to fay, that to propose them as inftructive, is no better than trifling; for no one who has the ufe, of reafon can miss them, where it is neceffary they should be taken notice of, nor doubt of their truth, when he does take notice of them.

But if men will call propofitions identical, wherein the fame term is not affirmed of itself, whether they fpeak more properly than I, others must judge. This is certain, all that they fay of propofitions that are not identical in my fenfe, concerns not me, nor what I have faid; all that I have faid relating to thofe propofitions wherein the fame term is affirmed of itfelf; and I would fain fee an inftance, wherein any fuch can be made ufe of, to the advantage and improvement of any one's knowledge. Inftances of other kinds, whatever use may be made of them, concern not me, as not being fuch as I call identical.

$ 4. Secondly, When a Part of any Complex Idea is predicated of the whole.

SECONDLY, Another fort of trifling propofitions is, when a part of the complex idea is predicated of the name of the whole, a part of the definition of the word defined. Such are all propofitions wherein the genus is predicated of the fpecies, or more compre henfive or lefs comprehenfive terms; for what information, what knowledge carries this propofition in it, viz. lead is a metal, to a man who knows the complex idea the name lead ftands for? all the fimple ideas that go to the complex one fignified by the term metal, being nothing but what he before comprehended, and fignified by the name lead. Indeed, to a man that knows the fignification of the word metal, and not of the word lead, it is a fhorter way to explain the fignification of the word lead, by faying it is a metal, which at once expreffes feveral of its fimple ideas, than to enumerate them one by one, telling him it is a body very heavy, fufible and malleable.

5. As Part of the Definition of the Terms defined. ALIKE trifling it is, to predicate any other part of the definition of the term defined, or to affirm any one of

the fimple ideas of a complex one, of the name of the whole complex idea; as all gold is fufible; for fufbility being one of the fimple ideas that goes to the making up the complex one the found gold ftands for, what can it be but playing with founds, to affirm that of the name gold, which is comprehended in its received fignification? It would be thought little better than ridiculous, to affirm gravely as a truth of moment, that gold is yellow; and I fee not how it is any jot more material to fay, it is fufible, unless that quality be left out of the complex idea, of which the found gold is the mark in ordinary fpeech. What inftruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before? For I am fuppofed to know the fignification of the word another ufes to me, or elfe he is to tell me. And if I know that the name gold stands for this complex idea of body, yellow, heavy, fufible, mallea ble, it will not much inftruct me to put it folemnly afterwards in a propofition, and gravely fay, all gold is fufible. Such propofitions can only ferve to fhow the difingenuity of one, who will go from the definition of his own terms, by reminding him fometimes of it; but carry no knowledge with them, but of the fignification of words, however certain they be.

$6. Inftance-Man and Palfry.

EVERY man is an animal, or living body, is as certain à propofition as can be; but no more conducing to the knowledge of things than to say, a palfry is an ambling horfe, or a neighing ambling animal, both being only about the fignification of words, and make me know but this, that body, fenfe, and motion, or power of fenfation and moving, are three of those ideas that I always comprehend and fignify by the word man, and where they are not to be found together, the name man belongs not to that thing; and fo of the other, that body, fenfe, and a certain way of going, with a certain kind of voice, are fome of thofe ideas which I always comprehend, and fignify by the word palfry; and when they are not to be found 10

103 gether, the name palfry belongs not to that thing. It is just the fame, and to the fame purpose, when any term ftanding for any one or more of the fimple ideas that altogether make up that complex idea which is called a man, is affirmed of the term man; v. g. fuppofe a Roman fignified by the word homo, all these diftinct ideas, united in one fubject, corporietas, fenfibilitas, potentia, fe movendi, rationalitas, rifibilitas; he might, no doubt, with great certainty, univerfally affirm one, more, or all of these together, of the word homo, but did no more than fay that the word homo, in his country, comprehended in its fignification all thefe ideas. Much like a romance knight, who by the word palfry fignified these ideas; body of a certain figure, four-legged, with fenfe, motion, ambling, neighing, white, ufed to have a woman on his back, might with the fame certainty univerfally affirm alfo any or all of thefe of the word palfry; but did thereby teach no more, but that the word palfry, in his or romance language, ftood for all these, and was not to be applied to any thing, where any of thefe was wanting. But he that shall tell me, that in whatever thing fenfe, motion, reafon, laughter, were united, that thing had actually a notion of GOD, or would be caft into a fleep by opium, made indeed an inftructive propofition, because neither having the notion of GOD, nor being caft into fleep by opium, being contained in the ideas fignified by the word man, we are by fuch propofitions taught fomething more than barely what the word man stands for, and therefore the knowledge contained in it is more than verbal.

