in those seas would not only put a stop to the practices which now exist, but that it would secure the Queensland vessels from the imputations under which they now lie, and facilitate the engagements of labour by the legitimate trader.'

It will thus be seen that, according to Lord Normanby, Queensland had done all in her power to secure the carrying on of the labour-traffic necessary to her sugar plantations under proper regulations, but that her vessels were exposed to imputations of being engaged in the evil practices against which those regulations were directed, because the aforesaid practices were carried on by the vessels of a country over which Queensland had no control. The more closely this question is examined, the more clearly it will appear that, unless Fiji and her inhabitants have been greatly wronged, much of the evil complained of has come from thence, and much of its success has resulted from the fact of this group of islands being beyond and outside the authority, not only of Queensland, but of Great Britain herself. It is comparatively easy to remonstrate with a colony, and to suggest such improvements in her laws as may appear necessary or desirable; the case is quite different in the case of an independent country, and doubly difficult when that country is, as to its Government, in so uncertain and unsatisfactory a condition as has long been the case with the Fijian group. It is therefore interesting, as well as necessary, in considering the question of the deportation of South Sea Islanders and the possibility of checking the abuses which have been consequent thereupon, to enter upon that which is indeed a question of a larger and more important nature, namely, the character and state of the Fijian group, their position with regard to ourselves and our Australasian Colonies, their past history, and the probabilities of their future. In order to do this in a satisfactory manner, it will be necessary to retrace our steps and take up the thread of our history at a date somewhat earlier than those transactions to which we have recently referred.

Passing over the early history of missionary labour in Fiji, and coming down to that period when Fijian affairs first came prominently before the notice of British statesmen, we find that upon February 18, 1859, Mr. Hammond of the Foreign Office forwarded to the Colonial Office, to be laid before. Secretary Sir Edward Lytton, a despatch from Mr. Pritchard, Her Majesty's Consul in the Fijian Islands. In this despatch Mr. Pritchard speaks of Thakombau as King of the Fiji Islands,' which he terms the richest and most extensive group of islands in Western Polynesia.' He says that he

has been careful to ascertain whether the King's title is unquestionable,' he assures the Home Government that the 'people' of the islands are anxious to become British sub'jects,' and in forwarding the request of Thakombau to that effect, observes that Thakombau and his people do not seek merely a protectorate; they cede the full sovereignty and 'domain in and over Fiji to Her Majesty; their object is to become a part of the British Empire, and bonâ fide British 'subjects.' In the same despatch Mr. Pritchard enlarges upon the natural fertility of the Fiji Islands, their commercial advantages, and their political importance. Upon the receipt of this despatch Sir Edward Lytton referred to the Admiralty for information as to certain parts of the question upon which that department could best furnish the facts. Accordingly, Mr. Washington, the Hydrographer of the navy, was directed to make a report, which he did upon March 12th, to the effect that a great part, though not all, of the available harbours in that part of the Pacific would be obtained by the acquisition of the Fiji group; that these were natural harbours, not requiring artificial development; that the Fiji Islands lay nearly in the direct track from Panama to Sydney; that a steamer touching at one of these islands for coal would lengthen her voyage only about 320 miles, or one day's run out of thirtytwo days in a distance of 8,000 miles; and that if, as was reported, coal existed upon these islands, it would at once double their value as a station. The Hydrographer further stated that he had been much struck by the entire want by "Great Britain of an advanced position in the Pacific Ocean.' We have valuable possessions on either side, as at Vancouver and Sydney, but not an islet or a rock in the 7,000 miles of ocean that separate them. He pointed out that it might hereafter be found very inconvenient that England should be shut out from any station in the Pacific, and that an enemy should have possession of Tongu-tabu, where there is a good harbour, within a few hundred miles of our homeward-bound gold ships from Sydney and Melbourne. Neither forts nor batteries,' he says, 'would be necessary to hold the ground; 'a single cruising ship should suffice for all the wants of the islands; coral reefs and the hearty good-will of the natives 'would do the rest.' After the receipt of this report, the next step appears to have been a reference by Sir Edward Lytton to Lord Malmesbury, the Foreign Secretary, in which, after stating the question to be one not hastily to be decided, as involving various considerations of importance and ex'pense,' he asks whether in Lord Malmesbury's opinion our

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occupation of these islands may not lead to embarrassment or complication with Foreign Powers who have rights or 'claims in that part of the Pacific Ocean?' Lord Malmesbury replied that he was not aware that such occupation would involve the violation of any such rights or claims; and about the same time Mr. Pritchard submitted his scheme for the Government of Fiji, namely, the appointment of a superintendent or governor, a colonial secretary and a judicial secretary, and the permanent station of two steam gun-boats in the group, which he thought would be a competent force to control the whole of Fiji, and to repress the local troubles that might occasionally occur. No further step appears to have been taken in the matter until December 1859, when Mr. Pritchard forwarded to the Home Government a document emanating from a council of chiefs which ratified and renewed the previous act of cession of Thakombau. Mr. Pritchard stated at the same time that the white population had rapidly increased in Fiji, that the chiefs felt their inability to control and guide their state affairs, and that they had an extreme and restless 'anxiety to place themselves under British rule.'

