259 § 21. Ideas of the leading qualities of Subftances are bef got by fhowing.

Now thefe leading qualities are beft made known by showing, and can hardly be made known otherwife; for the fhape of an horfe or caffuary, will be but rudely and imperfectly imprinted on the mind by words, the fight of the animals doth it a thousand times better; and the idea of the particular colour of gold is not to be got by any defcription of it, but only by the frequent exercife of the eyes about it, as is evident in those who are used to this metal, who will frequently diftinguifh true from counterfeit, pure from adulterate, by the fight, where others (who have as good eyes, but yet by ufe have not got the precife nice idea of that peculiar yellow) fhall not perceive any difference. The like may be faid of thofe other fimple ideas, peculiar in their kind to any fubftance, for which precife ideas there are no peculiar names. The particular ringing found there is in gold, diftinct from the found of other bodies, has no particu lar name annexed to it, no more than the particular yellow that belongs to that metal.

§ 22. The Ideas of their Powers beft by Definition. BUT because many of the fimple ideas that make up our fpecific ideas of fubftances, are powers which lie not obvious to our fenfes in the things as they ordinarily appear; therefore in the fignification of our names of fubfances, fome part of the fignification will be better made known by enumerating thofe fimple ideas, than in bowing the fubftance itself; for he that, to the yellow fhining colour of geld got by fight, fhall, from my enumerating them, have the ideas of great ductility, fufibility, fixednefs, and folubility in aq. regia, will have a perfecter idea of gold than he can have by feeing a piece of gold, and thereby imprinting in his mind only its obvious qualities. But if the formal conftitution of this fhining, heavy ductile thing (from whence all thefe its properties flow) lay open to our fenfes, as the formal conflitution or effence of a triangle does, the fignification of the word gold might as eafily be afcertained as that of triangle.

23. A Reflection on the Knowledge of Spirits. HENCE we may take notice how much the foundation of all our knowledge of corporeal things lies in our fenfes; for how fpirits, feparate from bodies (whofe knowledge and ideas of thefe things are certainly much more perfect than ours) know them, we have no notion, no idea at all; the whole extent of our knowledge or imagination reaches not beyond our own ideas limited to our ways of perception; though yet it be not to be doubted that fpirits of a higher rank than those immersed in flesh, may have as clear ideas of the radical constitution' of fubftances as we have of a triangle, and fo perceive how all their properties and operations flow from thence; but the manner how they come by that knowledge exceeds our conceptions.

§ 24. Ideas alfo of Subftances must be conformable to

things.

BUT though definitions will ferve to explain the names of fubftances as they ftand for our ideas, yet they leave them not without great imperfection as they stand for things; for our names of fubftances being not put barely for our ideas, but being made ufe of ultimately to reprefent things, and fo are put in their place, their fignification muft agree with the truth of things as well as with mens ideas. And therefore in fubftances we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex idea commonly received as the fignification of that word, but must go a little farther, and inquire into the nature and properties of the things themfelves, and thereby perfect as much as we can our ideas of their diftinct fpecies; or elfe learn them from fuch as are used to that fort of things, and are experienced in them; for fince it is intended their names fhould ftand for such collections of fimple ideas as do really exist in things themfelves, as well as for the complex idea in other mens minds, which in their ordinary acceptation they ftand for, therefore to define their names right, natural history is to be inquired into, and their properties are, with care and examination, to be found out. For it is not enough, for the avoiding inconveniences in difcourfes and arguings about

natural bodies and fubftantial things, to have learned, from the propriety of the language, the common but confufed or very imperfect idea to which each word is applied, and to keep them to that idea in our use of them; but we must, by acquainting ourselves with the history of that fort of things, rectify and fettle our complex idea belonging to each specific name; and in difcourfe with others (if we find them mistake us), we ought to tell what the complex idea is that we make fuch a name ftand for. This is the more neceffary to be done by all those who fearch after knowledge and philofophical verity, in that children being taught words whilft they have but imperfect notions of things, apply them at random, and without much thinking, and feldom frame determined ideas to be fignified by them; which cuftom (it being eafy, and ferving well enough for the ordinary affairs of life and converfation) they are apt to continue when they are men, and fo begin at the wrong end, learning words first and perfectly, but make the notions to which they apply thofe words afterwards very overtly. By this means it comes to pafs, that men fpeaking the proper language of their country, i. e. according to grammar rules of that language, do yet speak very improperly of things themfelves; and by their ar guing one with another, make but fmall progrefs in the difcoveries of ufeful truths, and the knowledge of things, as they are to be found in themselves, and not in our imaginations; and it matters not much, for the improvement of our knowledge, how they are called.

