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Utility Theory I
Extensive and Normal Forms
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alternatives analysis arbitrated solution arbitration scheme argument assumed assumption axioms Chapter characteristic function choose coalition structure collusion concept condition conflict of interest consider constant-sum cooperative game decision denote discussion dominates economic equilibrium pairs equilibrium point equilibrium strategy example exists expected value extensive form finite number gamble game in extensive game theory game tree given imputations indifferent individual information sets interpersonal comparisons interpretation least linear utility function lottery mathematical maximin strategy maximize mixed strategy move n-person game n-tuple Nash Nash's negotiation set Neumann and Morgenstern non-cooperative game normal form notion outcome Pareto optimal payoff matrix play player 2's possible preplay communication prisoner's dilemma pure strategy randomized rational reasonable restricted security level sense Shapley Shapley value side payments situation social strategy choice strategy x strictly competitive games subset theorem theory of games tion tive two-person games two-person theory unique utility theory yield zero-sum game