Cooperation under AnarchyThis path-breaking book offers fresh insights into a perennial problem. At times, the absence of centralized international authority precludes attainment of common goals. Yet, at other times, nations realize mutual interests through cooperation under anarchy. Drawing on a diverse set of historical cases in security and economic affairs, the contributors to this special issue of World Politics not only provide a unified explanation of the incidence of cooperation and conflict, but also suggest strategies to promote the emergence of cooperation. |
Contents
| 1 | |
APPLICATIONS TO SECURITY AFFAIRS | 58 |
APPLICATIONS TO ECONOMIC AFFAIRS | 147 |
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS | 226 |
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actions actors agreement alliance American analysis arms race assumptions Axelrod banks behavior believe benefits bilateral Britain British central monetary powers concert conflict costs countries creditors crisis cult currency Deadlock debt debtor defensive devaluation domestic Duncan Snidal economic effects empirical Europe European example exploitation exports foreign France French future gains game models game theory game-theoretic German gold governments Hanse hegemon important incentives increase interests international politics international regimes issues iterated iterated game Jervis Kenneth Waltz Keohane large numbers linkage loans military misperceptions mobilization mutual cooperation mutual defection negotiations number of players offensive outcomes payoff structures percent perfect information play preferences Princeton University Press Prisoners problems reduce rescheduling retaliation Robert Robert Axelrod Robert Jervis Russia security dilemma shadow single-play situation Soviet stabilization Stag Hunt Stephen Van Evera sterling tariff theoretical Tit-for-Tat trade treaties unilateral strategy United weapons World Politics York