Of Identity and Diversity.

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Chap. 27. thinks in him, and in the conftant change of his body keeps him the fame, and is that which he calls himself: let him alfo fuppofe it, to be the fame foul that was in Neftor or Therfites, at the fiege of Troy (for fouls being, as far as we know any thing of them in their nature, indifferent to any parcel of matter, the fuppofition has no apparent abfurdity in it), which it may have been, as well as it is now, the foul of any other man: but he now having no confcioufnefs of any of the actions either of Nettor or Therfites, does or can he conceive himfelf the fame perfon with either of them? can he be concerned in either of their actions? attribute them to himself, or think them his own more than the actions of any other man that ever exifted? So that this confcioufnels not reaching to any of the actions of either of thofe men, he is no more one felf with either of them, than if the foul or immaterial fpirit that now informs him, had been created, and began to exift, when it began to inform his prefent body; though it were ever fo true, that the fame fpirit that informed Neftor's or Therfites's body, were numerically the fame that now informs his; for this would no more make him the fame perfon with Neftor, than if fome of the particles of matter that were once a part of Neftor, were now a part of this man; the fame immaterial fubftance, without the fame confcioufnefs, no more making the fame perfon by being united to any body, than the fame particle of matter, without confcioufnefs united to any body, makes the fame perfon: But let him once find himself conscious of any of the actions of Neftor, he then finds himself the fame perfon with Neftor.

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AND thus we may be able, without any difficulty, conceive the fame perfon at the refurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the fame which he had here, the fame confcioufnefs going along with the foul that inhabits it: But yet the foul alone, in the change of bodies, would fcarce to any one, but to him that makes the foul the man, be enough to make the fame man; for should the foul of a prince, carrying C 6

with it the confcioufnefs of the prince's paft life, enter and inform the body of a cobler, as foon as deferted by his own foul, every one fees he would be the fame perfon with the prince, accountable only for the prince's actions: but who would fay it was the fame man? The body too goes to the making the man, and I would guefs, to every body, determine the man in this cafe ; wherein the foul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man; but he would be the fame cobler to every one befides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of fpeaking, the fame perfon, and the fame man, ftand for one and the fame thing. And indeed every one will always have a liberty to fpeak as he pleafes, and to apply what articulate founds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleafes. But yet when we will inquire what makes the fame fpirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of fpirit, man, or perfon in our minds; and having refolved with ourfelves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine in either of them, or the like, when it is the fum, and when not.

$16. Confcioufnefs makes the fame Perfon.

BUT though the fame immaterial fubftance or foul does not alone, wherever it be, and in whatsoever state, make the fame man; yet it is plain, confciousnefs, aз far as ever it can be extended, fhould it be to ages past, unites exiftences and actions very remote in time into the fame perfon, as well as it does the existence and actions of the immediately preceding moment: fo that whatever has the confcioufnefs of present and paft actions, is the fame perfon to whom they both belong. Had I the fame consciousness that I faw the ark and Noah's flood, as that I faw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now; I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that faw the Thames overflowed laft winter, and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the fame felf, place that felf in what fubstance you please, than that I who write this am the fame myself now whilft I write (whether I confift of all the fame fubftance, material or imma

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terial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the fame felf, it matters not whether this prefent felf be made up of the fame or other fubftances; I being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action was done a thousand years fince, appropriat ed to me now by this felf-confcioufnefs, as I am for what I did the last moment.

§ 17. Self depends on Consciousness.

