and fome other properties fignified by the name man, and retaining only a body, with life, sense, and spontaneous motion, comprehended under the name animal.

$9. General Natures are nothing but abstract Ideas. THAT this is the way whereby men first formed general ideas, and general names to them, I think is fo evident, that there needs no other proof of it, but the confidering of a man's felf or others, and the ordinary proceedings of their minds in knowledge. And he that thinks general natures or notions are any thing else but fuch abstract and partial ideas of more complex ones, taken at first from particular exiftences, will, I fear, be at a lofs where to find them; for let any one reflect, and then tell me, wherein does his idea of man differ from that of Peter and Paul, or his idea of horse from that of Bucephalus, but in the leaving out fomething that is peculiar to each individual, and retaining fo much of thofe particular complex ideas of feveral particular exiftences, as they are found to agree in? Of the complex ideas fignified by the names man and horfe, leaving out but thofe particulars wherein they differ, and retaining only thofe wherein they agree, and of thofe making a new diftinct complex idea, and giving the name animal to it, one has a more general term, that comprehends with man feveral other creatures. Leave out of the idea of animal, fense and spontaneous motion, and the remaining complex idea, made up of the remaining fimple ones of body, life, and nourishment, becomes a more general one, under the more comprehenfive term vivens. And not to dwell longer on this particular, fo evident in itself, by the fame way the mind proceeds to body, fubftance, and at laft to being, thing, and fuch univerfal terms, which ftand for any of our ideas whatsoever. To conclude, this whole mytery of genera and fpecies, which make such a noife in the schools, and are with juftice fo little regarded out of them, is nothing else but abstract ideas, more or lefs comprehenfive, with names annexed to them; in all which this is conftant and unvariable, that every more general term ftands for fuch an idea, as is but a part of any of those contained under it.

§ 10. Why the Genus is ordinarily made use of in Defi

nitions.

THIS may fhow us the reafon, why, in the defining of words, which is nothing but declaring their fignification, we make use of the genus, or next general word that comprehends it, which is not out of neceffity, but only to fave the labour of enumerating the several fimple ideas which the next general word or genus ftands for; or, perhaps, fometimes the fhame of not being able to do it. But though defining by genus and differentia (I crave leave to use thefe terms of art, though originally Latin, fince they moft properly fuit thofe notions they are applied to), I fay, though defining by the genus be the thorteft way, yet I think it may be doubted whether it be the beft. This I am fure, it is not the only, and so not absolutely neceffary; for definition being nothing but making another understand by words, what idea the term defined stands for, a definition is beft made by enumerating thofe fimple ideas that are combined in the fignification of the term defined; and if instead of fuch an enumeration, men have accustomed themfelves to ufe the next general term, it has not been out of neceflity, or for greater clearness, but for quicknefs and dispatch fake; for, I think, that to one who defired to know what ideas the word man stood for, if it should be faid, that man was a folid extended fubftance, having life, fenfe, fpontaneous motion, and the faculty of reafoning; I doubt not but the meaning of the term man would be as well understood, and the idea it ftands for be at least as clearly made known, as when it is defined to be a rational animal, which by the feveral definitions of animal, vivens, and corpus, refolves itfelf into thofe enumerated ideas. I have, in explaining the term man, followed here the ordinary definition of the schools, which though, perhaps, not the most exact, yet ferves well enough to my prefent purpose: And one may, in this inftance, fee what gave occafion to the rule, that a definition must confift of genus and differentia; and it fuffices to fhow us the little neceffity there is of fuch a rule, or advantage

in the ftrict obferving of it: For definitions, as has been faid, being only the explaining of one word by feveral others, fo that the meaning or idea it ftands for may be certainly known, languages are not always fo made according to the rules of logic, that every term can have its fignification exactly and clearly expreffed by two others. Experience fufficiently fatisfies us to the contrary, or else those who have made this rule have done ill, that they have given us fo few definitions conformable to it. But of definitions, more in the next chapter.

11. General and Univerfal are Creatures of the Un

derftanding.

