are, whether there were any fenfible being to perceive them or no and therefore we have reafon to look on thofe as the real modifications of matter, and such as are the exciting causes of all our various sensations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I fhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to fhow what complex ideas are adequate, and what not. §3. Modes are all adequate.

SECONDLY, Our complex ideas of modes, being voluntary collections of fimple ideas which the mind puts together without reference to any real-archetypes or ftanding patteris exifting any where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas; because they not being intended for copies of things really exifting, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing, they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they fhould; fo that the mind acquiefces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure with three fides meeting in three angles, I have a complete idea, wherein I require nothing elfe to make it perfect. That the mind is fatisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain in that it does not conceive that any understanding hath or can have a more complete or perfect idea of that thing it fignifies by the word triangle, fuppofing it to exift, than itself has in that complex idea of three fides, and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be effential to it, or neceffary to complete it, wherever or however it exists. But in our ideas of fubftances it is otherwife; for there, defiring to copy things as they really do exift, and to reprefent to ourselves that conftitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend; we find they ftill want fomething we fhould be glad were in them; and fo are all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and fo having nothing to reprefent but themfelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being fo to itfelf. He that at first put together the idea of danger, perceived abfence of diforder from

fear, fedate confideration from what was juftly to be done, and executing of that without disturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination; and intending to be nothing else but what it is, nor to have in it any other fimple ideas but what it hath, it could not alfo but be an adequate idea; and laying this up in his memory, with the name courage annexed to it, to fignify it to others, and denominate from thence any action he should obferve to agree with it, had thereby a ftandard to measure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea thus made, and laid up for a pattern, must neceffarily be adequate, being referred to nothing elfe but itself, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that first made this combination.

§ 4. Modes, in reference to fettled Names, may be inadequate.

INDEED another coming after, and in converfation learning from him the word courage, may make any idea, to which he gives that name courage, different from what the first author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he ufes it. And in this cafe, if he defigns that his idea in thinking fhould be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he uses in fpeaking is conformable in found to his from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate; because in this cafe, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word or found is the pattern of his in fpeaking, his idea is so far defective and inadequate, as it is diftant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to exprefs and fignify by the name he uses for it; which name he would have to be a fign of the other man's idea (to which, in its proper ufe, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it; to which, if his own does not exactly correfpond, it is faul ty and inadequate.

§ 5.

THEREFORE these complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correfpond to the

ideas in the mind of fome other intelligent being, expreffed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong and inadequate, because they agree not to that which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which refpect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect or inadequate. And on

this account our ideas of mixed modes are the most liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper fpeaking, than knowing right.

6. Ideas of Substances, as referred to real Effences, not

adequate.

THIRDLY, What ideas we have of fubftances, I have above fhown. Now thofe ideas have in the mind a double reference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a fuppofed real effence of each fpecies of things; 2. Sometimes they are only defigned to be pictures and reprefentations. in the mind, of things that do exift by ideas of thofe qualities that are difcoverable in them. In both which ways, thefe copies of thofe originals and archetypes, are imperfect and inadequate.

Firft, It is ufual for men to make the names of subftances ftand for things, as fuppofed to have certain real effences, whereby they are of this or that fpecies: and names ftanding for nothing but the ideas that are in mens minds, they muft confequently refer their ideas to fuch real effences, as to their archetypes. That men (especially fuch as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do fuppofe certain fpecific effences of fubftances, which each individual, in its feveral kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of, is fo far from needing proof, that it will be thought ftrange if any one fhould do otherwife; and thus they ordinarily apply the fpecific names they rank particular substances under, to things as diftinguished by such specific real effences. Who is there almoft, who would not take it amifs, if it fhould be doubted, whether he called himself man, with any other meaning, than as having the real effence of a man? And yet if you demand what thofe real effences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows,

that the ideas they have in their minds, being refered to real effences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be fo far from being adequate, that they cannot be fuppofed to be any reprefentation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of fubftances, are, as it has been fhown, certain collections of fimple ideas that have been obferved or fuppofed conftantly to exit together: But fuch a complex idea cannot be the real effence of any fubftance; for then the properties we difcover in that body, would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their neceffary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and as far as they are difcoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a space. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of fubliances, are not contained fuch ideas, on which all the other qualities that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of iron, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleablenefs; but yet this property has no neceffary connection with that complex idea, or any part of it; and there is no more reafon to think that malleablenefs depends on that colour, weight and hardness, than that that colour, or that weight depends on its malleablenefs; and yet, though we know nothing of thefe real effences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men should attribute the forts of things to fuch effences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by most men, fuppofed to have a real effence, whereby it is gold; and from whence thofe qualities flow which F find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardnefs, fu-fibility, fixednefs, and change of colour upon a flight touch of mercury, &c. This effence, from which all thefe properties flow, when I inquire into it, and fearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot difcover; the fartheft I can go, is only to prefume, that it being nothing but body, its real effence, or internal conflitation, onwhich these qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, fize and connection of its folid parts, of neither

of which having any diftinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its effence, which is the cause that it has that particular fhining yellowness, a greater weight than any thing I know of the fame bulk, and a fitness to have its colour changed by the touch of quickfilver. If any one will fay, that the real effence and internal conftitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, fize and arrangement or connection of its folid parts, but fomething else, called its particular form; I am farther from having any idea of its real effence, than I was before: for I have an idea of a figure, fize and situation of folid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, fize, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that fomething befides the figure, fize and pofture of the folid parts of that body, is its effence, fomething called fubftantial form; of that, I confefs, I have no idea at all, but only of the found form, which is far enough from an idea of its real effence, or conftitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real effence of this particular substance, I have alfo of the real effence of all other natural ones; of which effences, I confefs I have no diftinct ideas at all; and I am apt to fuppofe others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the fame fort of ignorance.

$7.

Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger a general name already in use, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular fpecies of bodies, having a real internal effence; by having of which effence, this particular substance comes to be of that fpecies, and to be called by that name? If it be fo, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that effence, muft be referred primarily to that effence; and confequently the