"General Bonaparte continues indisposed with a swelled face and breakings out. He is averse to the use of any applications to it, but has recently asked for a warming-pan, which as no such thing was to be found in the island, we have been compelled to get made for him.' Dr. O'Meara related to me yesterday a very characteristic observation of this remarkable personage. He asked him, on seeing that Dr. O'Meara had taken his oath to the authenticity of the paper he had brought to me,2 in what manner he had sworn to it. Dr. O'Meara replied 'On the New Testament.' 'Then you are such a fool," was his reply. The latter is a particularly favorite word of his."

Another anecdote of the same nature was related by Sir Hudson to Lord Bathurst in a letter of the 3d of November:

Cipriani came out one day from General Bonaparte's room to Dr. O'Meara, saying, in a manner indicative of great surprise, My master is certainly beginning to lose his head. He begins to believe in God, you may think. He said to the servant who was shutting the windows, "Why do you take from us the light which God gives us?" Oh, certainly he loses his head. He began at Waterloo, but now it is certain." Then continuing to speak of himself, Cipriani added, ‘I do not believe in God, because, if there were one, he would not have allowed a man who has done so much harm to live so long; and he does not believe in God, because, if he believed, he would not have caused so many millions of men to be killed in this world, for fear of meeting them in the other.''

O'Meara, on the 31st, transmitted to the Governor an account of a very interesting conversation which he had with Bonaparte respecting the battle of Waterloo; and as it differs in some points, and especially in the expressions used, from the narrative he has published, it is here given at length.

1 Count Las Cases says in his Journal, “As a substitute for a warming-pan the Emperor has been obliged to have holes bored in one of the large silver dishes used for keeping the meat warm at table."

2 Vide p. 299, ante. 3 Anche voi avete queste coglioneria." 4 Vol. i. pp. 173-178.

LONGWOOD, October 31, 1816. "SIR-The following conversation, which took place a few days past between General Bonaparte and myself, may probably not be uninteresting to you, as in it is explained his opinion respecting the great battle which decided the fate of Europe and of him; though I must think that feelings of jealousy toward the great Commander and the troops by whose united efforts he was foiled must have, in a great measure, formed that opinion :- The worst thing,' said he, 'that ever England did was that of endeavoring to make herself a great military nation. In doing that she must always be the slave of Russia, Prussia, or Austria, or at least in some degree subservient to them, because she has not enough of men to combat on the continent either France or any of the others, and consequently must hire men from some of them; whereas at sea, you are so superior, your sailors so much better, that you would always be superior, and could command all the others with safety to yourselves and but little comparative expense. Your soldiers, too, have not the qualities for a military nation; they are not equal in agility, address, or intelligence to the French, and when they meet with a reverse their discipline is very bad. When they get from under the fear of the lash, you can get them to do nothing, and in a retreat they can not be managed; and if they meet with wine or spirits they are so many devils (sono tanti diavoli), and there is no longer any subordination. I saw myself the retreat of Moore, and I never in my life witnessed any thing so bad as the conduct of the soldiers; it was impossible to collect them or make them do any thing; nearly all were drunk. The officers, too, depend too much upon interest for promotion. Your army,' continued he, 'is certainly brave, nobody can deny it. If you had lost the battle of Waterloo, what a state would England have been in the flower of your army destroyed, for not a man would have escaped, not even Lord Wellington himself!' I told him here that Lord Wellington had determined never to quit the field of battle alive. He replied, ' He could not leave it; he could not retreat; he would have been destroyed with his

