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the executive power fhould, because there is not always need of new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that are made. When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws, they make, into other hands, they have a power ftill to resume it out of those hands, when they find cause, and to punish for any mal-administration · against the laws. The fame holds alfo in regard of the federative power, that and the executive being both minifterial and fubordinate to the legislative, which, as has been fhewed, in a constituted common-wealth is the fupreme. The legislative alfo in this cafe being fuppofed to confift of feveral perfons, (for if it be a fingle perfon, it cannot but be always in being, and fo will, as fupreme, naturally have the fupreme executive power, together with the legislative) may affemble, and exercife their legislature, at the times that either their original conftitution, or their own adjournment, appoints, or when they please; if neither of these hath appointed any time, or there be no other way prescribed to convoke them for the fupreme power being placed in them by the people, it is always in them, and they may exercise it when they please, unless by their original conftitution they are limited to certain feasons, or by an act of their fupreme power they have adjourned to a certain time; and when that time comes, they have a right to affemble and act again.

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8. 154.

§. 154. If the legislative, or any part of it, be made up of reprefentatives chofen for that time by the people, which afterwards return into the ordinary state of fubjects, and have no fhare in the legislature but upon a new choice, this power of chufing must also be exercised by the people, either at certain ap pointed feafons, or elfe when they are fummoned to it; and in this latter cafe, the power of convoking the legislative is ordinarily placed in the executive, and has one of these two limitations in respect of time: that either the original conftitution requires their aflembling and acting at certain intervals, and then the executive power does nothing but minifterially iffue directions for their electing and affembling, according to due forms; or else it is left to his prudence to call them by new elections, when the occafions or exigencies of the public require the amendment of old, or making of new laws, or the redrefs or prevention of any inconveniencies, that lie on, or threaten the people.

§. 155. It may be demanded here, What if the executive power, being poffeffed of the force of the common-wealth, fhall make ufe of that force to hinder the meeting and acting of the legislative, when the original conftitution, or the public exigencies require it? I fay, ufing force upon the people without authority, and contrary to the truft put in

him that does fo, is a ftate of war with the people, who have a right to reinstate their legislative in the exercife of their power: for having erected a legislative, with an intent they fhould exercife the power of making laws, either at certain fet times, or when there is need of it, when they are hindered by any force from what is fo neceffary to the fociety, and wherein the fafety and prefervation of the people confifts, the people have a right to remove it by force. In all states and conditions, the true remedy of force without authority, is to oppofe force to it. The ufe of force without authority, always puts him that uses it into a state of war, as the aggreffor, and renders him liable to be treated. accordingly.

§. 156. The power of affembling and dif miffing the legislative, placed in the executive, gives not the executive a fuperiority over it, but is a fiduciary truft placed in him, for the fafety of the people, in a cafe where the uncertainty and variableness of human affairs could not bear a steady fixed rule for it not being poffible, that the firft framers of the government fhould, by any forefight, be fo much masters of future events, as to be able to prefix fo juft periods of return and duration to the affemblies of the legislative, in all times to come, that might exactly answer all the exigencies of the common-wealth; the that beft remedy could be found for this defect,

was

was to trust this to the prudence of one who was always to be prefent, and whose business it was to watch over the public good. Constant frequent meetings of the legislative, and long continuations of their affemblies, without neceffary occafion, could not but be burdenfome to the people, and must neceffarily in time produce more dangerous inconveniencies, and yet the quick turn of affairs might be fometimes fuch as to need their present help: any delay of their convening might endanger the public; and fometimes too their business might be fo great, that the limited time of their fitting might be too fhort for their work, and rob the public of that benefit which could be had only from their mature deliberation. What then could be done in this cafe to prevent the community from being exposed fome time or other to eminent hazard, on one fide or the other, by fixed intervals and periods, fet to the meeting and acting of the legislative, but to intrust it to the prudence of fome, who being prefent, and acquainted with the state of public affairs, might make use of this prerogative for the public good? and where else could this be fo well placed as in his hands, who was intrufted with the execution of the laws for the fame end? Thus fuppofing the regulation of times for the affembling and fitting of the legislative, not settled by the original conftitution, it naturally fell into the hands of the xecutive,

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executive, not as an arbitrary power depend ing on his good pleasure, but with this truft always to have it exercised only for the public weal, as the occurrences of times and change of affairs might require. Whether Jettled periods of their convening, or a liberty left to the prince for convoking the legislative, or perhaps a mixture of both, hath the leaft inconvenience attending it, it is not my business here to inquire, but only to fhew, that though the executive power may have the prerogative of convoking and diffolving fuch conventions of the legislative, yet it is not thereby fuperior to it.

§. 157. Things of this world are in fo conftant a flux, that nothing remains long in the fame ftate. Thus people, riches, trade, power, change their ftations, flourishing mighty cities come to ruin, and prove in times neglected défolate corners, whilst other unfrequented places grow into populous coun tries, filled with wealth and inhabitants. But things not always changing equally, and private intereft often keeping up customs and privileges, when the reafons of them are ceafed, it often comes to pafs, that in governments, where part of the legislative confifts of reprefentatives chofen by the people, that in tract of time this reprefentation becomes very unequal and difproportionate to the reafons it was at firft established upon. To what grofs abfurdities the following of cuftom,

when

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