hang for the least disobedience; because such a blind obedience is neceffary to that end, for which the commander has his power, viz. the preservation of the reft; but the difpofing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

§. 140. It is true, governments cannot be fupported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his fhare of the protection, should pay out of his eftate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own confent, i. e. the confent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chosen by them for if any one fhall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people, by his own authority, and without fuch confent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and fubverts the end of government: for what property have I in that, which another may by right take, when he pleases, to himself?

§. 141. Fourthly, The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands: for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pafs it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the common-wealth, which is by conftituting the legiflative, and appointing in whofe hands that hall be. And when the people have faid, We will submit to rules, and be governed by laws made by such men, and in such forms, no body else can

Lay

fay other men fhall make laws for them; nor can the people be bound by any laws, but fuch as are enacted by those whom they have chofen, and authorized to make laws for them. The power of the legislative, being derived from the people by a pofitive voluntary grant and inftitution, can be no other than what that pofitive grant conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legiflators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws, and place it in other hands.

§. 142. These are the bounds which the truft, that is put in them by the fociety, and the law of God and nature, have fet to the legislative power of every common-wealth, in all forms of government.

First, They are to govern by promulgated eftablished laws, not to be varied in particular cafes, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at court, and the country man at plough.

Secondly, Thefe laws alfo ought to be defigned for no other end ultimately, but the good of the people.

Thirdly, They must not raise taxes on the property of the people, without the confent of the people, given by themselves, or their deputies. And this properly concerns only fuch governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not referved any part of the legislative to Y 2

deputies,

deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves.

Fourthly, The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to any body elfe, or place it any where, but where the people have.

CHA P. XII.

Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Common-wealth.

§. 143.

TH

HE legislative power is that, which has a right to direct how the force of the common-wealth fhall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. But because those laws which are conftantly to be executed, and whofe force is always to continue, may be made in a little time; therefore there is no need, that the legislative should be always in being, not having always bufinefs to do. And because it may be too great a temptation to human frailty, apt to grafp at power, for the fame perfons, who have the power of making laws, to have alfo in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and fuit the law, both in its making, and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a diftinct intereft from the reft of the com

munity,

munity, contrary to the end of fociety and government: therefore in well-ordered common-wealths, where the good of the whole is fo confidered, as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers perfons, who duly affembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themfelves fubject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good.

§. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a fhort time made, have a conftant and lafting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is neceffary there fhould be a power always in being, which fhould fee to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be feparated.

§. 145. There is another power in every common-wealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which anfwers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into fociety: for though in à common-wealth the members of it are distinct perfons ftill in reference to one another, and as fuch are governed by the laws of the fociety; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, ftill in the ftate of

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nature

nature with the reft of mankind. Hence it is, that the controverfies that happen between any man of the fociety with those that are out of it, are managed by the public; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this confideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.

§. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the tranfactions, with all perfons and communities without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.

§. 147. Thefe two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the fociety within its felf, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the fecurity and intereft of the public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almoft united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much lefs capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, pofitive laws, than the executive; and fo muft neceffarily be left to the prudence and wisdom

of