whole army; he said so himself to that cavalry officer who was wounded. If Grouchy had come up at that time instead of the Prussians, not a man would have escaped.' I now asked him if he had not believed that the Prussians who advanced on his right were Grouchy's division, for a long time? He replied, To be sure I did; and I can even now scarcely account for the reason why it was not Grouchy's division and not them.' I then asked him what he supposed would have been the event if neither Grouchy nor the Prussians had come up that day, whether it would not have been a drawn battle; whether both armies would not have kept their ground? He replied,No; the English army would have been destroyed; they were defeated before mid-day (mezzo giorno). I would have gained every thing; I had gained every thing; I beat the Prussians; but accident, or more likely destiny, decided that Lord Wellington should gain it, and he did so. He was fortunate; accident and destiny favored him. I could scarcely have believed he would have given me battle, because, if he had retreated as he ought to have done to Antwerp, I must have been overwhelmed by armies of three or four hundred thousand men, coming against me, and against whom I could not possibly resist. Besides, if they intended to give battle, it was the greatest coglioneria in the world to separate the Prussian and English armies; they ought to have been united, and I can not conceive the reason of their separation. It was also coglioneria in him to hazard a battle in a place where, if defeated, all must have been lost, for he could not retreat.' (Here he said something about a forest as a reason for Lord Wellington not having it in his power to retreat, which I did not distinctly hear.) He would have been altogether destroyed; besides, he suffered himself to be surprised by me. He ought to have had all his army encamped from the beginning of June, as he must have known that I intended to attack him he might have lost every thing by it; it was a great fault on his part; but he has been fortunate, and every thing he did will meet with applause. My intentions were to destroy the English army; this I knew would produce

an immediate change of Ministry. The indignation against the Ministry for having caused the loss of forty thousand of the flower of the English army, of the sons of the first families, and others who would have perished there, would have excited such a popular commotion that they would have been turned out the people would have said, 'What is it to us who is on the throne of France, Louis or Napoleon? are we to sacrifice all our blood to place on the throne a detested family? No; we have suffered enough, let them fight it out among them; it's no affair of ours.' The English would have made peace and withdrawn from the coalition; the Saxons Bavarians, Belgians, Wirtemburghers, and others would have joined me; the Russians would have made peace. I would have been quietly seated on the throne; I would have made peace with all, which would have been permanent, for what could France do after the treaty of Paris? What was to be feared from her? This was my reason for attacking the English. I had succeeded before twelve o'clock; every thing was mine, I might almost say, but destiny and accident decided it otherwise. The English fought bravely doubtless, nobody can deny it, but they would have been all destroyed! What would have been the state of the English army after the loss of forty thousand of their best troops; for I suppose that there were about so many English in the field.' I asked after this if the retaining of Malta by the English was the real cause of the war? He replied at first it was, but afterward seemed to say that the war would have broken out even if that pretext had not been in the way. He added, Two days before the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris, he offered to the Ministers and others about me thirty millions of francs if I would consent that Malta should belong to the English, and also to acknowledge me King of France.' Such Sir, was the conversation, which I took down in writing directly after leaving him, and the correctness of which I can assert; and have the honor to remain, &c.

"BARRY E. O'MEARA."

Before quitting the month of October it will be interesting

to give some quotations from a long letter written by O'Meara to Mr. Finlaison, from which one or two extracts have been already taken. The letter is dated the 10th of October :

"I forgot to mention that he made to me one day a long complaint about The Times' newspaper being the one sent to him. He said, 'They send me "The Times," that infamous paper-the journal of the Bourbons. When I returned from Elba I found among the papers of the Bourbons an account of a sum of 6000 francs monthly paid by them to the editors of "The Times," with a hundred copies of the paper monthly; also I found the receipt of the editors acknowledging it, signed by them.' He also said that he had received several offers from the editors of London papers, and among others 'The Times,' to write for him for payment even before he went to Elba. He added, 'I am sorry I did not accept of their offers, as my name would not have been so hated by the English if I had done so the papers in England form the public opinion.'

"I beg you not to imagine that I participate in Bonaparte's sentiments because I record his words, or that I by any means vouch for the truth of his assertions; on the contrary, several of them I know to be incorrect (such as Sir Hudson's putting his hand upon his sword, and all that coarse personal abuse and obloquy vented by him, &c.); but as you have said in your confidential letter that Mr. Croker wishes to hear everything that I can pick up concerning him, I have thought it right that Ministers should be in possession of his real mode of speaking and thinking. You must be well aware that I could not make a practice of communicating Bonaparte's language to Sir Hudson Lowe, as it could not produce any good purpose; on the contrary, could not fail to aggravate and render ten times worse the bad understanding which already prevails between them; and my situation would be converted into that of an incendiary; neither am I placed about him as a spy. Doubtless I would think it my duty, and would instantly communicate to Sir Hudson any suspicions I might have of a plan for taking him off the island, or if I saw any