Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and DeliberationCheryl Misak argues that truth ought to be reinstated to a central position in moral and political philosophy. She argues that the correct account of truth is one found in a certain kind of pragmatism: a true belief is one upon which inquiry could not improve, a belief which would not be defeated by experience and argument. This account is not only an improvement on the views of central figures such as Rawls and Habermas, but it can also make sense of the idea that, despite conflict, pluralism, and the expression of difference, our moral and political beliefs aim at truth and can be subject to criticism. Anyone interested in a fresh discussion of political theory and philosophy will find this a fascinating read. |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
account of truth agreement aim at truth argues articulated assertion bivalence Chapter characterisation claim cognitivism cognitivist committed comprehensive doctrines conception of truth course criticise culture David Wiggins debate deliberative democracy democratic discourse discourse ethics discussion disquotationalist epistemology ethics fact fallibilism hold holism Horwich hypothesis idea ideal important instance issue justification kind Kymlicka lives matter metaphysical Misak moral and political moral deliberation moral inquiry moral judgements neo-Nazi neutrality principle non-cognitivism non-cognitivist notion of truth one’s ourselves Peirce philosophical pluralism political liberalism position practice pragmatism pragmatist principle of bivalence question Quine rational Rawls reasons requires response right answer Rorty Schmitt Schmittian seems sense seriously society someone standards statements suggest theorist Theory of Justice theory of truth things thought experiment transcendental argument true belief truth and objectivity truth-value underdetermination values verificationism view of truth warranted assertibility Wiggins wrong Xhosa