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each of which having in it a conformity to that abstract idea, is (as we call it) of that fort.

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BUT to deduce this a little more diftinctly, it will not perhaps he amifs to trace our notions and names from their beginning, and obferve by what degrees we proceed, and by what fteps we enlarge our ideas from our firft infancy. There is nothing more evident, than that the ideas of the perfons children converfe with (to inftance in them alone), are like the perfons themselves, only particular. The ideas of the nurfe and the mother are well framed in their minds, and, like pictures of them there, reprefent only thofe individuals. The names they firft gave to them are confined to thefe individuals, and the names of nurse and mamma, the child uses, determine themfelves to thofe perfons. Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made them obferve, that there are à great many other things in the world that in fome common agreements of fhape, and feveral other qualities, resemble their father and mother, and those perfons they have been used to, they frame an idea, which they find thofe many particulars do partake in, and to that they give, with others, the name man, for example; and thus they come to have a general name and a general idea, wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the complex idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all.

§ 8.

By the fame way that they come by the general name and idea of man, they eafily advance to more general names and notions; for obferving, that feveral things that differ from their idea of man, and cannot therefore be comprehended under that name, have yet certain qualities wherein they agree with man, by retaining only those qualities, and uniting them into one idea, they have again another and a more general idea, to which having given a name, they make a term of a more comprehenfive extenfion; which new idea is made, not by any new addition, but only, as before, by leaving out the shape,

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and fome other properties fignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, fenfe, and fpontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

$9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas. THAT this is the way whereby men firft formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think is fo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the confidering of a man's felf or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing else but such abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular existences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them; for let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Beter and Paul, or his idea of horfe from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out fomething that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining fo much of those particular complex ideas of feveral particular exiftences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas fignified by the names man and horfe, leaving out but thofe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thofe wherein they agree, and of those making a new distinct complex idea, and giving the name animal to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends with man feveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, fenfe and fpontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenfive term vivens. And not to dwell longer on this particular, fo evident in itself, by the fame way the mind proceeds to body, fubftance, and at laft to being, thing, and fuch universal terms, which ftand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mytery of genera and species, which make such a noife in the fchools, and are with juftice fo little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or lefs comprehenfive, with names annexed to them; in all which this is conftant and unvariable, that every more general term stands for such an idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

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§ 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made ufe of in 'Defi kto na eni binitions.

THIS may fhow us the reafon, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their fignification, we make ufe of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it, which is not out of neceffity, ìbut only to fave the labour of enumerating the several fimple ideas which the next general word or genus ftands for; or, perhaps, fometimes the fhame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to use these terms of art, though originally Latin, fince they most properly fuit thofe notions they are applied to), I fay, though defining by the genus be the shorteft way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the best. This I am fure, it is not the only, and fo not abfolutely neceffary; for definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what iden the term defined ftands for, a definition is beft made by enumerating thofe fimple ideas that are combined in the fignification of the term defined; and if instead of fuch an enumeration, men have accustomed themselves to ufe the next general term, it has not been out of neceffity, or for greater clearness, but for quicknefs and difpatch fake; for, I think, that to one who defired to know what ideas the word man stood for, if it should be faid, that man was a folid extended fubftance, having life, fenfe, fpontane-ous motion, and the faculty of reasoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea it ftands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational animal, which by the feveral definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, refolves, itself into thofe enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the fchools, which though, perhaps, not the moft exact, yet ferves well enough to my prefent purpose: And one may, in this inftance, fee what gave occafion to the rule, that a definition must confift of genus and differentia; and it fuffices to fhow us the little neceffity there is of fuch a rule, or advantage

in the ftrict obferving of it: For definitions, as has been faid, being only the explaining of one word by feveral others, fo that the meaning or idea it ftands for may be certainly known, languages are not always, fo made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its fignification exactly and clearly expreffed by two others. Experience fufficiently fatisfies us to the contrary, or elfe thofe who have made this rule have done ill, that they have given us fo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

§11. General and Universal are Greatures of the Un

der flanding.

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To return to general words, it is plain, by what has been faid, that general and universal belong not to the real exiftence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own ufe, and concern only figns, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been faid, when ufed for figns of general ideas, and fo are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general, when they are fet up as the reprefentatives of many particular things; but univerfality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their exiftence; even those words and ideas, which in their fignification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that reft are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of fignifying or reprefenting many particulars; for the fignification they have, is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.

§ 12. Abstract Ideas are the Effences of the Genera and

Species.

THE next thing therefore to be confidered, is, What kind of fignification it is, that general qvords have. For as it is evident that they do not fignify barely one particular thing, (for then they would not be general terms, but proper names) fo on the other fide it is as evident they do not fignify a plurality; for man and men would

143 then fignify the fame, and the diftinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be fuperfluous and ufelefs. That then which general words fignify, is a fort of things; and each of them does that, by being a fign of an abstract idea in the mind; to which idea, as things exifting are found to agree, fo they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of that fort; whereby it is evident, that the effences of the forts, or (if the Latin word pleases better) Species of things, are nothing elfe but thefe abftract ideas. For the having the effence of any fpecies, being that which makes any thing to be of that species, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having the effence, and the having that conformity, muft needs be the fame thing; fince to be of any fpecies, and to have a right to the name of that fpecies, is all one. As for example, to be a man, or of the fpecies man, and to have right to the name man, is the fame thing. Again, to be a man, or of the fpecies man, and have the effence of a man, is the fame thing. Now fince nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the fpecies man, but what has the cffence of that fpecies; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name ftands, and the effence of the fpecies, is one and the fame; from whence it is eafy to obferve, that the effences of the forts of things, and confequently the forting of this, is the workmanfhip of the underftanding, that abftracts and makes thofe general ideas.

13. They are the workmanship of the Understanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things. I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things makes feveral of them alike: There is nothing more obvious, efpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by feed. But yet, I think, we may fay the forting of them under names is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occafion from the fimilitude it obferves amongst

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