b. A fingle hereditary perfon, having the Conftant, fupreme, executive power, and with it the power of convoking cand diffolving the other two within certain periods of times bs210An affembly of hereditary nobility.

3. An affembly of reprefentatives chofen, pro tempores by the people. Such a form of government fuppofed, it is evident,

§. 214. First, That when fuch a single perfon, or prince, fets up his own arbitrary will in place of the laws, which are the will of the fociety, declared by the legislative, then the legislative is changed for that being in effect the legiflative, whofe rules and laws are put in execution, and required to be obeyed; when other laws are fet up, and other rules pretended, and inforced, than what the legislative, conftituted by the foeiety, have enacted, it is plain that the legiflative is changed. Whoever introduces new Jaws, not being thereunto authorized by the. fundamental appointment of the fociety, or fubverts the old, difowns and overturns the power by which they were made, and fo fets up a new legiflative.

§. 215. Secondly, When the prince hinders, the legislative from affembling in its due time, or from acting freely, purfuant to thofe ends for which it was conftituted, the legiflative is altered: for it is not a certain number of men, no, nor their meeting, unless they have alfo freedom of debating, and leisure Cc 2

of

of perfecting, what is for the good of the fociety, wherein the legislative confifts: when these are taken away or altered, fo as to deprive the fociety of the due exercise of their power, the legislative is truly altered; for it is not names that conftitute governments, but the use and exercise of thofe powers that were intended to accompany them; so that he, who takes away the freedom, or hinders the acting of the legislative in its due feasons, in effect takes away the legislative, and puts an end to the government.

2 §. 216. Thirdly, When, by the arbitrary power of the prince, the electors, or ways of election, are altered, without the confent, and contrary to the common interest of the people, there also the legislative is altered : for, if others than those whom the fociety hath authorized thereunto, do chufe, or in another way than what the fociety hath prefcribed, thofe chofen are not the legislative appointed by the people.

§. 217. Fourthly, The delivery also of the people into the fubjection of a foreign power, either by the prince, or by the legislative, is certainly a change of the legislative, and fo a diffolution of the government: for the end why people entered into fociety being to be preserved one intire, free, independent fociety, to be governed by its own laws; this is loft, whenever they are given up into the power of another.

S..218.

§. 218. Why, in such a conftitution as this, the diffolution of the government in these cafes is to be imputed to the prince, is evident; because he, having the force, treasure and offices of the state to employ, and often perfuading himself, or being flattered by others, that as fupreme magiftrate he is uncapable of controul he alone is in a condition to make great advances toward fuch changes, under pretence of lawful authority, and has it in his hands to terrify or fupprefs oppofers, as factious, feditious, and enemies to the government whereas no other part of the legislative, or people, is capable by themfelves to attempt any alteration of the legislative, without open and vifible rebellion, apt enough to be taken notice of, which, when it prevails, produces effects very little different from foreign conqueft. Befides, the prince in fuch a form of government, having the power of diffolving the other parts of the legislative, and thereby rendering them private perfons, they can never in oppofition to him, or without his concurrence, alter the legiflative by a law, his confent being neceffary to give any of their decrees that fanction. But yet, fo far as the other parts of the legiflative any way contribute to any attempt upon the government, and do either promote, or not, what lies in them, hinder fuch defigns, they are guilty, and partake in this, which

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which is certainly the greateft crime men can be guilty of one towards another.

$219. There is one way more whereby fuch a government may be diffolved, and that is, when he who has the fupreme executive power, neglects and abandons that charge, fo that the laws already made can no longer be put in execution. This is demonftratively to reduce all to anarchy, and fo effectually to diffolve the government for laws not being made for themfelves, but to be, by their execution, the bonds of the fociety, to keep every part of the body politic in its due place and function; when that totally ceafes, the government vifibly ceafes, and the people become a confufed multitude, without order or connexion. Where there is no longer the administration of juftice, for the fecuring of men's rights, nor any remaining power within the community to direct the force, or provide for the neceffities of the public, there certainly is no government left. Where the laws cannot be executed, it is all one as if there were no laws; and a government without laws is, I fuppofe, a mystery in politics, unconceivable to human capacity, and inconfiftent with human fociety.

§. 220. In thefe and the like cafes, when the government is diffolved, the people are at liberty to provide for themfelves, by erecting a new legislative, differing from the other, by the change of perfons, or form, or both,

as

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as they fhall find it most for their fafety and good for the fociety can never, by the fault of another, lose the native and original right it has to preserve itfelf, which can only be done by a fettled legislative, and a fair and impartial execution of the laws made by it. But the ftate of mankind is not fo miferable that they are not capable of using this remedy, till it be too late to look for any. To tell people they may provide for themselves, by erecting a new legiflative, when by oppreffion, artifice, or being delivered over to a foreign power, their old one is is only to tell them, they may expect relief when it is too late, and the evil is paft cure. This is in effect no more than to bid them first be flaves, and then to take care of their liberty; and when their chains are on, tell them, they may act like freemen. This, if barely fo, is rather mockery than relief; and men can never be fecure from tyranny, if there be no means to escape it till they are perfectly under it: and therefore it is, that they have not only a right to get out of it, but to prevent it.

gone,

§. 221. There is therefore, fecondly, another way whereby governments are diffolved, and that is, when the legiflative, or the prince, either of them, act contrary to their trust.

Firft, The legislative acts against the trust repofed in them, when they endeavour to invade the property of the fubject, and to Cc 4 make