God, Reason, and Theistic ProofsAttempting to prove the existence of God is an ancient and venerable tradition within the discipline known as the philosophy of religion. But can we truly prove the existence of God using human reason alone? Just how do we prove the existence of God? Why try? Which, if any, of the various theistic proofs are persuasive? God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs tackles these fundamental questions head-on. Stephen T. Davis examines a cross-section of theistic proofs that have been offered by theologians and thinkers from Anselm to Paley, explaining in clear terms what theistic proofs are and what they try to accomplish. He then goes on to explore in depth the relationship between theistic proofs and religious realism, the ontological argument for the existence of God, the cosmological and teleological arguments, the position known as foundationalism, and the argument from religious experience. Wisely structured and clearly written, this volume will make an excellent resource for those looking for a comprehensive introduction to the debate surrounding the existence of God, or for those seeking intellectual validation for their faith. |
Contents
What is a Theistic Proof? | 1 |
II THE GOAL OF A THEISTIC PROOF | 5 |
III ASSUMPTIONS OF THEISTIC PROOFS | 8 |
IV WHAT IF A THEISTIC PROOF WERE SUCCESSFUL? | 9 |
V DO THEISTIC PROOFS ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING? | 12 |
The Ontological Argument | 15 |
II ANSELMS ARGUMENT | 21 |
III GAUNILOS CRITICISMS OF THE OA | 26 |
III HUMES OBJECTIONS | 100 |
IV EVOLUTION AS A CRITICISM OF THE DA | 106 |
V NEWER VERSIONS OF THE DA | 107 |
VI CRITICISMS OF NEWER DAS | 111 |
VII CONCLUSION | 115 |
VIII SWINBURNE AND BAYES THEOREM | 116 |
Religious Experience | 121 |
II RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE AS A THEISTIC PROOF | 122 |
IV KANT S CRITICISM | 32 |
V Rowes criticism | 35 |
VI TWO BRIEF REFUTATIONS OF THE OA | 42 |
Theistic Proofs and Religious Realism | 46 |
II ANSELM ON CONCEIVING | 48 |
III D Z PHILLIPS POSITION | 50 |
IV ANSELM AGAINST PHILLIPS | 56 |
V CONCLUSION | 58 |
The Cosmological Argument | 60 |
II THE THIRD WAY | 64 |
III WHY IS INFINITE REGRESS IMPOSSIBLE IN A HIERARCHICAL SERIES? | 70 |
IV CRITICISMS OF THE CA | 73 |
Theistic Proofs and Foundationalism | 78 |
II REFORMED EPISTEMOLOGY | 81 |
III ANALYSING PLANTINGAs ARGUMENT | 85 |
IV CRITICISMS OF F O UN D ATI O N A LI S M | 90 |
The Design Argument | 97 |
II PALEYS VERSION OF THE DA | 98 |
III swinburnes argument | 128 |
IV OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT | 131 |
V CONCLUSION | 137 |
Other Theistic Proofs | 139 |
II A GENERIC COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT | 144 |
III THE MORAL ARGUMENT | 146 |
IV THE KALAAM COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT | 150 |
Alternatives to Theistic Proofs | 156 |
III CRITICISMS OF THE WAGER | 159 |
IV JAMES ARGUMENT | 166 |
V OBJECTIONS TO JAMES ARGUMENT | 171 |
Conclusion | 176 |
III DO THEISTIC PROOFS PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF GOD? | 182 |
IV THE VALUE OF THEISTIC PROOFS | 188 |
Bibliography | 194 |
201 | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept accordingly actual infinite Anselm Anthropic Principle Aquinas argue atheists begs the question believe Camus causal Chapter Christian claim concept conclusion contingent convince Cosmological Argument Craig criticism crucial D. Z. Phillips definition depend design arguers discuss entail epistemic Epistemology evidence example exist in reality existence of God existing thing explanation fact faith follows foundationalism Gaunilo GCB exists GCLI God's greatest conceivable human Hume incoherent infinite number intellectual James Kant logically moral mover natural theology necessary non-existing thing notion objection obviously ontological argument Oxford Pascal Pascal's Wager perhaps person Phillips philosophers Philosophy of Religion Plantinga plausible possible premise principle probability properly basic properties proposition Proslogion rational reason religious belief religious experience religious nonrealism religious realism Richard Swinburne seems sense simply sort successful theistic proof Suppose Swinburne term theism theistic provers theory truth University Press veridical versions W-conceive Wager