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munity, contrary to the end of society and government: therefore in' well-ordered common-wealths, where the good of the whole is so confidered, as it ought, the legislative power
into the hands of divers persons, who duly assembled, have by themfelves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them, to take care, that they make them for the public good.
$. 144. But because the laws, that are at once, and in a short time made, have a conftant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto; therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being, which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.
§. 145. There is another power in every common-wealth, which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society : for though in à common-wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another, and as such are governed by the laws of the society; yet in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of
nature with the rest of mankind. Hence it is, that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it, are managed by the public ; and an injury done to a member of their body, engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this confideration, the whole community is one body in the state of nature, in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.
$. 146. This therefore contains the power of war and
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons and communities without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.
147. These two powers, executive, and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self, upon all that are parts of it; the other the management of the security and interest of the public without, with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive ; and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom
of those, whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good : for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners, depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those, who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill, for the advantage of the common-wealth.
§. 148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in the hands of distinct persons : for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the common-wealth in distinct, and not subordinate hands; or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons, that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands: which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.
IMC HA P. XIII. Of the Subordination of the Powers of the
mon-wealth, standing upon its own basis, and acting according to its own nature, that is acting for the preservation of the community, there can be but one fupreme power, which is the legislative, to which all the rest are and must be subordinate, yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for 'certain ends, there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them: for all power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it, who may place it anew where they Thall think best for their safety and security. And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body, even of their legislators, whenever they thall be so foolish, or so wicked, as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject : for no man or society of men, having a power to deliver up their prefer
vation, or consequently the means of it, to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another; when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a flavish condition, they will always have a right to preferve, what they have not a power to part with ; and to rid themselves of those, who invade this fundamental, sacred, and unalterable law of self-preservation, for which they entered into fòciety. And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power, but not as considered under
form of government, because this power of the people can never take place till the government be diffolved.
$. 150. In all cases, whilst the government sublists, the legislative is the supreme power : for what can give laws to another, muft needs be superior to him ; and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society, but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts, and for every member of the society, prescribing rules to their actions, and giving power of execution, where they are tranfgressed, the legislative must needs be the fupreme, and all other powers,
members or parts of the society, derived from and subordinate to it.
§. 151. In some common-wealths, where the legislative is not always in being, and the executive is vested in a single person, who has also a share in the legidative; there that single