The Vocabulary of Philosophy, Mental, Moral and Metaphysical: With Quotations and References; for the Use of Students |
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2d Edit absolute abstract according Acroamatical action Analogy Anima Mundi animal applied argument Aristotle Atheism body born called cause chap Cicero common conception consciousness constitution denote Deontology Descartes died distinction distinguished Divine doctrine Elements Entelechy Enthymeme Essay on Hum essence existence experience external faculty feeling G. C. Lewis genus Hamilton Hist human Hylozoism idea imagination implies Induction Intell intellect intelligence intuition judgment Kant knowledge Laws of Thought Leibnitz Locke Logic Lond Malebranche matter means memory Metaphys metaphysics mind mode moral nature notion object operations opposed Pantheism perception phenomena Phil Philos philosophy Plato Pneumatology predicate principle properly proposition Psychology qualities quod reason Reid Reid's relation says sect sensation sense signifies Sir William Hamilton Sophism soul species Stewart substance syllogism term theory things thought tion true truth understanding universal virtue vols Whately word
Popular passages
Page 233 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive.
Page 318 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Page 282 - ... as if there were sought in knowledge a couch whereupon to rest a searching and restless spirit; or a terrace for a wandering and variable mind to walk up and down with a fair prospect; or a tower of state for a proud mind to raise itself upon; or a fort or commanding ground for strife and contention; or a shop for profit or sale; and not a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate.
Page 233 - For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, ie the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person...
Page 193 - Fancy does not require that the materials which she makes use of should be susceptible of change in their constitution, from her touch ; and, where they admit of modification, it is enough for her purpose if it be slight, limited, and evanescent. Directly the reverse of these, are the desires and demands of the Imagination. She recoils from everything but the plastic, the pliant, and the indefinite.
Page 175 - Our observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Page 268 - For if we will reflect on our own ways of thinking, we shall find that sometimes the mind perceives the agreement or disagreement of two ideas immediately by themselves, without the intervention of any other : and this, I think, we may call
Page 253 - The vis insita, or innate -force of matter, is a power of resisting, by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest, or of moving uniformly forward in a right line.
Page 556 - I shall only add to it, by way of explanation, that every resemblance of ideas is not that which we call wit, unless it be such an one that gives delight and surprise to the reader.
Page 433 - I would be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding.