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cording to the established law: for every one in that ftate being both judge and executioner of the law of nature, men being partial to themselves, paffion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat, in their own cafes; as well as negligence, and unconcernednefs, to make them too remifs in other men's.

§. 126. Thirdly, In the ftate of nature there often wants power to back and support the fentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injuftice offended, will seldom fail, where they are able, by force to make good their injuftice; fuch refiftance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently deftructive, to those who attempt it.

§. 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the ftate of nature, being but in an ill condition, while they remain in it, are quickly driven into fociety. Hence it comes to pafs, that we feldom find any number of men live any time together in this ftate. The inconveniencies that they are therein expofed to, by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the tranfgreffions of others, make them take fanctuary under the establifhed laws of government, and therein feek the prefervation of their property. It is this makes them fo willingly give up every one his fingle power of punishing, to be X 2 exercifed

exercised by fuch alone, as fhall be арpointed to it amongst them; and by fuch rules as the community, or those authorized by them to that purpose, fhall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rife of both the legislative and executive power, as well as of the governments and focieties themfelves.

§. 128. For in the state of nature, to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers.

The firft is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself, and others within the permiffion of the law of nature: by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one fociety, diftinct from all other creatures. And were it not for the corruption and vitiousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other; no neceffity that men fhould feparate from this great and natural community, and by pofitive agree ments combine into fmaller and divided affociations.d: to

The other power a man has in the state of nature, is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both thefe he gives up, when he joins in a private, if I may fo call it, or particular politic fociety, and incorporates into any common-wealth, feparate from the rest of mankind.

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§. 129. The firft power, viz. of doing whatfoever he thought for the prefervation of himSelf, and the reft of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the fociety, fo far forth as the prefervation of himself, and the reft of that fociety fhall require; which laws of the fociety in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of

nature.

§. 130. Secondly, The power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, (which he might before employ in the execution of the law of nature, by his own fingle authority, as he thought fit) to affift the executive power of the fociety, as the law thereof fhall require : for being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies, from the labour, affiftance, and fociety of others in the fame community, as well as protection from its whole strength; he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, profperity, and fafety of the fociety fhall require; which is not only neceffary, but juft, fince the other members of the fociety do

the like.

§. 131. But though men, when they enter into fociety, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the fociety, to be fo far difpofed of by the legislative, as the good of the fociety fhall require; yet it being

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only

only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worfe) the power of the fociety, or legislative conftituted by them, can never be fuppofed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to fecure every one's property, by providing against thofe three defects above mentioned, that made the ftate of nature fo unfafe and uneafy. And fo whoever has the legislative or fupreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established ftanding laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controverfies by thofe laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of fuch laws, or abroad to prevent or redrefs foreign injuries, and fecure the community from inroads and invafion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, fafety, and public good of the people.

CHA P. X.

Of the Forms of a Common-wealth.

§. 132. THE

THE majority having, as has been fhewed, upon men's first uniting

into fociety, the whole power of the com

munity

munity naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy: or elfe may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or fucceffors; and then it is an oligarchy: or elfe into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an bereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating fucceffor to return to them; an elective monarchy. And to accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more perfons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the fupreme power to revert to them again; when it is fo reverted, the community may difpofe of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the fupreme power, which is the legislative, it being impoffible to conceive that an inferior power should prefcribe to a fuperior, or any but the fupreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, fuch is the form of the common-wealth.

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§. 133.

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