$25. Not eafy to be made fo.

Ir were therefore to be wished, that men verfed in phyfical inquiries, and acquainted with the feveral forts of natural bodies, would fet down thofe fimple ideas, wherein they observe the individuals of each fort conftantly to agree. This would remedy a great deal of that confufion which comes from feveral perfons applying the fame name to a collection of a smaller or greater number of fenfible qualities, proportionably as they have been more or lefs acquainted with, or accurate in examining the qualities of any fort of things which

come under one denomination. But a dictionary of this fort, containing, as it were, a natural history, requires too many hands, as well as too much time, coft, pains, and fagacity, ever to be hoped for; and till that be done, we must content ourselves with fuch definitions of the names of substances, as explain the sense men use them in; and it would be well, where there is occafion, if they would afford us fo much. This yet is not usually done; but men talk to one another, and difpute in words, whofe meaning is not agreed between them, out of a mistake that the fignification of common words are certainly established, and the precife ideas they ftand for perfectly known, and that it is a fhame to be ignorant of them; both which fuppofitions are falfe, no names of complex ideas having fo fettled determined fignifications, that they are conftantly used for the fame precife ideas. Nor is it a fhame for a man not to have a certain knowledge of any thing, but by the neceffary ways of attaining it; and fo it is no difcredit not to know what precife idea any found stands for in another man's mind, without he declare it to me by fome other way than barely ufing that found, there being no other way, without fuch a declaration, certainly to know it. Indeed the neceffity of communication by language brings men to an agreement in the fignification of common words within fome tolerable latitude, that may ferve for ordinary converfation; and fo a man cannot be fupposed wholly ignorant of the ideas which are annexed to words by common ufe, in a language familiar to him. But common ufe, being but a very uncertain rule, which reduces itself at laft to the ideas of particular men, proves often but a very variable ftandard. But though fuch a dictionary as I have above mentioned, will require too much time, coft, and pains, to be hoped for in this age, yet methinks it is not unreasonable to propose, that words ftanding for things, which are known and diftinguished by their outward fhapes, fhould be expreffed by little draughts and prints made of them. A vocabulary made after this fashion would perhaps with more eafe, and in lefs time, teach the true fignification

of many terms, especially in languages of remote countries or ages, and fettle truer ideas in mens minds of feveral things, whereof we read the names in ancient authors, than all the large and laborious comments of learned critics. Naturalifts, that treat of plants and animals, have found the benefit of this way; and he that has had occafion to confult them, will have reason to confefs, that he has a clearer idea of apium, or ibex, from a little print of that herb or beaft, than he could have from a long definition of the names of either of them. And fo no doubt he would have of frigil and fiftrum, if instead of a curry-comb and cymbal, which are the English names dictionaries render them by, he could fee ftamped in the margin fmall pictures of thefe inftruments, as they were in ufe amongst the ancients. Toga, tunica, pallium, are words eafily tranflated by gown, coat, and cloak; but we have thereby no more true ideas of the fashion of those habits amongst the Romans, then we have of the faces of the tailors who made them. Such things as thefe, which the eye diftinguishes by their fhapes, would be beft let into the mind by draughts made of them, and more determine the fignification of fuch words, than any other words fet for them, or made ufe of to define them. But this only by the by.

$ 26. By Conftancy in their Signification. FIFTHLY, If men will not be at the pains to declare the meaning of their words, and definitions of their terms are not to be had; yet this is the least that can be expected, that in all difcourfes, wherein one man pretends to inftruct or convince another, he fhould use the fame word conftantly in the fame fenfe. If this were done (which nobody can refufe without great difingenuity), many of the books extant might be fpared; many of the controverfies in difpute would be at an end; feveral of those great volumes, fwoln with ambiguous words, now used in one fenfe, and by and by in another, would fhrink into a very narrow compafs; and many of the philofophers (to mention no other), as well as poets works, might be contained in a nut-fhell.