To return to general words, it is plain, by what has been faid, that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things, but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own ufe, and concern only figns, whether words or ideas. Words are general, as has been faid, when used for signs of general ideas, and fo are applicable indifferently to many particular things; and ideas are general, when they are fet up as the reprefentatives of many particular things; but univerfality belongs not to things themfelves, which are all of them particular in their existence; even those words and ideas, which in their fignification are general. When, therefore, we quit particulars, the generals that reft are only creatures of our own making, their general nature being nothing but the capacity they are put into by the understanding, of fignifying or reprefenting many particulars; for the fignification they have, is nothing but a relation that by the mind of man is added to them.

12. Abstract Ideas are the Effences of the Genera and

Species.

For

THE next thing therefore to be confidered, is, What kind of fignification it is, that general words have. as it is evident that they do not fignify barely one particular thing, (for then they would not be general terms, but proper names) fo on the other fide it is as evident they do not fignify a plurality; for man and men would

Chap. 3. then fignify the fame, and the distinction of numbers (as the grammarians call them) would be fuperfluous and ufelefs. That then which general words fignify, is a fort of things; and each of them does that, by being a fign of an abstract idea in the mind; to which idea, as things exifting are found to agree, fo they come to be ranked under that name, or, which is all one, be of that fort; whereby it is evident, that the effences of the forts, or (if the Latin word pleafes better) /pecies of things, are nothing else but these abstract ideas. For the having the effence of any species, being that which makes any thing to be of that fpecies, and the conformity to the idea to which the name is annexed, being that which gives a right to that name, the having the effence, and the having that conformity, must needs be the fame thing; fince to be of any species, and to have As for a right to the name of that fpecies, is all one. example, to be a man, or of the fpecies man, and to have right to the name man, is the fame thing. Again, to be a man, or of the fpecies man, and have the effence of a man, is the fame thing. Now fince nothing can be a man, or have a right to the name man, but what has a conformity to the abstract idea the name man stands for; nor any thing be a man, or have a right to the fpecies man, but what has the effence of that fpecies; it follows, that the abstract idea for which the name stands, and the effence of the fpecies, is one and the fame; from whence it is easy to obferve, that the effences of the forts of things, and confequently the forting of this, is the workmanship of the underítanding, that abstracts and makes thofe general ideas.

13. They are the workmanship of the Understanding, but have their foundation in the Similitude of things. I WOULD not here be thought to forget, much less to deny, that nature in the production of things makes feveral of them alike: There is nothing more obvious, efpecially in the races of animals, and all things propagated by feed. But yet, I think, we may fay the forting of them under names is the workmanship of the underfianding, taking occafion from the fimilitude it obferves amongst

them to make abstract general ideas, and fet them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms (for in that fenfe the word form has a very proper fignification), to which as particular things exifting are found to agree, fo they come to be of that fpecies, have that denomination, or are put into that claffis. For when we fay, this is a man, that a horfe; this juftice, that cruelty; this a watch, that a jack; what do we else but rank things under different fpecific names, as agreeing to thofe abstract ideas, of which we have made those names the figns? and what are the effences of thofe fpecies fet out and marked by names, but those abstract ideas in the mind, which are as it were the bonds between particular things that exift, and the names they are to be ranked under? And when general names have any connection with particular beings, these abftract ideas are the medium that unites them; fo that the effences of fpecies, as diftinguifhed and denominated by us, neither are nor can be any thing but those precife abftract ideas we have in our minds; and therefore the fuppofed real effences of fubftances, if different from our abftract ideas, cannot be the effences of the fpecies we rank things into; for two fpecies may be one as rationally, as two different effences be the effence of one fpecies and I demand what are the alterations may or may not be in a horfe or lead, without making either of them to be of another fpecies? In determining the fpecies of things by our abstract ideas, this is eafy to refolve but if any one will regulate himself herein by fuppofed real effences, he will, I suppose, be at a lofs; and he will never be able to know when any thing precifely ceases to be of the fpecies of a horfe or lead.

§ 14. Each diftinct abstract Idea is a diftinct Effence. NOR will any one wonder, that I fay thefe effences, or abstract ideas (which are measures of name, and the boundaries of fpecies), are the workmanship of the underStanding, who confiders, that at leaft the complex ones are often, in feveral men, different collections of fimple ideas; and therefore that is covetousness to one man, which is not fo to another. Nay, even in fubftances,