Previously, however, to the receipt of Mr. Pritchard's despatch, the Duke of Newcastle, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, had selected Colonel Smythe of the Royal Artillery for 'the delicate and important duty of reporting whether it would 'be expedient that Her Majesty's Government should accept an offer which has been made, to cede to Her Majesty the sovereignty over the Fiji Islands.' Ample and definite instructions were addressed to Colonel Smythe, who was directed to state in full both the advantages and disadvantages which, in his view, would attend such acceptance, and in what manner and on what terms the acquisition, if decided on, had best be effected. In these instructions allusion was made to the conditions upon which the sovereignty had been offered to Her Majesty; namely, that Thakombau should retain the title and rank of Tui Viti,' or King of the Fijis, in so far as the aboriginal population was concerned; that Her Majesty should pay for him the sum of 45,000 dollars, demanded of him by the Government of the United States, in respect of certain claims made against the chief by the captain of an American vessel; and that in consideration of such payment he should make over to Her Majesty not less than 200,000 acres of land. Colonel Smythe arrived at Levuka, the principal port of the Fiji group, early in July 1860, and in his very first communication to the Secretary of State he says:

In one important point I have ascertained that the information

supplied to Her Majesty's Government, and embodied in my instructions, is inexact. Thakombau, the Chief of Bau, although probably the most influential chief in the group, has no claim to the title of Tui Viti or King of Fiji, nor would the other chiefs submit to his authority except through foreign compulsion.'

In his next despatch Colonel Smythe confirms this statement, and reports that the group is composed of a great number of independent kingdoms, the rulers of which are moved, not less by jealousy of one another than by fear of foreign aggression,' to solicit the domination of England. On May 1, 1861, Colonel Smythe forwarded to the Duke of Newcastle his report upon the matters into which he had been directed to inquire, accompanying it with a letter in which he reiterated his statement as to Thakombau's position in these words:

'Thakombau has no claim to the title of King of Fiji. There is, in fact, no such title. He is only one, although probably the most influential, of the numerous independent chiefs of Fiji, and has consequently no power to cede the sovereignty of the entire group to Her Majesty. He is of an ambitious disposition, and his object seems to be, through the assistance of England, to become the ruler of Fiji, and to be protected at the same time from France and the United States of America, of both which Powers he has great apprehensions. He is most desirous to get quit of the claims of the Government of the latter country, for which the United States' officers, for their own convenience, have made him responsible, although the amount of the claims has been apportioned by them among several tribes. He could not convey to Her Majesty 200,000 acres of land as consideration for the payment of the claims for him, as he does not possess them, nor does he acknowledge to have offered more than his consent that lands to this extent might be acquired by Her Majesty's Government for public purposes in Fiji.'

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Colonel Smythe goes on to say that Thakombau's cession may, however, be considered valid as having been acquiesced in by the other chiefs; he disputes the justice of the American claims upon him, and with these preliminary remarks,' lays before the Duke of Newcastle his careful and elaborate report. In this document will be found a fair and accurate account of the condition of the Fiji group at the time of the proposed transfer to Great Britain. Colonel Smythe begins with a geographical description of the islands, about two hundred in number, of which less than one half are inhabited. Two of them (Viti-Levu and Vanua-Levu) are much larger than the rest, and almost every island is surrounded by a coral reef. Their population is estimated at 200,000, of whom 60,000 are numbered as Christian converts: their principal occupation

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is the cultivation of their yam and taro plots, sailing in their canoes, fishing, and frequently fighting. Out of some forty independent tribes there are twelve of superior influence, and over each the rule of their chief is absolutely despotic. At the date of Colonel Smythe's report the permanent white residents amounted to about 200, who were principally British subjects. The principal articles of produce are cocoa-nut oil, tortoise-shell, pearl-shell, and arrow-root. The sugar-cane and coffee-tree also grow well. Colonel Smythe recapitulates the reasons stated in his instructions as having been urged in favour of accepting the sovereignty of the Fiji Islands-namely, their probable utility as a station for steamers between Panama and Sydney, the supply of cotton which might be obtained from them, and the importance of their possession to the national power and security in the Pacific. With reference to the first reason he points out that the line from Panama to Sydney via Fiji, would be 260 miles longer, and infinitely more difficult and dangerous than the line by New Zealand. With regard to the second point he states that the cotton plant is not indigenous in Fiji, that it was only introduced some twenty-five years ago, that the habits of the people are indolent, and that it would be difficult to obtain the labour required in a cotton plantation. He therefore thinks that the supply of cotton from Fiji can never be otherwise than insignificant.' As to the third reason for acceptance, Colonel Smythe points out that the influence of a great Power in the Pacific is dependent entirely on its naval force; that by the possession of Australia and New Zealand, England completely commands the western portion of the Pacific; that the Fiji Islands do not lie in the path of any great commercial route; that their possession might even be a source of embarrassment in time of war; and that all that England really requires is an island with a good harbour midway between Auckland and Panama, in the steam-packet route. Colonel Smythe goes on to say that cannibalism, strangulation of widows, infanticide, and other enormities prevail in Fiji to a frightful extent.' In order to suppress these practices, which would be a necessary consequence of the establishment of British authority, and for the general support of the Government, a force of not less than the wing of a regiment would be required, in addition to a ship of war, with a tender of light draught, both steamers.' The necessary expenses of a civil establishment would probably not fall short of 7,000l. a year, and the raising of revenue would be, for some time at least, attended with considerable difficulties.

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