or any falsehood be in either; for all things that had the texture of a violet, producing conftantly the idea which he called blue, and thofe which had the texture of a marigold, producing conftantly the idea which he has conftantly called yellow; whatever thofe appearances were in his mind, he would be able as regularly to diftinguish things for his ufe by thofe appearances, and understand and fignify those diftinctions marked by the name blue and yellow, as if the appearances, or ideas in his mind, received from those two flowers, were exactly the fame with the ideas in other mens minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the fenfible ideas produced by any object in different mens minds, are moft commonly very near and undifcernibly alike: For which opinion I think there might be many reasons offered; but that being befides my prefent bufinefs, I fhall not trouble my reader with them, but only mind him, that the contrary fuppofition, if it could be proved, is of little ufe, either for the improvement of our knowledge, or conveniency of life; and fo we need not trouble ourfelves to examine it.

§ 16. First, Simple Ideas in this Senfe not false, and why. FROM what has been faid concerning our fimple ideas, I think it evident, that our fimple ideas can none of them be falfe in refpect of things exifting without us: For the truth of thefe appearances, or perceptions in our minds, confifting, as has been faid, only in their being answerable to the powers in external objects, to produce by our fenfes fuch appearances in us, and each of them being in the mind, fuch as it is, fuitable to the power that produced it, and which alone it reprefents; it cannot upon that account, or as referred to fuch a pattern, be falfe. Blue or yellow, bitter or fweet, can never be falfe ideas; thefe perceptions in the mind are just such as they are there, anfwering the powers appointed by God to produce them, and fo are truly what they are and are intended to be. Indeed the names may be mifapphed, but that in this refpect makes no falfehood in the ideas, as if a man ignorant in the English tongue fhould call purple fearlet.

$ 17. Secondly, Modes not falfe.

SECONDLY, Neither can our complex ideas of modes in reference to the effence of any thing really exifting, be false; because whatever complex idea I have of any mode, it hath no reference to any pattern exifting, and made by nature; it is not fuppofed to contain in it any other ideas than what it hath, nor to reprefent any thing but fuch a complication of ideas as it does: Thus when I have the idea of fuch an action of a man, who forbears to afford himself fuch meat, drink and clothing, and other conveniencies of life as his riches and estate will be fufficient to fupply, and his ftation requires, I have no falfe ideas, but fuch an one as reprefents an action, either as I find or imagine it, and fo is capable of neither truth or falsehood: But when I give the name frugality, or virtue, to this action, then it may be called a falfe idea, if thereby it be fuppofed to agree with that idea, to which, in propriety of speech, the name of frugality doth belong, or to be conformable to that law, which is the standard of virtue and vice.

§ 18. Thirdly, Ideas of Subftances when falfe. THIRDLY, Our complex ideas of fubftances, being all referred to patterns in things themfelves, may be falfe: That they are all falfe, when looked upon as the reprefentations of the unknown effences of things, is fo evident, that there needs nothing to be faid of it: I fhall therefore pafs over that chimerical fuppofition, and confider them as collections of fimple ideas in the mind, taken from combinations of fimple ideas exifting together conftantly in things, of which patterns they are the fuppofed copies; and in this reference of them, to the existence of things, they are falfe ideas: 1. When they put together fimple ideas, which in the real existence of things have no union; as when to the fhape and fize that exift together in a horse, is joined, in the fame complex idea, the power of barking like a dog; which three ideas, however put together into one in the mind, were never united in nature; and this therefore may be called a falfe idea of an horfe. 2. Ideas of fubftances are, in this refpect, alfo falfe, when from any collection of fimple

ideas that do always exift together, there is feparated, by a direct negation, any other fimple idea which is conftantly joined with them. Thus, if to extenfion, folidity, fufibility, the peculiar weightiness, and yellow colour of gold, any one join in his thoughts the negation of a greater degree of fixednefs than is in lead or copper, he may be faid to have a falfe complex idea, as well as when he joins to thofe other fimple ones the idea of perfect abfolute fixednefs: For either way, the complex idea of gold being made up of fuch simple ones as have no union in nature, may be termed falfe; but if he leave out of this his complex idea, that of fixednefs quite, without either actually joining to, or feparating of it from the reft in his mind, it is, I think, to be looked on as an inadequate and imperfect idea rather than a falfe one; fince though it contains not all the fimple ideas that are united in nature, yet it puts none together but what do really exift together.