SELF is that confcious thinking thing (whatever fubftance made up of, whether spiritual or material, fimple or compounded, it matters not) which is fenfible, or confcious of pleasure and pain, capable of happiness or mifery, and fo is concerned for itself, as far as that confeioufnefs extends. Thus every one finds, that whilst comprehended under that confcioufnefs, the little finger is as much a part of itself, as what is moft fo. Upon feparation of this little finger, fhould this consciousness go along with the little finger, and leave the rest of the body, it is evident the little finger would be the perfon, the fame perfon; and felf then would have nothing to do with the reft of the body. As in this cafe it is the consciousness that goes along with the fubftance, when one part is separate from another, which makes the fame perfon, and constitutes this infeparable felf; so it is in reference to fubftances remote in time. That with which the consciousness of this prefent thinking thing can join itself, makes the fame perfon, and is one felf with it, and with nothing elfe; and fo attributes to it felf, and owns all the actions of that thing as its own, as far as that consciousness reaches, and no farther: as every one who reflects will perceive.

*. §18. Objects of Reward and Punishment. In this perfonal identity is founded all the right and juftice of reward and punishment; happiness and mifery being that for which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of any fubftance, not joined to or affected with that consciousness: For as it is evident in the inftance I gave but now, if the consciousness went along with the little finger when it was cut off, that would be the fame felf which was concerned for the

whole body yesterday, as making a part of it felf, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now: Though if the fame body fhould ftill live, and immedi ately, from the feparation of the little finger, have its own peculiar confcioufnefs, whereof the little finger knew nothing; it would not at all be concerned for it, as a part of itself, or could own any of its actions, or have any of them imputed to him.

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THIS may show us wherein perfonal identity confifts, not in the identity of fubftance, but, as I have faid, in the identity of confcioufnefs; wherein if Socrates and the prefent Mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the fame perfon: If the fame Socrates waking and fleeping do not partake of the fame confcioufness, Socrates waking and fleeping is not the fame perfon; and to punish Socrates waking for what fleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never confcious of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outfides were fo like, that they could not be diftinguifhed; for fuch twins have been seen.

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Bur yet poffibly it will still be objected, Suppose I wholly lose the memory of fome parts of my life, beyond a poffibility of retrieving them, fo that perhaps I fhall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same perfon that did thofe actions, had thofe thoughts that I once was confcious of, though I have now forgot them ? To which I answer, That we must here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this cafe, is the man only; and the fame man being prefumed to be the fame perfon, I is easily here fuppofed to ftand alfo for the fame perfon. But if it be poilible for the fame man to have distinct incommunicable consciousnesses at different times, it is past doubt the fame man would at different times make different perions; which, we fee, is the fense of mankind in the folemneit declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the fober man's actions, nor the fober man for what the

mad man did, thereby making them two perfons: which is fomewhat explained by our way of fpeaking English, when we fay fuch an one is not himself, or is befides himJelf; in which phrafes it is infinuated, as if thofe who now, or at leaft firft ufed them, thought that felf was changed, the self-fame perfon was no longer in that man. 21. Difference between Identity of Man and Perfon. BUT yet it is hard to conceive that Socrates, the fame individual man, fhould be two perfons. To help us a little in this, we must confider what is meant by Socrates, or the fame individual man.

First, It must be either the fame individual, immaterial thinking fubftance; in fhort, the fame numerical foul and nothing elfe.

Secondly, Or the fame animal, without any regard to an immaterial foul.

Thirdly, Or the fame immaterial fpirit united to the fame animal.

Now take which of thefe fuppofitions you please, it is impoflible to make perfonal identity to confift in any thing but consciousness, or reach any farther than that does.

For by the first of them, it must be allowed poffible, that a man born of different women, and in diftant times, may be the fame man; a way of fpeaking, which whoever admits, muft allow it poffible for the fame man to be two diftinct perfons, as any two that have lived in different ages, without the knowledge of one another's thoughts.

By the fecond and third, Socrates in this life, and after it, cannot be the fame man any way, but by the fame confcioufnefs; and fo making human identity to confift in the fame thing wherein we place perfonal identity, there will be no difficulty to allow the fame man to be the fame perfon: But then they who place human identity in confcioufnefs only, and not in fomething else, muft confider how they will make the infant Socrates the fame man with Socrates after the refurrection. But whatfoever to fome men makes a man, and confequently the fame individual man, wherein perhaps few are