English names hour, foot, and pound; but yet there is nothing more evident, than that the ideas a Roman annexed to these Latin names, were very far different from those which an Englishman expreffes by thofe English ones. And if either of these fhould make use of the measures that thofe of the other language defigned by their names, he would be quite out in his account. Thefe are too fenfible proofs to be doubted; and we fhall find this much more fo in the names of more abstract and compounded ideas, fuch as are the greatest part of those which make up moral difcourfes; whofe names, when men come curioufly to compare with thofe they are tranflated into, in other languages, they will find very few of them exactly to correfpond in the whole extent of their fignifications.

$9. This favs Species to be made for Communication. THE reason why I take fo particular notice of this, is, that we may not be mistaken about genera and Species, and their effences, as if they were things regularly and conftantly made by nature, and had a real existence in things, when they appear, upon a more wary furvey, to be nothing else but an artifice of the understanding, for the easier fignifying fuch collections of ideas, as it fhould often have occafion to communicate by one general term, under which divers particulars, as far forth as they agreed to that abftract idea, might be comprehended. And if the doubtful fignification of the word fpecies, may make it found harsh to fome, that I say that the fpecies of mixed modes are made by the understanding; yet, I think, it can by nobody be denied, that it is the mind makes thofe abftract complex ideas, to which fpecific names are given. And if it be true, as it is, that the mind makes the patterns for forting and naming of things, I leave it to be confidered who makes the boundaries of the fort of fpecies; fince with me, fpecies and fort have no other difference, than that of a Latin and English idiom.

10. In mixed Modes it is the Name that ties the Combination together, and makes it a Species. THE near relation that there is between fpecies, effences, and

their general name, at leaft in mixed modes, will farther appear, when we confider that it is the name that seems to preferve thofe effences, and give them their lafting duration; for the connection between the bofe parts of thofe complex ideas being made by the mind, this union, which has no particular foundation in nature, would ceafe again, were there not fomething that did as it were hold it together, and keep the parts from scattering. Though therefore it be the mind that makes the collection, it is the name which is as it were the knot that ties them faft together. What a vaft variety of different ideas does the word triumphus hold together, and deliver to us as one fpecies! Had this name been never made or quite loft, we might no doub, have had defcriptions of what paffed in that folennity: but yet, I think, that which holds thofe different parts together, in the unity of one complex idea, is that very word annexed to it; without which, the feveral parts of that would no more be thought to make one ning, than any other fhow, which having never been made but once, had never been united into one compex idea, under one denomination. How much therebre in mixed modes, the unity neceffary to any effence depends on the mind, and how much the continuation and fixing of that unity depends on the name in common ufe annexed to it, I leave to be confidered bythofe, who look upon effences and fpecies as real establhed things in nature.

§ 11.

SUITABLE to this, we find, that men speaking of mixed modes, feldom imagire or take any other for fpecies of them but fuch as are fet but by name: becaufe they being of man's making ory, in order to naming, no fuch fpecies are taken notice of, or fuppofed to be, unless a name be joined to it, the fign of man's having combined into one idea feveral loofe ones; and by that name giving a lafting union to the parts, which would otherwife ceafe to have ary, as foon as the mind laid by that abstract idea, and ceafed actually to think on it. But when a name is once annexed to it, wherein the parts of that complex idea have a fettled and permanent union, then

is the efence as it were established, and the fpecies looked on as complete. For to what purpofe fhould the memory charge itself with fuch compofitions, unless it were by abstraction to make them general? And to what purpofe make them general, unless it were that they might have general name:, for the convenience of difcourfe and communication? Thus we fee, that killing a man with a fword or a hatchet, are looked on as no diftinct species of action but if the point of the sword first enter the body, it pafles for a distinct Species, where it has a diftinct name; as in England, in whofe language it is called ftabbing; but in another country, where it has not happened to be specified under a peculiar name, it paffes not for a diftinct fpees. But in the fpecies of corporeal fubftances, thought be the mind that makes the nominal effence, yet fince hofe ideas which are combined in it are fupposed to have an union in nature, whether the mind joins them or 10, therefore those are looked on as diftinct Species, without any operation of the mind, either abstracting or giving a name to that complex idea. 12. For the Originds of mixed Modes, we look no far

ther than the Mind, which alfo fhows them to be the workmanship of the Understanding.

