vey of them, we fhall find that they have fomething peculiar, which perhaps may deferve our attention. § 2. 1. The ideas they ftand for are made by the Underftanding. THE first particularity I fhall obferve in them, is, that the abstract ideas, or, if you please, the effences of the feveral fpecies of mixed modes, are made by the understanding, wherein they differ from those of fimple ideas; in which fort the mind has no power to make any one, but only receives fuch as are prefented to it, by the real existence of things operating upon it. § 3. 2. Made arbitrarily and without Patterns. In the next place, thefe effences of the fpecies of mixed modes, are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily, made without patterns, or reference to any real existence; wherein they differ from those of substances, which carry with them the fuppofition of fome real being, from which they are taken, and to which they are conformable. But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly: It unites and retains certain collections, as fo many diftinct fpecific ideas; whilft others, that as often occur in nature, and are as plainly fuggested by outward things, pafs neglected, without particular names or fpecifications. Nor does the mind, in thefe of mixed modes, as in the complex ideas of fubftances, examine them by the real existence of things, or verify them by patterns, containing fuch peculiar compofitions in nature. To know whether his idea of adultery or incest be right, will a man feek it any where amongst things exifting? Or is it true, because any one has been witnefs to fuch an action? No: but it fuffices here, that men having put together fuch a collection into one complex idea, that makes the archetype and fpecific idea, whether ever any fuch action were committed in rerum natura or no. § 4. How this is done. To understand this aright, we must confider wherein this making of thefe complex ideas confifts: and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those. which the mind had before; wherein the mind does thefe three things: First, it chooses a certain number: Secondly, it gives them connection, and makes them into one idea: Thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in thefe, and what liberty it takes in them, we fhall eafily observe how thefe effences of the fpecies of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind, and confequently, that the fpecies themselves are of mens making. § 5. Evidently arbitrary, that the Idea is often before the Exiftence. NOBODY can doubt, but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas, put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this fort of complex ideas may be made, abftracted, and have names given them, and fo a fpecies be conftituted, before any one individual of that fpecies ever exifted. Who can doubt. but the ideas of facrilege or adultery might be framed in the mind of men, and have names given them; and so these fpecies of mixed modes be constituted, before either of them was ever committed; and might be as well difcourfed of and reafoned about, and as certain truths difcovered of them, whilft yet they had no being but in the understanding, as well as now, that they have but too frequently a real exiftence? Whereby it is plain, how much the forts of mixed modes are the creatures of the understanding, where they have a being as fubfervient to all the ends of real truth and knowledge, as when they really exift and we cannot doubt but law-makers have often made laws about fpecies of actions, which were only the creatures of their own understandings; beings that had no other existence, but in their own minds. And I think nobody can deny, but that the refurrection was a fpecies of mixed modes in the mind, before it really existed. § 6. Inflances-Murder, Incest, Stabbing. To fee how arbitrarily thefe effences of mixed modes are made by the mind, we need but take a view of almost any of them. A little looking into them will fatisfy us, that it is the mind that combines feveral scattered independent ideas into one complex one, and by the common name it gives them, makes them the effence of a certain fpecies, without regulating itself by any connection they have in nature: For what greater connection in nature has the idea of a man, than the idea of a fheep, with killing; that this is made a particular species of action, fignified by the word murder, and the other not? Or what union is there in nature between the idea of the relation of a father, with killing, than that of a fon or neighbour; that those are combined into one complex idea, and thereby made the effence of the diftinct fpecies parricide, whilft the other make no diftinct fpecies at all? But though they have made killing a man's father, or mother, a distinct fpecies from killing his fon and daughter; yet in fome other cafes, fon and daughter are taken in too, as well as father and mother; and they are all equally comprehended in the fame fpecies, as in that of inceft. Thus the mind in mixed modes arbitrarily unites into complex ideas fuch as it finds convenient; whilst others that have altogether as much union in nature, are left loofe, and never combined into one idea, because they have no need of one name. It is evident