tion, because it was not yet their intereft to do it.— The wearying and harraffing our forces anfwered all the purposes of a general engagement, without flaughter and bloodfhed to themselves.

Lord Cornwallis, according to orders, marched on immediately with the referve to Flat Bufh, where finding the provincials in poffeffion of the pass, he complied with his orders in making no attempt upon it. When the whole army was landed, the Heffans under the command of General Heifter, compofed the centre at Flat Bufh. Major-general Grant commanded the left wing which extended to the coast;. and the principal army containing the greatest part of the British forces, under the command of General Clinton, Earl Percy, and Lord Cornwallis, turned. fhort to the right, and approached to the oppofite coaft at Flat Land. Had our Generals been going to attack the bravest troops that ever ferved in Flanders or Germany, they could not have been more on their guard than when they were going to attack men they had determined to be cowards and poltroons.

When every thing was prepared for forcing the hills, and advancing towards the lines of the provincials, General Clinton at the head of the van of the army, confifting of the light infantry, light horfe, aud grenadiers under Lord Cornwallis, with the fourteen field pieces, began in the evening of the 26th as foon as it was dark, to march from Flat Land, and having paffed through the part of the country called the New Lots, they arrived upon the road that croffes the hills: from Bedford to Jamaica, where turning to the left towards the former of thefe places, they feized a confiderable pafs, which the Americans had through fome unaccountable'

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unaccountable negled left unguarded. body, under Lord Percy, with ten field pieces, followed at a moderate distance, and the way being thus fuccefsfully opened, the whole army paffed the hills without noife or impediment, and defcended by the town of Bedford into the lower country, which lay between them and Putnam's lines. The engagement was begun early in the morning by the Heffians, at Flat Bufh, and by General Grant along the coast, and a warm cannonade, with a fharp fire of fmall arms, was eagerly fupported on both fides for fome hours. During this time the King's troops gained no advantage, but were upon the point of being repulfed, had not the fhips in the mean time made feveral motions to the left, and attacked a battery on Red Hook, both to distract the right of the colonifts who were engaged with General Grant, and to call off their attention totally from the left and rear, where their greatest danger lay. Thofe who were engaged with the Heffians were the first who perceived the march of the Bri tish army, and the danger they themfelves were in; they accordingly retreated in large bodies, and in good order, with their artillery, with a defign to recover their camp. They were however attacked furioufly by the King's troops, and driven back into the woods, where they were met by the Heffians, and alternately intercepted and chafed by the dragoons and light infantry. In thefe critical and defperate circumstances, fome of their regiments, though overpowered by numbers, forced their way to the lines, through all the difficulties and dangers that oppofed and furrounded them. Others, not lefs brave, perifhed in the attempt. Some kept the woods and escaped, while others, lefs fortunate, were loft under the fame protec

tion. The nature of the country, and the variety of fituation, occafioned a repetition and continuance of fmall engagements, purfuits and flaughter, which lafted for many hours.

Had the fkill and attention of the American Generals on this occafion been equal to the bravery of their troops, the British Generals would have repented their landing upon Long Island; but Putnam fuffered him"felf to be fo effectually entrapped, that the bravery of his forces were rendered ineffectual through the want of capacity in their cammander. The right wing of the provincials, which was engaged with General Grant on the coast, were so late in knowing what was carrying on in other parts, that they were intercepted in their retreat by fome of the British troops, who in the morning had not only turned round the hill upon their left, but had traverfed the whole extent of the country in their rear. Such of them as did not flee to the woods, which were the greatest number, were obliged to throw themfelves into the marsh at Cowan's Cave, where many were drowned, and others. perished in the mud. A confiderable number, however, made their escape this way to the lines, though they were much thinned by the fire of the purfuers.

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The lofs of the Americans on this occafion was very confiderable, but not fo great as our accounts reprefented it; it was faid that they loft 3,000 men including about 1000 prifoners. Almost a whole regiment from Maryland, confifting altogether of men of the best families, were faid to have been totally cut off, but it was found afterwards that many of thefe had elcaped among the reft. Their own accounts do not acknowledge any fuch numbers flain as our people affirmed; tho' it was confeffed that they loft a

number

number of their best and bravest troops. But what was wort on their fide, this defeat dafhed all their hopes of fuccefs, and damped their fpirits. New fol diers, full of fpirits and pride of bodily ftrength, can fcarcely conceive any advantage over them, which the old can derive from difcipline, and a knowledge of their bufinefs. And if they are commanded, and fkilfully led to action in this temper, fo that those who oppofe them are deprived of an opportunity of turning thefe advantages to account, they will do wonderful execution; for as they are not capable of perfectly understanding danger, and are not acquainted by experience of the pain and vexation of wounds, they are often more daring and adventurous than old foldiers. But when they find courage and ftrength totally, ufelefs and when they are making the greatest and, as they imagine, the most effectual efforts, and that they are furrounded, overpowered, and deftroyed, by means that they cannot understand, they withdraw all due confidence from thofe things on which they had before placed too much, and afcribe an irrefiftible power to military fkill and difcipline, which they do not really poffefs. From thefe confiderations they abandon their natural ftrength, and it is generally a long time before they dare truft their new knowledge and skill fo far as to bring it effectually to

action.

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The commanders of the provincial troops committed unpardonable errors on this occa fion; they fcarcely difcovered as much prudence and difcernment as the meanest country peafant would have done, had he been placed at the head of their army: they had taken no care to watch the motions of their enemy, nor to guard thofe paffes that might have been eafily de

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fended

fended against even a fuperior force, and would have prevented them from being furrounded. - -They ought to have had fcouts and watches placed in all parts of the island, and to have fecured every poft that was in the fmallest degree tenable. They ought to have had parties concealed behind every hedge, wall, or ditch, to have fired by surprise upon every advanced party of their foes, which might have retreated to the main body when fore preffed, and given the alarm in due time. They might, as they knew the country, had flanking parties of fwift troops, who might have thinned their enemies by occafional attacks, and fled to redoubts and thickets, and marched another way and made a fresh attack on another quarter. They ought to have neglected no poffible methods of defence that could have been devised in such a trying and critical fituation. The apologies of the American Generals are childish and trifling. They represented that they had no idea of fo many troops being landed on the ifland; but they ought to have been acquainted with every circumftance, and watched every motion of the enemy. General Howe fhewed a great meafure of skill and conduct in his military arrangement, and the whole attack was conducted with much prudence and fagacity; the men alfo fhewed much valour and intrepidity, and as foldiers behaved well. Their ardor was fo great, that the Generals could with dif ficulty prevent them from attacking the American lines, in their keennefs in purfuing the fugitives. And it was imagined by fome fanguine people, that they would have carried all before them; but in fuch cafes it is not eafy for partizans to keep moderation in their conjectures. It is highly probable, that there was an emulation between the British and Heffian

troops