First, then, I cannot choose but observe, that to say, because we are not able to imagine how a thing should be, therefore the being of that thing must be impossible, is in itself a disingenuous way of argumentation; especially in those, who at the same time declare they believe this world to be eternal, and yet are as little able to comprehend how it should be eternal, as how it should be made out of nothing.

In the next place, I conceive that nothing can be properly said to endure any longer than it remains just the same; for in the instant any part of it is changed, that thing, as it was before, is no more in being.

In the third place, that every part of this world we live in is changed every moment; and by consequence, that this whole world is so too, because the whole is nothing else but what is composed of every part; and that therefore we cannot properly say, this world has continued for many ages, but only that all things in this world have been changed for several years together.

To evade which opinion, those who maintain the eternity of the world are forced to say, that the matter of it is not changed, but the accidents only, though this be a sort of argument which they will not allow of in others: For when it is by the Romanists urged, in defence of transubstantiation in the sacrament, That the accidents of the wafer remain, though the substance of it be changed, they reject that as a ridiculous notion; and yet it is not one jot more absurd to say, That the accidents remain when the matter is changed, than that the matter remains when the accidents are changed; nay, of the two, the assertors of this latter opinion are the least excuseable, because they boldly attribute it to a natural cause, whereas the Romanists have the modesty at least to own it for a mysterious miracle.

But that the weakness of this imagination, of separating accidents from bodies, may the plainer appear, let us examine a little what the meaning of the word accident is. Accident then does not signify a being distinct from body or matter, but is only a word whereby we express the several ways we consider of what is in a body or matter that is before us. For example: If we perceive a body to have length, then we consider of that length as an accident of that body; and when we perceive a body to have a smell or taste, then we consider of that smell and that taste as accidents of that body: But in none of these considerations we mean that any thing can have length, or smell, or taste, but what really is body; and when any thing that had a smell or taste has left off to have a smell or taste, it is because that part of it which had a smell or taste is no more in it. So that, upon an examination of the whole matter, I am apt to believe, that there can be naturally no change of accidents, but where there is a real change of bodies.

But to proceed a little further, the question being, Whether it be more probable, that the world or that God Almighty has been from all eternity? I think I may ven-. ture to affirm, that of two propositions, the least probable is that which comes nearest to a contradiction: Now nothing can come nearer to a contradiction than eternity, or abiding the same for ever, and a continued changing, or not abiding the same one moment: And therefore I conclude, it is less probable that this changeable world should have been from all eternity, than that some other being of more excellence and greater perfection should be so, whose very nature is incapable of change.

That Being, of more excellence and greater perfection, I call God; and those, who, out of a foolish aversion they have for the name of God, will call it Nature, do not in any kind differ from this notion of that Being, but only change its name, and rather shew they have a vain mistaken ambition of being thought atheists, than that they have any reason strong enough to convince them to be so.

The next question I shall take into consideration is this, Whether, though there be a God, it is probable, that he should take a more particular care of mankind than he

does of beasts and other animals? To which I have this to offer, that though there are several sorts of animals which give us occasion to imagine they have some kind of reason in them, though not to so great a perfection as men have, yet, since no other animal did ever any one thing that could give us the least cause to believe they have a conception of another world, or of a Deity; and that no man was ever yet born but had a conception, or, at least, a suspicion of it, more or less; I say, for this reason, it is probable, in my opinion, that there is something nearer a-kin to the nature of God in men, than there is in any other animals whatsoever; and for that reason, that God Almighty does take a more particular care of us than he does of them.

If then God be eternal, and it is probable there is something in our nature which is a-kin to the nature of God, it is also probable, that that part of us never dies.

It is also probable, that what by it we are prompted most to value and esteem, as the highest perfections, good qualities, and virtues, are parts of the essence and nature of God.

Now, of all good qualities, or virtues, it is justice which all men do most highly esteem and value in others, though they have not all the good fortune to practise it themselves. For justice is that good quality, or virtue, which causes all other good qualities or virtues to be esteemed; nay, it is that virtue, without which all other virtues become as vices; that is, they all come to be abhorred.