19. Truth or Falsehood always fuppofes Affirmation or

Negation.

THOUGH, in compliance with the ordinary way of fpeaking, I have showed in what fenfe, and upon what ground our ideas may be fometimes called true or falfe, yet if we will look a little nearer into the matter, in all cafes where any idea is called true or falfe, it is from fome judgment that the mind makes, or is fuppofed to make, that is true or falfe: For truth or falsehood, being never without fome affirmation or negation, exprefs or tacit, it is not to be found but when figns are joined or feparated, according to the agreement or difagreement of the things they stand for. The figns we chiefly ufe are either ideas of words, wherewith we make either mental or verbal propofitions. Truth lies in fo joining or separating these representatives, as the things they stand for do in themselves agree or difagree; and falsehood in the contrary, as fhall be more fully fhowed hereafter.

§ 20. Ideas in themselves neither true nor falfe. ANY idea then which we have in our minds, whether conformable or not to the existence of things, or to any ideas in the min ls of other men, cannot properly for this

alone be called falfe: For these representations, if they have nothing in them but what is really exifting in things without, cannot be thought false, being exact reprefentations of fomething: Nor yet if they have any thing in them differing from the reality of things, can they properly be faid to be false representations, or ideas of things they do not reprefent: But the mistake and falsehood is,

§ 21. But are falfe; 1. When judged agreeable to another man's Idea, without being fo.

FIRST, When the mind, having any idea, it judges and concludes it the fame that is in other mens minds, fignified by the fame name, or that it is conformable to the ordinary received fignification or definition of that word, when indeed it is not, which is the most usual mistake in mixed modes, though other ideas also are liable to it. § 22. 2. When judged to agree to real Existence, when

they do not.

SECONDLY, When it having a complex idea made up of fuch a collection of fimple ones, as nature never puts together, it judges it to agree to a fpecies of creatures really exifting, as when it joins the weight of tin, to the colour, fufibility, and fixednefs of gold.

§ 23. 3. When judged adequate, without being fo. THIRDLY, When in its complex idea it has united a certain number of fimple ideas that do really exift together in fome fort of creatures, but has also left out others as much infeparable, it judges this to be a perfect complete idea of a fort of things which really it is not; v. g. having joined the ideas of fubftance, yellow, malleable, moft heavy and fufible, it takes that complex idea to be the complete idea of gold, when yet its peculiar fixednefs and folubility in aqua regia are as infeparable from thofe other ideas or qualities of that body, as they are one from another.

§ 24. 4. When judged to reprefent the real Effence. FOURTHLY, The mistake is yet greater, when I judge that this complex idea contains in it the real effence of any body exifting, when at least it contains but fome few of those properties which flow from its real effence and confti

tution; I fay, only fome few of those properties; for thofe properties confifting moftly in the active and paffive powers it has, in reference to other things, all that are vulgarly known of any one body, and of which the complex idea of that kind of things is ufually made, are but a very few, in comparifon of what a man, that has feveral ways tried and examined it, knows of that one fort of things; and all that the most expert man knows, are but few, in comparison of what are really in that body, and depend on its internal or effential confti-t tution. The effence of a triangle lies in a very little compafs, confifts in a very few ideas; three lines including a space make up that effence; but the properties that flow from this effence, are more than can be eafily known or enumerated: So I imagine it is in fubftances; their real effences lie in a little compafs, though the properties flowing from that internal conftitution are endless.

§ 25. Ideas when false.

To conclude; a man having no notion of any thing without him, but by the idea he has of it in his mind (which idea he has a power to call by what name he pleases), he may indeed make an idea neither answering the reality of things, nor agreeing to the ideas commonly fignified by other peoples words, but cannot make a wrong or falfe idea of a thing, which is no other wife known to him but by the idea he has of it: v. g. When I frame an idea of the legs, arms, and body of a man, and join to this a horse's head and neck, I do not make a falfe idea of any thing, because it reprefents nothing without me: But when I call it a Man or Tartar, and imagine it either to represent some real being without me, or to be the fame idea that others call by the fame name; in either of these cafes I may err; and upon this account it is, that it comes to be termed a falfe idea; though indeed the falfehood lies not in the idea, but in that tacit mental propofition, wherein a conformity and refemblance is attributed to it, which it has not: But yet, if having framed fuch an idea in my mind, without thinking either that existence, or the name Man or Tar