7. For this teaches but the Sigrification of Words. BEFORE a man makes any propofition, he is fuppofed to understand the terms he ules in it, or else he talks like a parrot, only making a noise by imitation, and framing certain founds which he has learnt of others, but not as a rational creature, ufing them for figns of ideas which he has in his mind. The hearer alfo is fuppofed to understand the terms as the speaker uses them, or elfe he talks jargon, and makes an unintel

ligible noife; and therefore he trifles with words, who makes fuch a propofition, which when it is made, contains no more than one of the terms does, and which a man was fuppofed to know before; v. g. a triangle hath three fides, or faffron is yellow. And this is no farther intolerable than where a man goes to explain his terms to one who is fuppofed, or declares himself not to understand him; and then it teaches only the fignification of that word, and the use of that fign.

§ 8. But no real Knowledge.

WE can know then the truth of two forts of propofitions with perfect certainty; the one is, of thofe trifling propofitions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, not inftructive. And, fecondly, we can know the truth, and fo may be certain in propofitions which affirm fomething of another, which is a neceffary consequence of its precise complex idea, but not contained in it; as that the external angle of all triangles is bigger than either of the oppofite internal angles; which relation of the outward angle to either of the oppofite internal angles, making no part of the complex idea fignified by the name triangle, this is a real truth, and conveys with it inftructive real knowledge.

$9. General Propofitions concerning Substances are often trifling.

WE have little or no knowledge of what combinations there be of fimple ideas exifting together in fubftances, but by our fenfes; we cannot make any univerfal certain propofitions concerning them, any farther than our nominal effences lead us, which being to a very few and inconfiderable truths, in refpect of those which depend on the real conftitutions, the general propofitions that are made about fubftances, if they are certain, are for the most part but trifling, and if they are inftructive are uncertain, and fuch as we can have no knowledge of their real truth, how much soever conftant obfervation and analogy may aflist our judgments in guefling. Hence it comes to pafs, that

one may often meet with very clear and coherent difcourfes, that amount yet to nothing. For it is plain, that names of fubitantial beings, as well as others, as far as they have relative fignifications affixed to them, may, with great truth, be joined negatively and affir matively in propofitions, as their relative definitions make them fit to be fo joined; and propofitions confifting of fuch terms, may, with the fame clearness, be deduced one from another, as thofe that convey the moit real truths; and all this, without any knowledge of the nature or reality of things exifting without us. By this method one may make demonstrations and undoubted propofitions in words, and yet thereby advance not one jot in the knowledge of the truth of things; v. g. he that having learnt thefe following words, with their ordinary mutual relative acceptations annexed to them; v. g. fubstance, man, animal, form, foul, vegetative, fenfitive, rational, may make feveral undoubted propofitions about the foul, without knowing at all what the foul really is; and of this fort, a man may find an infinite number of propofi tions, reafonings, and conclufions, in books of metaphyfics, fchool-divinity, and fome forts of natural philofophy, and, after all, know as little of GOD, spi rits, or bodies, as he did before he fet out.

$10. And why.

He that hath liberty to define, i. e. determine the fig nification of his names of fubítances (as certainly every one does in effect, who makes them ftand for his owin ideas), and makes their fignifications at a ventures. taking them from his own or other mens fanoies, and not from an examination or inquiry into the nature. of things themfelves, may, with little trouble, demonftrate them one of another, according to thofe fe veral refpects and mutual relations he has given them. one to another; wherein, however things agree or difagree in their own nature, he needs mind nothing but his own notions, with the names he hath beftowed: upon them; but thereby no more increases his own knowledge, than he does his riches, who taking a bag