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politic, under one fupreme government; of elfe when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the fociety, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the fociety fhall require; to the execution whereof, his own affiftance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by fetting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controverfies, and redrefs the” injuries that may happen to any member of the common-wealth; which judge is the legislative, or magiftrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men, however affociated, that have no fuch decifive power to appeal to, there they are ftill in the state of nature.

90. Hence it is evident, that abfolute monarchy, which by fome men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconfiftent with civil fociety, and fo can be no form of civil-government at all for the end of civil fociety, being to avoid, and remedy thofe inconveniencies of the ftate of nature, which neceffarily follow from every man's being judge in his own cafe, by fetting up a known authority, to which every one of that fociety may appeal upon any injury received, or controverfy that may arife, and

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which every one of the * fociety ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not fuch an authority to appeal to, for the decifion of any difference between them, there those perfons are ftill in the fate of nature; and fo is every abfolute prince, in refpect of those who are under his dominion.

§. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in himfelf alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and redrefs may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be fuffered from the prince, or by his order: fo that fuch a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or how your please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is with the rest of mankind for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controverfies of right betwixt them, there they are ftill in the ftate of

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The public power of all fociety is above every foul contained in the fame fociety; and the principal ufe of that power is, to give laws unto all that are under it, which laws in fuch cafes we must obey, unless there be reason fhewed which may neceffarily inforce, that the law of reafon, or of God, doth enjoin the contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol, l. i̟. felt. 16.

of nature, and under all the inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the fubject, or rather flave of an abfolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary ftate of nature, he has a liberty to judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal, as thofe in fociety ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and fo is expofed to all the mifery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one,

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To take away all fuch mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i. fuch as attend men in the ftate of nature, there was no way but only by growing into compofition and agreement amongst themfelves, by ordaining fome kind of government public, and by yielding themfelves fubject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govern, by them the peace, tranquillity and happy eftate of the reft might be procured. Men always knew that where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that however men may feek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others, it was not to be fuffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally, they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial'; and therefore that ftrifes and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common confent, all to be ordered by fome, whom they fhould agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one man fhould take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl, Pol. 1, i. *fect. 10.

one, who being in the unreftrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.

§. 92. For he that thinks abfolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the bafenefs of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be convinced of the contrary. He that would have been infolent and injurious in the woods of America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and religion fhall be found out to justify all that he fhall do to his fubjects, and the fword prefently filence all thofe that dare question it: for what the protection of abfolute monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be, and to what a degree of happiness and fecurity it carries civil fociety, where this fort of government is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may eafily fee.

§. 93. In abfolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controverfies, and reftrain any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This every one thinks neceffary, and believes he deferves to be thought a declared enemy to fociety and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true love of mankind and fociety, and fuch a charity as

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we owe all one to another, there is reafon to doubt for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit, or greatnefs, may and naturally must do, keep thofe animals from hurting, or deftroying one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and fo are taken care of, not out of any love the mafter has for them, but love of himself, and the profit they bring him for if it be asked, what fecurity, what fence is there, in such a state, against the violence and oppreffion of this abfolute ruler? the very question can fcarce be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deferves death only to ask after fafety. Betwixt fubject and fubject, they will grant, there must be meafures, laws and judges, for their mutual peace and fecurity: but as for the ruler, he ought to be abfolute, and is above all fuch circumftances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that fide where the strongest hand is to do it, is prefently the voice of faction and rebellion as if when men quitting the ftate of nature entered into fociety, they agreed that all of them but one, should be under the reftraint of laws, but that he fhould ftill retain all the liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity. This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mif