properties of thofe that live under it, efpecially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own cafe and he that has right on his fide, having ordinarily but his own fingle strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries, or to punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniencies, which diforder men's properties in the ftate of nature, men unite into focieties, that they may have the united ftrength of the whole fociety to fecure and defend their properties, and may have ftanding rules to bound it, by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the fociety which they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into fuch hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they fhall be governed by declared laws, or elfe their peace, quiet, and property will ftill be at the fame uncertainty, as it was in the state of nature.

§. 137. Abfolute arbitrary power, or governing without fettled ftanding laws, can neither of them confift with the ends of fociety and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the ftate of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preferve their lives, liberties and fortunes, and by fated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they fhould intend, had they a power

fo

fo to do, to give to any one, or more, an abfolute arbitrary power over their persons and eftates, and put a force into the magiftrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them. This were to put themselves into a worse condition than the ftate of nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a fingle man, or many in combination. Whereas by suppofing they have given up themselves to the abfolute arbitrary power and will of a legiflator, they have difarmed themselves, and armed him, to make a prey of them when he pleases; he being in a much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is expofed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 fingle men ; no body being fecure, that his will, who has fuch a command, is better than that of other men, though his force be 100,000 times ftronger. And therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined refolutions for then mankind will be in a far worfe condition than in the state of nature, if they fhall have armed one, or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant

4

bitant and unlimited decrees of their fudden thoughts, or unreftrained, and till that moment unknown wills, without having any measures fet down which may guide and justify their actions: for all the power the government has, being only for the good of the fociety, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws; that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and fecure within the limits of the law; and the rulers too kept within their bounds, and not be tempted, by the power they have in their hands, to employ it to fuch purposes, and by fuch measures, as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

§. 138. Thirdly, The fupreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own confent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into fociety, it neceffarily fuppofes and requires, that the people should have property, without which they must be fuppofed to lofe that, by entering into fociety, which was the end for which they entered into it; too grofs an abfurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in fociety having property, they have fuch a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are their's, that no body hath a right to take their substance or any part of it from them, without their own confent: without

ན

this they have no property at all; for I have truly no property in that, which another can by right take from me, when he pleafes," against my confent. Hence it is a mistake to think, that the fupreme or legislative power of any common-wealth, can do what it will, and difpofe of the eftates of the fubject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative confifts, wholly or in part, in affemblies which are variable, whofe members, upon the diffolution of the affembly, are fubjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the reft. But in governments, where the legislative is in one lasting affembly always in being, or in one man, as in abfolute monarchies, there is danger ftill, that they will think themfelves to have a diftinct intereft from the reft of the community; and fo will be apt to increase their own riches and power, by taking what they think fit from the people: for a man's property is not at all fecure, tho' there be good and equitable laws to set the ' bounds of it between him and his fellow fubjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man, what part he pleases of his property, and ufe and dispose of it as he thinks good.

§. 139. But government, into whatsoever hands it is put, being, as I have before fhewed, intrusted with this condition, and for this

5

end,

end, that men might have and fecure their properties; the prince, or fenate, however it may have power to make laws, for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the fubjects property, without their own confent for this would be in effect to leave. them no property at all. And to let us fee, that even abfolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being abfolute, but is ftill limited by that reason, and confined to those ends, which required it in fome cases to be abfolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial difcipline: for the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole common-wealth, requires an abfolute obedience to the command of every fuperior officer, and it is juftly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we fee, that neither the ferjeant, that could command a foldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or ftand in a breach, where he is almoft fure to perish, can command that foldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general, that can condemn him to death for deferting his poft, or for not obeying the most desperate orders, can yet, with all his abfolute power of life and death, difpofe of one farthing of that foldier's eftate, or feize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command any thing, and Y hang