V. Review. See the titles APPEAL indictment under § 1, ch. 74, of acts of AND 1875, providing that cruelty to animals ERROR, vol. 1, p. 581; MANDATE shall be deemed a misdemeanor, where AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. the court in rendering judgment upon Reversible Error.-In an indictment a verdict of guilty under the statute, under § 1, ch. 74, of acts of 1875, it was adds to its judgment as a part thereof held reversible error for the court in an order requiring defendant to give rendering a judgment upon a verdict a bond with approved security to keep of guilty under this statute to add to the peace and be of good behavior or its judgment as a part thereof an order in default thereof be imprisoned till requiring a defendant to give a bond such bond is given, and such judgment with approved security to keep the is reversed by the appellate court, peace or be for good behavior, and in proper judgment will be entered by default thereof, be imprisoned till such said court without remanding it to the bond is given. State v. Gould, 26 W. court below, because the court below Va. 258. See the title BAIL AND in effect said that no imprisonment RECOGNIZANCE, vol. 2, p. 196. should be added as further punishment. Mandate by Appellate Court.-In an State v. Gould, 26 W. Va. 258. CUL DE SAC.-See Talbott v. Richmond, etc., R. Co., 31 Gratt. 685, 692. And see generally, the title STREETS AND HIGHWAYS. Cumulative Evidence. See the titles CONTINUANCES, vol. 3, p. 270; EVIDENCE; NEW TRIALS. Cumulative Punishment. See the title SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT. Cumulative Remedies. See the titles ABATEMENT, REVIVAL AND SURVIVAL, vol. 1, p. 49; ACTIONS, vol. 1, p. 126; ARBITRATION AND AWARD, vol. 1, p. 710. Cumulative Voting. See the titles ELECTIONS; STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS. Curative Acts. See the titles ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, vol. 1, p. 120; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, vol. 3, p. 176. CURATOR.-See the titles EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; GUARDIAN AND WARD; INSANITY; SPENDTHRIFTS AND SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS. The word curator annexed to the name of a defendant against whom a decree is rendered is descriptive merely, and the decree is a personal decree, although tiere be superadded a direction to the defendant "as curator" to collect and apply certain funds to its payment. Fulkerson v. Taylor, 100 Va. 426, 41 S. E. 863. Cure by Verdict. See the title AMENDMENTS, vol. 1, p. 359. CURRENT EXPENSES.-See Spilman v. Parkersburg, 35 W. Va. 605, 14 S. E. 282. See also, the title MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. CURRENT FUNDS.-The words of the bond that it is "to be paid in current funds," does not necessarily raise the presumption, that it is to be paid in another and more valuable medium; but their proper interpretation depends upon the time when and the circumstances under which they are used. The most just and reasonable interpretation of the words current funds, is, that they are intended to guard against any contingency of an obligation to pay in coin. Meredith v. Salmon, 21 Gratt. 762. See also, Wrightsman v. Bowyer, 24 Gratt. 439; Sexton v. Windell, 23 Gratt. 538. CURRENT MONEY.-In Smith v. Walker, 1 Call 38, it is said: "This bond is for value received this 15th day of May, 1778, I promise to pay, etc., one hundred and forty-one pounds current money of Virginia, etc.,' which imports that the value was then received, and therefore evidence to show that the contract was in 1774, would be in express contradiction of the words of the bond, which the rule supposes can not be done. It is said, however, that parol evidence may be received, because the words current money are equivocal; but it means paper as well as specie; and as the former is perfectly consistent with the other parts of the bond, the case is to be governed by the general directions of the act." CURTESY. I. Definitions and Distinctions, 149. II. Requisites, 149. A. In General, 149. B. Marriage, 150. C. Seisin of the Wife, 150. D. Birth of Issue, 151. E. Death of Wife, 151. III. Nature and Incidents, 152. A. Curtesy Initiate, 152. B. Curtesy Consummate, 153. IV. Estate Subject to Curtesy, 151. A. In General-Must Be Estate of Inheritance, 154. C. Wife's Equitable Separate Estate, 155. D. Wife's Statutory or Legal Separate Estate, 156. V. How Curtesy Defeated, 157. A. Conveyance in Lieu of Curtesy, 157. B. By Divorce, 157. C. By Desertion, 158. D. By Antenuptial Contract, 158. E. By Husband's Joining in Wife's Conveyance, 159. F. By Instrument Creating Wife's Estate, 159. G. Deed of Wife, 159. H. By Wife's Devise, 159. I. Conveyance of Husband, 160. CROSS REFERENCES. See the titles DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; DIVORCE; DOWER; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; HUSBAND AND WIFE; SEPARATE ESTATE OF MARRIED WOMEN; WILLS. I. Definitions and Distinctions. | be held by her See post, “Requisites," II. held by her husband therein, whether they had issue born alive during the coverture or not." W. Va. "Curtesy is the estate to which by Code, 1899, ch. 65, § 15, p. 666; Alder common law a man is entitled, on the ements of which she was seised in son v. Alderson, 46 W. Va. 242, 33 S. F. 228. But the former statute, W. Va. Code, 1868, ch. 65, § 15, as amended by acts 1872-1873, ch. 207, § 2, provid ing that "if a married woman die seized of an estate of inheritance in lands, her husband shall be tenant by the curtesy in the same," did not dispense with any of the four common-law requisites of curtesy; marriage, seisin of the wife, but was only declaratory of the comissue born alive and death of the wife, Va. 455; Fulton v. Johnson, 24 W. mon law. Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Va. 95. Distinguished from Marital Right."Although the tenancy by the curtesy is ordinarily, to appearance, a mere prolongation of the tenancy by the marital right, enabling the husband to hold for his own life what otherwise would terminate with the life of the wife, yet the Tenancy, by the curtesy is a mere prolongation of the tenancy by the marital right, enabling the plaintiff to hold for his own life what would other-tenancy by the marital right attaches wise terminate with the death of his wife. Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 602. Curtesy Initiate.-The estate by the curtesy initiate, before the act of 18761877, was a marital right of the husband to the possibility of an estate by the curtesy consummate, to an estate for life, in the wife's realty, if there should be or had been issue, and if the husband should survive the wife. to some estates to which the tenancy by the curtesy can not attach, though there should be issue of the marriage, as, for example, estates for life-even estates pur autre vie. And to other estates it can not attach, in which there Browne v. Bockover, 84 Va. 432, 4 S. E. 745. may be curtesy, as, for example, estates held for the separate use of the wife. In such estates, under some circumstances, there may be curtesy; but it is of their very essence not to be subject to the marital right." Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599. II. Requisites. West Virginia.-Under the present (1899) Code of West Virginia, “if a married woman die seized of an estate of inheritance in lands, her husband A. IN GENERAL. shall be tenant by curtesy in the same. An estate by the curtesy in the lands of which a married woman may hereafter die seized, shall exist and Curtesy Initiate. The requisites of curtesy initiate are marriage, seisin of the wife during coverture and birth of issue alive. Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 816; Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639, 46 Am. Rep. 740; Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599. Curtesy Consummate. In order to entitle the husband to an estate by the curtesy consummate, the above requisites must exist and the death of the wife in the husband's lifetime must also occur. Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639, 46 Am. Rep. 740; Muse v. Friedenwald, 77 Va. 57; Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599; Hutchings v. Commercial Bank, 91 Va. 75, 20 S. E. 950; Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 816. B. MARRIAGE. The tenancy by curtesy being a species of marital right, therefore marriage was an essential requisite to its existence. Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 602; Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639; Browne v. Bockover, 84 Va. 432, 4 S. E. 745; Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Va. 455; Fulton v. Johnson, 24 W. Va. 95; Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 816; Alderson v. Alderson, 46 W. Va. 242, 33 S. E. 228. It was the general doctrine of the common law that marriage alone, without the birth of issue, casts upon the husband an estate in all the wife's real property in possession, whether of inheritance or of freehold, for life during the joint lives of husband and wife. Upon the birth of issue the husband became tenant by curtesy in all his wife's real estate of inheritance. See Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 602; Merritt v. Hughes, 36 W. Va. 356, 15 S. E. 56; Pickens v. Kniseley, 36 W. Va. 794, 15 S. E. 997; Arnold v. Bunnell, 42 W. Va. 473, 26 S. E. 359; Guernsey v. Lazear, 51 W. Va. 329, 41 S. E. 405; Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 815. C. SEISIN OF THE WIFE. Necessity for Actual Seisin.-Seisin in law of the wife was not sufficient to invest the husband with an estate as tenant by the curtesy. Nothing short of seisin in fact, or actual seisin would effect this. Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Va. 455; Stuart v. Stuart, 18 W. Va. 675; Fulton v. Johnson, 24 W. Va. 95; Jones v. Thorn, 45 W. Va. 186, 32 S. E. 173. Under Va. Code, 1819, ch. 107, § 2 (see Va. Code, 1887, § 2274), allowing the widow to remain on the premises until the assignment of her dower, free of rent, where the widow thus remains in possession, she is seised of the premises; and if her daughter, one of the heirs of her husband, marries, has issue born alive and dies in her mother's lifetime, the husband of the daughter is denied curtesy because of the lack of actual seisin during coverture. Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129. Distinction between Seisin in Fact and Seisin in Law. “Seisin in fact or in deed, as Lord Coke calls it, or actual seisin, means possession of the freehold by the pedis positio of one's self or one's tenant or agent, or by construction of law, as in case of a commonwealth's grant, a conveyance under the statute of uses, or doubtless of grants or devise, where there is no actual adverse occupancy. Seisin in law is a right to the possession of the freehold, when there is no adverse occupancy thereof, such as exists in the heir after descent of lands upon him before actual entry by himself or his tenant." Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Seim v. O'Grady, 42 W. Va. 77, 24 S. E. 994; 2 Minor Inst. (4th Ed.) 123. There is a seisin in deed and a seisin in law, and the difference between the two is, that in one case an actual possession has been taken, and in the other there is a right like that of an heir upon descent from his ancestor, while the possession is vacant, before he has made an actual entry. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. 330, 47 S. E. 90. Livery of Seisin.-At common law livery of seisin means delivery of actual corporeal possession. There may be, it is true, a seisin in law as well as in deed or fact; but where the word is used, it certainly may be taken to mean seisin in fact as well as law. If any distinction is to be drawn, it would first import actual possession. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. 330, 47 S. E. 90. Purchaser at Judicial Sale.-By virtue of a decree of confirmation of a judicial sale of vacant and unoccupied lots or lands, the purchaser has, by construction of law, such possession as amounts to such seisin in fact as will entitle the husband of such purchaser to curtesy in such lots or land. Seim v. O'Grady, 42 W. Va. 77, 24 S. E. 994. Trust Estate. Where real estate is devised to trustees for the use of the wife and family of the testator's son, and to his heirs forever, and the son ceases to have a family, he is not thereby entitled to any curtesy in his wife's interest in the property in case of her death before their youngest child attains majority, the wife never having in fact been seised of the land during the coverture. Stuart v. Stuart, 18 W. Va. 675. Thus where one dies intestate, seised in fact of an estate of inheritance in land, and one of his heirs is a married woman and dies, she has seisin in fact so as to entitle her surviving husband to curtesy in her share. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. 330, 49 S. E. 90. Seisin of Coparcener.-Actual possession of land descended to several heirs by some of the coparceners gives actual possession to a married woman coparcener so as to entitle her husband to curtesy in her share, though he or she were never in actual possession. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. 330, 47 S. E. 90. alleges that a person was "seised and possessed" of land, it prima facie imports seisin in fact, not mere seisin in law. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. 330, 47 S. E. 90. D. BIRTH OF ISSUE. At common law issue born alive of the marriage was a requisite of curtesy. Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639; Browne v. Bockover, 84 Va. 424, 4 S. E. 245; Porter v. Porter, 27 Gratt. 599; Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 Va. 129; Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 813. W. Va. Code of 1868.-The West Virginia Code, 1868, ch. 65, § 15, as amended by acts, 1872, 1873, ch. 207, § 2, providing that "if a married woman die seised of an estate of inheritance in lands, her husband shall be tenant by the curtesy in the same," did not dispense with the requisite as to birth of issue, but was merely declaratory of the common law. Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Vą. 455. See also, Fulton v. Johnson, 24 W. Va. 95. Act of 1882.-But since the act of 1882, W. Va. Code, 1899, ch. 65, § 15, the birth of issue is no longer a requisite to curtesy in West Virginia, it being provided by said section that “an estate by the curtesy in the lands of which a married woman may hereafter die seised shall exist and be held by her husband therein, whether they had issue born alive during the coverture or not." Winkler v. Winkler, 18 W. Va. 455. See also, Alderson v. Alderson, 46 W. Va. 242, 33 S. E. 228; Fulton v. Johnson, 24 W. Va. 95. As soon as a child was born, the husband's right to curtesy was said to be initiate. Wyatt v. Smith, 25 W. Va. 813. E. DEATH OF WIFE. Seisin Without Entry. If one die in- The death of the wife during the lifetestate seised in fact of land, that seisin time of her husband is a requisite of in fact is cast by descent on his heir, curtesy consummate. Porter v. Porter, and the heir has seisin in fact without 27 Gratt. 599; Carpenter v. Garrett, 75 entry. Bragg v. Wiseman, 55 W. Va. Va. 129; Muse v. Friedenwald, 77 Va. 330, 47 S. E. 90. 57; Breeding v. Davis, 77 Va. 639; Allegation of Seisin.-When a bill Browne v. Bockover, 84 Vą. 424, 4 S. E. |