dies, and the guardian sells and delivers the wheat as the husband's property, and takes receipts for it in the name of the husband, who, with the guardian's consent agrees on the price with the purchaser; it was held, that the wheat was the property of the husband, and the purchaser is liable to him, and not to the guardian, for the price. Guerrant . Hocker, 7 Leigh 366. See the title GUARDIAN AND WARD. F. UNDER RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND TRUSTEE. 1. Where Injunction Lies. If a trustee claims a growing crop of wheat, which in his absence another trustee takes possession of and commences cutting, the cestui que trust in the first deed may file a bill that the second trustee be enjoined from selling the wheat, which he has cut, and for the appointment of a receiver and other appropriate relief; for in such a case a court of law could furnish no adequate relief for the wrong complained of, and a court of equity had jurisdiction. Kerr v. Hill, 27 W. Va. 576. III. Code Provisions as to Growing Crops Not Severed. one to crop his land and to give him part of the crop after paying all advances, and the crop has not been di- A. NO DISTRESS OR LEVY-INvided, such cropper is not a tenant, but a mere employee, and the ownership of the entire crop is in the land owner. Parrish v. Com., 81 Va. 1. 4. Landlord May Sue for Damage to Crop. The owner of land, who has leased it to a tenant for a share of the crop, may sue for a tort of a wrongdoer damaging the growing crop. Neal v. Ohio River Co., 47 W. Va. 216, 34 S. E. 914. DIAN CORN EXCEPTED. By W. Va. Code, 1899, ch. 41, § 18, it is provided that no growing crop, not severed, shall be liable to distress or levy, except Indian corn, which may be taken at any time after October 15, in any year. Hubbs . Swabacker, 51 W. Va. 441, 41 S. E. 164. See also, Va. Code, 1904, tit. 16, ch. 39, § 904. IV. Offenses Created by Illegal If a cropper forcibly, or against the OF consent of a landowner, take the crop from the possession of the latter, the taking is larceny, robbery, or other offense, according to the circumstances of the case. Parrish v. Com., 81 Va. 1. E. UNDER RELATIONSHIP GUARDIAN AND WARD. 1. Right of Husband of Ward. After marriage of a female ward, the guardian continues in possession of her V. Evidence. A. ADMISSIBILITY IN GENERAL. A crop of grass growing in a meadow, and partly matured, affords a basis for measure of damages for the wrongful destruction of the crop by fire as for the value of the crop matured into hay. Kyle . Ohio River R. Co., 49 W. Va. 296, 38 S. E. 489. See the title FIRES. title FIRES. B. PAROL EVIDENCE. See the explain a written contract of lease for a fixed and certain period. Harris v. Carson, 7 Leigh 632. See the title PAROL EVIDENCE. VII. What Deeds of Trust Conveying Crops Not Fraudulent. to A deed of trust which among other things conveys growing crops of wheat, And in an action for the destruction rye, and oats, and which is not to be of a crop of grass by fire, evidence of enforced for two years from its date, the value of the usual crop of hay is is not necessarily fraudulent as to credadmissible, and not to be rejected as itors. Cochran v. Paris, 11 Gratt. 348. proving profits mere conjectural or. See the titles DEEDS OF TRUST; speculative. Kyle v. Ohio River R. Co., FRAUDULENT AND VOLUN 49 W. Va. 296, 38 S. E. 489. TARY CONVEYANCES. A deed of trust given in 1870 secure a bona fide debt of $10,000, evidenced by four notes payable in one, two, three, and four years and conveying a tract of land with the crops then upon or thereafter grown upon the land until the said notes are fully paid, and other property, is not fraudulent per se on its face. Brockenbrough v. Brockenbrough, 31 Gratt. 580. See the titles DEEDS OF TRUST; FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCES. 1. When Admissible. To Explain Intention of Parties Conveying Crop.-There was no error in permitting parol evidence of the intention of the parties to a deed that the purchaser should have the growing crop, that being in harmony and not inconsistent with the deed. Robinson v. Pitzer, 3 W. Va. 370. See the title PAROL EVIDENCE. To Prove Understanding as to Condition of Sale. Where there is an understanding before a public sale of land that the purchaser does not get the growing crop of wheat, this understanding need not be evidenced by any writing, but may be proven by parol evidence. Kerr v. Hill, 27 W. Va. 577. See the title PAROL EVIDENCE. 