CONFORMABLY alfo to wha has been faid, concerning the effences of the fpecies of med modes, that they are the creatures of the understanding rather than the works of nature; conformable, I say, to this, we find that their names lead our thoughts to the mind, and no farther. When we fpeak of justice or gratitude, weframe to ourselves no imagination of any thing exifting, which we would conceive; but our thoughts terminate in the abstract ideas of thofe virtues, and look not farther; s they do, when we fpeak of a horfe or iron, whofe fpeciic ideas we con fider not as barely in the mind, but as in things themfelves, which afford the original patterns of thofe ideas. But in mixed modes, at least the most confiderable parts of them, which are moral beings, we confider the original patterns as being in the mind; and to thofe we refer for the diftinguishing of particular beings under names. And hence I think it is, that these effence of the species

of mixed modes, are by a more particular name called notions; as by a peculiar right, appertaining to the understanding.

13. Their being made by the Understanding without Patterns, fhows the reafon why they are fo compounded. HENCE likewife we may learn, Why the complex ideas of mixed modes are commonly more compounded and decompounded than thofe of natural fubftances; because they being the workmanship of the understanding, pursuing only its own ends, and the conveniency of expreffing in fshort thofe ideas it would make known to another, does with great liberty unite often into one abstract idea things that in their nature have no coherence; and fo, under one term, bundle together a great variety of compounded and decompounded ideas. Thus the name of proceffion, what a great mixture of independent ideas of perfons, habits, tapers, orders, motions, founds, does it contain in that complex one, which the mind of man has arbitrarily put together, to exprefs by that one name? Whereas the complex ideas of the forts of fubftances are usually made up of only a small number of fimple ones; and in the fpecies of animals, these two, viz. fhape and voice, commonly make the whole nominal effence.

§14. Names of mixed Modes ftand always for their rea?

Effences.

ANOTHER thing we may obferve from what has been faid, is, that the names of mixed modes always fignify (when they have any determined fignification) the real effences of their fpecies; for thefe abftract ideas, being the workmanship of the mind, and not referred to the real exiftence of things, there is no fuppofition of any thing more fignified by that name, but barely that complex idea the mind itself has formed, which is all it would have expreffed by it, and is that on which all the properties of the fpecies depend, and from which alone they all flow, and fo in these the real and nominal effence is the fame; which of what concernment it is to the certain knowledge of general truth we fhall fee hereafter.

§ 15. Why their Names are ufually got before their

Ideas.

THIS alfo may show us the reafon, Why for the most part the names of mixed modes are got, before the Ideas they ftand for are perfectly known, because there being no fpecies of thefe ordinarily taken notice of, but what have names, and thofe fpecies, or rather their effences, being abstract complex ideas made arbitrarily by the mind, it is convenient, if not neceffary, to know the names, before one endeavour to frame thefe complex ideas, unless a man will fill his head with a company of abstract complex ideas, which others having no names for, he has nothing to do with, but to lay by and forget again. I confefs, that in the beginning of languages, it was neceffary to have the idea before one gave it the name; and fo it is ftill, where making a new complex idea, one alfo, by giv ing it a new name, makes a new word; but this concerns not languages made, which have generally pretty well provided for ideas, which men have frequent occafion to have and communicate; and in fuch, I ask, whether it be not the ordinary method, that children learn the names of mixed modes before they have their ideas? What one of a thousand ever frames the abstract idea of glory and ambition, before he has heard the name of them? In fimple ideas and fubftances, I grant it is otherwife; which being fuch ideas as have a real existence and union in nature, the ideas or names are got one before the other, as it happens.

$ 16. Reafon of my being fo large on this Subject. WHAT has been faid here of mixed modes, is with very little difference applicable alfo to relations; which, fince every man himself may obferve, I may fpare myfelf the pains to enlarge on; especially, fince what I have here faid concerning words in this third book, will poffibly be thought by fome to be much more than what fo flight a fubject required. I allow it might be brought into a narrower compafs; but I was willing to ftay my reader on an argument that appears to me new, and a little out of the way (I am fure it is one I thought not of when I began to write), That by fearching it to the bottom, and