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4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit.
Ś. Will and Understanding, two Powers.
6. Faculties.'
7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceflity.
8. Liberty, what.
9. Supposes Understanding and Will.
Ic. Belongs not to Volition.
11. Voluntary opposed to involuntary, not to necessary.
12. Liberty, what.
13. Neceflity, what.
14-20. Liberty belongs not to the Will.
21. But to the Agent or Man.
22-24. In respect of willing, a Man is not free.
25, 26, 27. The Will determined by something without it.
28. Volition, what.
29. What determines the Will.
30. Will and Desire must not be confounded.
31. Uneasiness determines the Will
32. Desire is Uncafiness.
33. The Uneasiness of Desire determines the Will.
34. This the spring of Action.
35. The greatest pofitive Good determines not the Will,

but Uneasiness.
36. Because the removal of Uneasiness is the first step to

37. Because Uneasiness alone is present.
38. Because all who allow the joys of Heaven possible,

pursue them not; but a great Uneasiness is never

39. Defire accompanies all Uneasiness.
40. The most pressing Uneasiness naturally determines the

41. All desire Happiness.
42. Happiness, what.
43. What Good is desired, what not.
44. Why the greatest Good is not always desired.
45. Why, not being desired, it moves not the Will.
46. Due confideration raises Desire.
47. The Power to fufpend the Prosecution of


makes for Consideration.
48. To be determined by our own Judgment is go Restraint

to Liberty.
49. The freeft Agents are so determined.


50. A constant Determination to a Pursuit of Happiness

no Abridgment of Liberty.
51. The Neceffity of pursuing true Happiness, the Founda-

tion of all Liberty.
32. The Reason of it.
53. Government of our Paffions the right Improvement of
54, 55. How Men come to pursue different Courses.
56. How Men come to choose ill.
57. First, From bodily Pains. Secondly, From wrong De.

fires, arising from wrong Judgment.
58, 59. Our Judgment of prefent Good or Evil always

60. From a wrong Judgment of what makes a necessary

part of their Happiness.
61, 62. A more particular Account of wrong Judgments.
63. In comparing present and future.
64, 65. Causes of this.
66. In considering Consequences of A&ions.
67. Causes of this
68. Wrong Judgment of what is necessary to our Happi-

69. We can change the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness

in things.
70, 71, 72, 73. Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeft

wrong Judgment.







Baron HERBERT of Cardiff, Lord Ross of Kendal, Par,

Fitzhugh, Marmion, St. Quintin, and Shurland; Lord President of his Majelty's most honourable Privy Council, and Lord Lieutenant of the County of Wilts and of South Wales.


'HIS treatise, which is grown up under your Lord

Ship’s eye, and has ventured into the world by your order, does now, by a natural kind of right, come to your Lordship for that protection which you several years fince promised it. It is not that I think any name, how great foever, fet at the beginning of a book, will be able to cover the faults that are to be found in it; things in print must stand and fall by their own worth, or the reader's fancy; but there being nothing more to be defired for truth than a fair unprejudised hearing, nobody is more likely to procure me that than your Lordship, who are allowed to have got so intimate an acquaintance with her in her more retired receffes. Your Lordship is known to have so far advanced your speculations in the most abstract and general knowledge of things beyond the ordinary reach or common methods, that your allowance and approbation of the design of this treatise will at least preserve it from being condemned without reading, and will prevail to have those parts a little weighed, which might otherwise, perhaps, be thought to deserve no consideration, for being somewhat out of the common road. The imputation of novelty

is a terrible charge amongst those who judge of mens heads, as they do of their perukes, by the fashion, and can allow none to be right but the received doctrines. Truth scarce ever yet carried it by vote anywhere at its first appearance : New opinions are always suspected, and usually opposed, without any other reason, but because they are not already common : But truth, like gold, is not the less so for being newly brought out of the mine; it is trial and examination must give it price, and not any antique fashion ; and though it be not yet current by the public stamp, yet it may for all that be as old as nature, and is certainly not the less genuine. Your Lordfhip can give great and convincing instances of this, whenever you please to oblige the public with some of those large and comprehensive discoveries you have made of truths hitherto unknown, unless to some few, to whom your Lordship has been pleased not wholly to conceal them. This alone were a fufficient reason, were there no other, why I should dedicate this Effay to your Lordship ; and its having some little correspondence with some parts of that nobler and vast system of the sciences your Lordship has made so new, exact, and instructive a draught of, I think it glory enough, if your Lordship permit me to boast, that here and there I have fallen into some thoughts not wholly different from yours. If your Lordship think fit, that, by your encouragement, this should appear in the world, I hope it may be a reason, some time or other, to lead your Lordship farther; and you will allow me to say, that you here give the world an earnest of something that, if they can bear with this, will be truly worth their expectation. This, my Lord, shows what a present I here make to your Lordfhip, just such as the poor man does to his rich and great neighbour, by whom the basket of flowers or fruit is not ill taken, though he has more plenty of his own growth, and in much greater perfection.' Worthless things receive a value when they are made the offerings of respect, esteem, and gratitude. These you have given me lo mighty and peculiar reasons to have in the highest degree for your Lordship, that

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