For he who wants justice, and has wit, judgment, or valour, will, for the having wit, judgment, or valour, be the more abhorred; because the more wit, judgment, or valour he has, if he wants justice, the more he will certainly become a wicked man; and he who wants justice, and has power, will, for the having that power, be the more abhorred, because the more power he has, if he wants justice, the more he will certainly become a wicked man: and, therefore, in my opinion, it is a very unreasonable thing for men, out of a design of extolling God Almighty's power, to rob him of justice,the quality without which even power itself must necessarily be abhorred. And pray what can be more disrespectful to God Almighty, than to fancy that he shall punish us for doing that which he has from all eternity predestinated, that is, compelled us to do? It is an act that I can hardly believe there ever was yet born a man cruel enough to be guilty of, even in the depth of his revenge; and shall we make that an attribute of the most perfect and the most high God, which is beneath the effect of the meanest of passions in the worst of men? It is, in my opinion, more reasonable to believe that God Almighty, out of his love to mankind, has given us an eternal soul; that an eternal being and free-will are things in their nature inseparable one from the other; and that, therefore, according to our actions proceeding from our wills, God Almighty, in justice, will reward and punish us in another world for the good and ill deeds we perform in this. I do not say that the best of our actions here are good enough to make us deserve the utmost joys of heaven; we must owe them to God Almighty's grace and favour, as indeed we owe all things else.

Neither will I take upon me to guess at the several degrees of joys there are in Heaven; our dull senses making it as impossible for us to discourse well of those things, as it is impossible for a man born blind to talk well of colours. Nor will I pretend to judge how long, or how much God Almighty will punish us hereafter, because, for the same reason that we think him to be a God of justice, we must also conclude him to be a God of mercy.

This only I do verily believe, that the more we love him, the more he will love us; and the less we love him, the worse it will be for us.

Again, if this instinct, or conception, we have of a Deity be the ground of our religion, it ought also to be the guide of our religion; that is, if the strongest reason we have to believe that God Almighty does take a more particular care of us than he does of other animals, is, because there is something in our nature nearer a-kin to the na

ture of God than any thing that is in any other animal; I say, in all reason, that part of us, which is nearest a-kin to the nature of God, ought to be our guide and director in chusing the best way for our religious worship of God.

There is also this other consequence, which, in my opinion, does naturally depend upon what has been said, that one of the greatest crimes a man can be guilty of, is to force us to act or sin against that instinct of religion which God Almighty has placed. in our hearts; for, if that instinct be somewhat a-kin to the nature of God, the sinning against it must be somewhat a-kin to the sin against the Holy Ghost.

If then it be probable that there is a God, and that this God will reward and punish us hereafter for all the good and ill things we act in this life, it does highly concern every man to examine seriously, which is the best way of worshipping and serving this God, that is, which is the best religion.

Now, if it be probable, that the instinct which we have within us of a Deity, be akin to the nature of God, that religion is probably the best whose doctrine does most recommend to us those things which, by that instinct, we are prompted to believe are virtues and good qualities, and that, I think, without exceeding the bounds of modesty, I may take upon me to affirm is the Christian religion.

And for the same reason it does also follow, that the religion amongst Christians, which does most recommend to us virtue and a good life, is, in all probability, the best religion.

And here I must leave every man to take pains in seeking out and chusing for himself, he only being answerable to God Almighty for his own soul.

I began this discourse as if I had to do with those who have no religion at all; and now, addressing myself to Christians, I hope they will not be offended at me for ending it with the words of our Saviour,

"Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."

I shall beg leave farther only to propose a few questions to all those in general who are pleased to call themselves Christians.

First, Whether there be any thing more directly opposite to the doctrine and practice of Jesus Christ, than to use any kind of force upon men in matters of religion? and consequently, whether all those that practise it (let them be of what church or sect they please) ought not justly to be called Anti-christians?

Secondly, Whether there can be any thing more unmanly, more barbarous, or more ridiculous, than to go about to convince a man's judgment by any thing but by reason? It is so ridiculous, that boys at school are whipped for it; who, instead of answering an argument with reason, are loggerheads enough to go to cuffs.

And, thirdly, Whether the practice of it has not always been ruinous and destructive to those countries where it has been used, either in monarchies or commonwealths? and whether the contrary practice has not always been successful to those countries where it has been used, either in monarchies or commonwealths?

I shall conclude with giving them this friendly advice,-If they would be thought men of reason, or of a good conscience, let them endeavour, by their good counsel and good example, to persuade others to lead such lives as may save their souls, and not be perpetually quarrelling among themselves, and cutting one another's throats, about those things which they all agree are not absolutely necessary to salvation.

The Duke of Buckingham his Grace's Letter to the unknown Author of a Paper, entituled, "A short Answer to his Grace the Duke of Buckingham's Paper concerning Religion, Toleration, and Liberty of Conscience."

To the foregoing tract an Answer shortly after appeared, turning chiefly upon a common argument adopted by the duke against the eternity of the world, from its mutability. From Buckingham's mode of employing this argument, the Answerer alleged, that, had his grace been contending with atheists, he would have urged the impossibility of the world's being eternal, because it was not invisible. This called forth the following letter, to which a reply was immediately published by the Answerer.

