that opulent part of the world, was the general CHAP. fenfe of the British nation. ·

VI.

HENCE it obviously appears how very valuable fuch an acquifition must have been, and how much 1741. the unsuccessful attempt of the land forces is to be regretted, for on them alone can any imputation of misconduct defcend; it would be tranfgreffing the bounds of candour and honefty, to throw the leaft afperfions on the conduct of the commander of the fleet; who deftroyed all the Spanish fhipping, and the forts that defended the harbour; and not only with the greatest protection landed the army, and fecured their re-imbarkation without the lofs of a man; but it is evident did every thing, and every where, confiftent with the part he bore in the expedition, and not in the leaft derogatory to the glorious reputation he had lately acquired; for the very ruins he left behind him, will for ages remain the monumental trophies of the valour and fuccefs of the naval force of Britain.

WHEN the army was landed, the business fell entirely within their province; yet the admiral fupplied the general with feamen to raise his batteries, who from the beginning before Boca Chica caftle, promifed little hopes of fuccefs: no trenches were timely opened, no regular approaches made to beat the Spaniards out of their works, till a great number of troops were deftroyed; but after fixteen days the army made an attack, which might as well have been done the first day, with as little lofs in the affault as when the place was taken. When Monfieur de Pointi befieged and took Carthagena in the year 1697, he regulated his measures on fhore in a quite different manner, and was crowned with a very reverse of fortune than what happened to VOL. I. X

the

PART the British troops; and his fuccefs was principalI. ly owing to his conduct and prudence, for his

force was very unequal to the British, the French 1741. commander having only a fquadron of feven men of war from eighty to thirty guns, one bomb veffel, and nine frigates, with 2,300 feamen and 1,800 foldiers, and thofe but very indifferently difciplined; and the Spaniards were at that time as numerous and as capable of defending the place against the French, as they were now against the English. The British admiral pursued the fteps of Monfieur de Pointi, and landed the army on the very fame fpot the French commander had pitched upon for the fame purpose: but the British troops when landed, very widely departed from the difpofitions put in execution by the French forces; for De Pointi having landed his men on the 15th of April, instead of concerting a formal and tedious attack, without erecting any battery, made a way through the wood to the lake; and after examining the fort, on the 16th marched fome of his troops up to, and posted himself at the foot of the counterfearp, which fo terrified the Spaniards that they immediately offered to capitulate, and the governor with his garrifon, confifting of 300 men, furrendered themselves prifoners of war, without any more than the lofs of fifty men to the French: whereas the British troops loft above eight times that number before they entered the caftle. After the reduction of Boca Chica caftle, the British army re-immbarked on board the fleet, which transported them round the harbour, and re-landed them nearer the town; from whence they marched up to La Quinta, and encamping before Lazar, reconnoitred and took poffeffion of La Popa; but the French commander, after

fending

fending a party up the harbour to poffefs them- CHAP. felves of La Popa, re-imbarked all that he had VI. brought on fhore before Boca Chica, and order

ing the fquadron to warp through the channel, 1741. thought it unneceffary to re-imbark the land forces; and on the 18th marched them up through the country to fort Lazar, who in their way entered the fort of St. Croix, afterwards called Caftillo Grande, which the Spaniards had abandoned: the next day the French army croffed the lake, and De Pointi on reconnoitring St Lazar, beheld with much trouble the time it must coft if he attacked it in form, and brought his artillery to batter it; but afterwards getting up to an eminencey, above all the others, perceived if he could make a way through the wood to that height, they might afterwards go upon a level from thence to the foot of the fort, all the way being covered with woods; and that he could fix a miner to the fort if the garrifon refolved to continue there. Upon this, on the 20th, he ordered his major-general to call to arms, and put the negroes to work upon cutting of a way to facilitate the march of the troops, which were about 2,200; this was carried on half way up the hill, where dividing the way to encompass the fort, one part of the forces marched to the right and the other to the left, and arrived at the foot of the fort in a very little time, where they made the greatest fire that was poffible; during which time the garrifon did little execution, by reason the befiegers made their fhot upon them fo foon as they expofed their bodies to view; and the French officers calling out for the fcaling ladders, and placing their miners, the fear of the garrifon gave them occafion to think they would be attacked on all fides, which had effectually hap

I.

PART pened if they had not chose to retire through the quarter towards the gate that was then free to them. In this manner the French poffeffed 1741. themselves of St Lazar, with the lofs of only one captain and five grenadiers: what a furprizing difference between that and the lofs fuftained by the English in the fame unfortunate attack! how melancholy the reflection between the deaths of five and five hundred! and how reverse the iffue of one action so profperously executed, by a body of 2,200 undifciplined Frenchmen; and the unhappy event of the other, though carried on by above 5,000 Britons!

DE POINTI afterwards pufhed on his fuccefs, and in lefs than a fortnight obliged the town to furrender to him: the Spaniards, to the number of 2,800 lifted men, marched out with military honours, leaving the town with the inhabitants, and nine millions of money to the victorious French.

HAD the British troops fucceeded at the attack of fort Lazar, there was the highest probability they would have entered the town as triumphantly as the French had done: but many, too many reafons, glare ftrongly to the world to e vince the true caufe of fuch an ignoble difappointment. Certainly the British troops attacked the fort in a very different manner from the French, and they failed for want of advancing to afcend the hill to the right and left, where it was practicable, instead of halting at the foot of a fteep part of the hill they could not afcend, and remaining there to perifh at the mercy of the Spaniards. The various turns of war are fo uncertain and precarious, as to elude the best concerted plans of the ableft and most vigilant commanders; while trivial accidents often lead to

the

1741.

the noblest victories: and it would be an uncha- CHAP. ritable pen, that pofitively afferted the misconduct VI. of fuch an expedition to any particular perfon; but an impartial writer cannot avoid taking notice, that General Wentworth acted very imprudently in not confulting Admiral Vernon upon the attack, who could have advised a proper difpofition being made for it, and would undoubtedly have been ready to have given affiftance in it from the fleet: and it is certain the general never carried, nor fent, any of the officers that were to lead the attack, to La Popa, where he might have given them his proper directions, and they have known how to have executed his orders to the best advantage from their own obfervations; who if they were directed to carry on the attack to the right and left, took a contrary road from a mistake, principally owing to their ignorance of the acceffible parts of the hill, which if they had opportunely afcended, like De Pointi, and lodged their men in the Spanish intrenchments, they would have been under cover againft all fire from the town, and thofe in the fort would not have dared to expose themselves over the walls to fire upon them; fo they would have had a short and easy fap in a clay hill, to have mined under a corner of the fort and made a breach, if the garrifon would have stayed for giving them that trouble; which it is probable they would not, but have rather chose to abandon the fort as it was done to the French.

WHEN the land army were thus circumvented in their views, and too greatly diminished to renew the affault, there was not even the leaft pof fibility of reducing the town by the fire from the fleet: the walls were too tenable to admit of any breach, except on the land fide, and there was

no