2. When Not. A deed of trust to secure bona fide creditors, conveying land, slaves, and crops cut and growing, not to be enforced for two years, reserving the profits in the meantime to the grantor, and directing the surplus proceeds of sale, after payment of the debts secured, to be paid to the grantor, is not fraudulent per se, though made Parol Evidence of Usage as to Way- without the knowledge of creditors. going Crops Can Not Explain Written Dance v. Seaman, 11 Gratt. 778. See Contract.-Parol evidence of a usage the titles DEEDS OF TRUST; for the offgoing tenant to have the FRAUDULENT AND VOLUNTARY waygoing crop, is not admissible to CONVEYANCES. I. Definition, 101. CROSS BILLS. II. Answer as Cross Bill, 101. A. In General, 101. 1. Independent of Statute in Virginia, 101. C. Object in Allowing, 103. D. Form and Sufficiency, 103. E. Parties and Process, 104. F. Effect, 104. 1. In General, 104. 2. As Bar to Cross Bill, 104. 3. To Give Relief between Codefendants,.101. III. Petition or Bill as Cross Bill, 104. A. In General, 106. B. To Obtain Affirmative Relief, 107. 1. When Proper, 107. a. General Principle, 107. b. Applications of Principle, 107. (1) Decree of Conveyance, 107. (2) Injunction against Sale of Stock, 107. (3) Rescission of Contracts, 107. (4) Confirmation of Contracts, 108. (5) Inquiry as to Investments by Executors, 108. (6) To Enforce Lien of Judgment, 108. (7) To Ascertain Amounts and Priorities of Liens, 108. (8) Attacking Liens as Fraudulent Preferences, 109. (9) Attacking Deed for Fraud, 109. (10) Order of Restitution from Decree of Commissioner, 109. (11) To Set Aside Interlocutory Decree of Sale, 109. 2. Indispensability, 109. a. In General, 109. (1) Under Strict Rales of Pleading, 109. (2) Qualifications and Exceptions, 110. (a) Qualifications, 110. (b) Suits for an Account, 110. (c) Bills for Specific Performance, 110. (d) Reason for Exceptions, 111. b. Between Codefendants, 111. C. To Obtain Discovery, 112. D. To Introduce Newly-Arising Defenses, 112. V. Time for Filing, 112. VI. Form and Sufficiency, 113. A. Relevancy to Original Bill, 113. B. Allegations Showing Equitable Jurisdiction, 114. D. Prayer for Relief, 115. VII. Parties, 115. A. Necessity for, 115. B. Complainant, 116. C. Defendant, 116. D. Adding New Parties, 117. E. Want of Proper Parties, 117. VIII. Process, 118. IX. Answer, Replication or Demurrer, 119. A. Answer, 119. B. Necessity for Special Replication, 119. C. Effect of Failure to Reply, 119. D. Demurrer, 120. 1. Grounds, 120. 2. Effect of Overruling Demurrer to Cross Bill, 120. X. Effect of Dismissal of Original Bill, 120. XI. Hearing, 121. A. Causes Heard Together, 121. B. Stay of Proceedings, 121. C. Evidence, 121. D. Effect of Dismissal, 121. E. Executions Issue Severally, 122. XII. Appeal, 122. XIII. Leave to Amend after Remand of Cause, 122. CROSS REFERENCES. See the titles ACTIONS, vol. 1, p. 122; ANSWERS, vol. 1, p. 389; SET-OFF, RECOUPMENT AND COUNTERCLAIM. And see references given in body of title. As to cross bills for divorce, see the title DIVORCE. I. Definition. "In Daniel's Chancery Practice, 1st American edition, at pages 1742 and 1743, chapter 31, it is said: 'A cross bill is a bill brought by a defendant against a plaintiff or other parties in a former bill depending, touching the matter in question in that bill.'" West Virginia Oil, etc., Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 637. "A cross bill is a proceeding to procure a complete determination of a matter in litigation. It is a mode of defense to the original subject of litigation." Derbyshire v. Jones, 94 Va. 140, 26 S. E. 416. See post, "In General, IV. A. "A cross bill, ex vi terminorum, implies a bill brought by a defendant in a suit against the plaintiff in the same suit, or against other defendants in the same suit, or against both, touching the matters in question in the original bill." Higginbotham v. May, 90 Va. 234, 17 S. E. 941; West Virginia Oil, etc., Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 637. II. Answer as Cross Bill. See generally, the title ANSWERS, vol. 1, p. 389. A. IN GENERAL. 1. Independant of Statute in Virginia. See post, "Object in Allowing," II, C. An answer containing new matter calling for affirmative relief may be treated as a cross bill. Spoor v. Tilson, 97 Va. 279, 33 S. E. 609; Adkins v. |