My nameless, angry, harmless, humble Servant,

I HAVE twice read over, with a great deal of patience, a paper of yours, which you call an answer to a discourse of mine; and, to my confusion, must own, that I am not able to comprehend what part of my discourse it is you do answer, nor in all yours, what it is you mean. But in this you are even with me, for I perceive you do as little understand any part of what I have written, though I thought it had been in so plain a stile that a child of six years old might very well have done it. Yet I do not take ill from you this art you have of misunderstanding plain things, since you have done the same in his majesty's promise to the church of England. The true meaning of which (without this misunderstanding art of yours) would easily have appeared to be, that he would not suffer any body to injure the church of England, but he did not promise that he would have the church of England persecute every body else.

Having confessed that I cannot understand your writing, you ought not to be offended at me if I cannot remember it neither. And yet there is one passage in it which I shall never forget, because it does, in a most extraordinary manner, delight me; it is this shrewd convincing argument of yours, which you say," Had you been to treat with atheists, you would have urged to them that it is impossible this world should be eternal, because then it must also be invisible." It is, I swear, a refined, quaint kind of notion, which (to do you justice) I do verily believe is entirely your own: yet, for all this, I cannot be absolutely convinced that I am now the same George Duke of Buckin gham which I was forty years ago. And to shew you I am in earnest, I do here promise you, that if you will do for me a favour less difficult, which is, to make me the same George Duke of Buckingham I was but twenty years ago, I will (as poor a man as I am) give you a thousand guineas for your pains; and that is somewhat more, I am afraid, than you will ever get by your writing.

You have done me the honour to call yourself my humble servant, and, therefore, in gratitude, I shall offer you an advice, which I am confident, upon second thoughts, you will not find to be altogether unreasonable; that hereafter, before you take upon you to write French, you will be pleased to learn the language, for the word opinionatré which you are so infinitely charmed with in your paper, has the misfortune to be

no French word; the true French word, which, I suppose, you would have used, is opiniatreté, and yet I protest I do not see how (though you had written it right) it would have much more graced your discourse, than if it had been expressed in English. Stick therefore to your English metaphors, at which you are admirable; and be always careful of not turning (according to your own words) the wine of hopes into the vinegar of despair, and then you cannot fail of being sufficiently applauded by every body, as you are by Your grateful friend,

BUCKINGHAM.

A Remonstrance, by way of Address, from the Church of England to both Houses of Parliament, upon the Account of Religion. Together with some Remarks upon Dr Sher lock's Sermon, preached the 29th of May, 1685.

King Charles died February 6, 1684-5: The same day his brother James, Duke of York, whose succession had been so long and so violently opposed, was peaceably proclaimed king, and entered on the regal office with a voluntary declaration, that he would make the law the rule of his government, both in church and state. Now, by law, several branches of the revenues expired with the king; the reformed religion was that of the state; and yet on the second day of his reign he went publicly to mass; and on the third, he caused those revenues to be levied by the authority of a proclamation without awaiting the consent of parliament. On the 19th of May,. he met his people in parliament for the first time. In his speech from the throne on the 22d, he repeated the declaration which he had before made to the council, and communicated the news which he had received of the Earl of Argyle's landing in Scotland; which produced a joint vote of thanks from both houses; the settlement of revenue on him for life; a solemn tender of lives and fortunes; and as solemn a resolution to take his majesty's gracious word for the security of the church of England. On the 29th, Dr Sherlock, having been appointed to preach before the Commons, took occasion to suggest, that a papist, because of his religion, could never be a loyal subject. The next day Mr Richard Baxter, who had refused a bishopric in the beginning of King Charles's reign for conscience sake, was tried at the King's Bench bar, for what was called a scandalous libel (under the title of a Paraphase of the New Testament) on the bishops and clergy, Jefferies being judge, who took occasion to say, that, by the grace of Almighty God, he would crush the whole party; and soon after were published the two following extraordinary pieces, the object of which decidedly is to pave the way for an union between: the church of England and Rome at the expence of the former.

His majesty having so often and so solemnly declared he would maintain me, as by law established, I cannot but rely upon his royal word, according to your prudent and generous vote, and think myself sufficiently secured by having the word of a king, who, whilst a subject, was never known to break it.' Yet, notwithstanding, seeing you,. my children, here assembled to consult and advise about the most important matters

It was the cant of the tories upon James's accession, that they had the "word of a king" for the preserva-tion of their religion and liberties. Dryden enlarges upon this topic in the Threnodia Augustalis: