Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and DeliberationCheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sense of the idea that, despite conflict, pluralism, and the expression of difference, our moral and political beliefs aim at truth and can be subject to criticism. |
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aboutthe andpolitical andthe Apel argues articulated assertion atrue atthe bivalence C.S.Peirce canbe characterisation claim cognitivism cognitivist committed comprehensive doctrine conception ofthe culture David Wiggins debate decisionmaking deliberative democracy democratic discourse discourse ethics disquotationalist doesnot empiricism epistemology ethics evidence fallibilism Habermas holism Horwich idea ideal Ihave instance inthe isan isnot issue isthat istrue itis justification kind kindof Kymlicka liberal matter mightbe Misak moral and political moral deliberation moral judgements moraland mustbe neutrality principle notion objectivity oftruth one’s onthe ourselves Peirce Peirce’s philosophical position practice pragmatism pragmatist question rational Rawls reasons requires right answer Rorty Schmitt Schmittian sense seriously someone statement suggest thata thatis thatone thatthe thatwe thegood theory thepragmatist thereis things thinkthat thought thought experiment tobe tosay totake tothe transcendental true belief truthand truthis truthvalue underdetermination values verificationism warranted assertibility wayof wecan wehave wemust whatis Wiggins wrong