then, that the mind by its free choice gives a connection to a certain number of ideas, which in nature have no more union with one another, than others that it leaves out why elfe is the part of the weapon the beginning of the wound is made with, taken notice of, to make the diftinct fpecies called ftabbing, and the figure and matter of the weapon left out? I do not fay this is done without reafon, as we fhall fee more by and by; but this I fay, that it is done by the free choice of the mind, purfuing its own ends; and that therefore these fpecies of mixed modes are the workmanship of the understanding: and there is nothing more evident than that for the most part, in the framing thefe ideas, the mind fearches not its patterns in nature, nor refers the ideas it makes to the real exiftence of things, but puts fuch together as may best ferve its own purposes, without tying itself to a precife imitation of any thing that really exifts. : § 7. But ftill fubfervient to the end of Language. BUT though thefe complex ideas, or effences of mixed modes, depend on the mind, and are made by it with great liberty, yet they are not made at random, and jumbled together without any reafon at all. Though thefe complex ideas be not always copied from nature, yet they are always fuited to the end for which abstract ideas are made and though they be combinations made of ideas that are loofe enough, and have as little union in themfelves, as feveral others to which the mind never gives a connection that combines them into one idea, yet they are always made for the convenience of communication, which is the chief end of language. The ufe of language is, by fhort founds to fignify with ease and dispatch general conceptions; wherein not only abundance of particulars may be contained, but also a great variety of independent ideas collected into one complex one. In the making, therefore, of the fpecies of mixed modes, men have had regard only to fuch combinations as they had occafion to mention one to another. Thofe they have combined into diftinct complex ideas, and given names to; whilst others that in nature have as near an union are left loose and unregarded: For to go no farther than human actions themselves, if they would make diftinct abstract ideas of all the varieties might be obferved in them, the number must be infinite, and the memory confounded with the plenty, as well as overcharged to little purpofe. It fuffices, that men make and name fo many complex ideas of thefe mixed modes, as they find they have occafion to have names for, in the ordinary occurrence of their affairs. If they join to the idea of killing, the idea of father or mother, and so make a diftinct species from killing a man's fon or neighbour, it is because of the different heinoufnefs of the crime, and the distinct punishment is due to the murdering a man's father and mother, different from what ought to be inflicted on the murder of a fon or neighbour; and therefore they find it neceffary to mention it by a diftin&t name, which is the end of making that distinct combination. But though the ideas of mother and daughter are fo differently treated, in reference to the idea of killing, that the one is joined with it, to make a distinct abftract idea with a name, and fo a distinct species, and the other not; yet in refpect of carnal knowledge, they are both taken in under inceft; and that still for the fame convenience of expreffing under one name, and reckoning of one fpecies, fuch unclean mixtures as have a peculiar turpitude beyond others; and this to avoid circumlocutions and tedious defcriptions. § 8. Whereof the intranflatable Words of divers Languages are a proof. A MODERATE skill in different languages will eafily fatiffy one of the truth of this; it being fo obvious to obferve great store of words in one language, which have not any that anfwer them in another; which plainly fhows, that thofe of one country, by their customs and manner of life, have found occafion to make feveral complex ideas, and give names to them, which others never collected into fpecific ideas. This could not have happened, if these species were the steady workmanship of nature, and not collections made and abstracted by the mind, in order to naming, and for the convenience of communication. The terms of our law, which are not empty founds, will hardly find words that anfwer them in the Spanish or Italian, no fcanty languages; much lefs, I think, could any one tranflate them into the Caribees or Wefloe tongues: and the Verfura of the Romans, or Corban of the Jews, have no words in other languages to answer them; the reason whereof is plain, from what has been faid. Nay, if we will look a little more nearly into this matter, and exactly compare different languages, we fhall find, that though they have words which in translations and dictionaries are fuppofed to answer one another, yet there is scarce one of ten amongst the names of complex ideas, efpecially of mixed modes, that ftands for the fame precife idea, which the word does that in dictionaries it is rendered by. There are no ideas more common, and lefs compounded, than the measures of time, extenfion, and weight; and the Latin names, hora, pes, libra, are without difficulty rendered by the |