prefent cafe. No body doubts but an exprefs confent, of any man entering into any fociety, makes him a perfect member of that fociety, a subject of that government. The difficulty is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit confent, and how far it binds, i.e. how far any one fhall be looked on to have confented, and thereby fubmitted to any government, where he has made no expreffions of it at all. And to this I fay, that every man, that hath any poffeffions, or enjoyment, of any part of the dominions of any government, doth thereby give his tacit confent, and is as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during fuch enjoy→ ment, as any one under it; whether this his poffeffion be of land, to him and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very being of any one within the territories of that government.

§. 120. To understand this the better, it is fit to confider, that every man, when he at first incorporates himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed alfo, and fubmits to the community, thofe poffeffions, which he has, or fhall acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a direct contradiction, for any one to enter into fociety with others for the fecuring and regulating

gulating of property; and yet to fuppofe his Land, whofe property is to be regulated by the laws of the fociety, fhould be exempt from the jurifdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the land, is a fubject. By the fame act therefore, whereby any one unites his perfon, which was before free, to any common-wealth; by the same he unites his poffeffions, which were before free, to it alfo; and they become, both of them, perfon and poffeffion, fubject to the government and dominion of that common-wealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth, by inheritance, purchase, permiffion, or otherways, enjoys any part of the land, fo annexed to, and under the government of that common-wealth, muft take it with the condition it is under; that is, of fubmitting to the government of the common-wealth, under whose jurifdiction it is, as far forth as any fubject of it.

§. 121. But fince the government has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the poffeffor of it, (before he has actually incorporated himself in the fociety) only as he dwells upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of fuch enjoyment, to fubmit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; fo that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but fuch a tacit confent to the government, will, by donation,

3

donation, fale, or otherwife, quit the faid poffeffion, he is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other common

wealth; or to agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the world, they can find free and unpoffeffed: whereas he, that has once, by actual agreement, and any express declaration, given his confent to be of any common-wealth, is perpetually and indifpenfibly obliged to be, and remain unalterably a fubject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the ftate of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be diffolved ; or elfe by fome public act cuts him off from being any longer a member of it.

§. 122. But fubmitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that fociety: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all thofe, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that fociety, a perpetual fubject of that common-wealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whofe family he found it convenient to abide for fome time; though, whilft he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and fubmit to the government he

found

found there. And thus we fee, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in confcience, to fubmit to its administration, as far forth as any denifon; yet do not thereby come to be fubjects or members of that common-wealth. Nothing can make any man fo, but his actually entering into it by pofitive. engagement, and exprefs promife and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political focieties, and that confent which makes any one a member of any

common-wealth.

CHA P. IX.

Of the Ends of Political Society and Govern

§. 123.

I

ment.

F man in the ftate of nature be

fo free, as has been faid; if he be abfolute lord of his own person and poffeffions, equal to the greateft, and fubject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to anfwer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and conftantly exposed to the invafion of others: for all being kings as

much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no ftrict obfervers of equity and juftice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this ftate is very unfafe, very unfecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reafon, that he feeks out, and is willing to join in fociety with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual prefervation of their lives, liberties and eftates, which I call by the general name, property.

§. 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men's uniting into common-wealths, and putting themselves under government, is the prefervation of their property. To which in the ftate of nature there are many things wanting.

First, There wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common confent to be the ftandard of right and wrong, and the common meafure to decide all controverfies between them; for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures; yet men being biaffed by their intereft, as well as ignorant for want of ftudy of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cafes.

§. 125. Secondly, In the ftate of nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences ac

cording