Had Ge lines near Haerlem, to cover New York. neral Washington commanded old troops, which he could have depended upon, General Howe might have paid dear for this adventure. Had Washington attacked Percy in the mean time of the embarkation, all the forces under the Earl might have been cut off, without the reft being able to afford them the fmallest aid or affiftance. There was only one thing which could have preferved them, namely the fleet, which furrounded the island, which could have afforded them protection almoft in any fituation into which they could have been reduced. This fleet was of vast service in all the operations of the army, and indeed it does not appear that our troops could have done any thing unless they had been protected by the fleet. In this the provincials were chiefly inferior, being totally destitute of any force of this nature. The ar my was obliged to halt for fome days at Frog's Neck, to wait for the arrival of provifions and ftores, and for a reinforcement that was drawn from Staten. Lland. When these arrived they marched through Pelham manor to New Rochefter, which lies on the. coast of the Sound, which is the name of that channel which feparates Long Ifland from the continent. Here they were joined by the greatest part of a regiment of light horse from Ireland, the rest of the troops had been taken in their paffage by the American cruizers upon the coaft. They were alfo joined by the fecond divifion of Heffians, under General Knyphaufen, with a regiment of Waldeckers, both of which had arrived at New York fince the army had departed from it. The chief object of this expedition was to cut off the communication between Washington and the eastern colonies: and if this measure did not bring him to an engagement, to enclofe him on all fides in his faftneffes on the North end of York Iland. The King's troops were now mafters of the lower road to Connecticut and Bofton, but to gain the upper it was neceffary to advance to the higher grounds called the White Plains. This is a rugged, ftoney, and mountainous tract of ground, and is only part of an afcent to a country that is ftill higher, rougher, and of more difficult accefs. When the army advanced to the higher grounds it was judged neceffary to leave the fecond divifion of Heffians with the regiment of Waldeck, at New Rochelle, to keep a communication between the supplies of provifions and neceffaries that were to arrive at that port. The army was now fo truly powerful, that it was enabled to fupport every fervice. General Howe foon began to find that he had now another game to play than what he had upon Long Island.----Washington forefaw the intention of this scheme, and provided against its effects. He perceived the danger he would be in if the British General fucceeded in his fcheme; that he would be compelled to commit the whole fortune of the war, and the fafety of all the colonies, to the hazard of a general engagement. In his prefent ftate this would have been highly imprudent; his troops were not well recovered from the terror of their late misfotunes, and in cafe he should have been defeated, there could fcarcely be a poflibility of a retreat. His army is faid at this time to have been much reduced by ficknefs, which the feverity of the service, indifferent quarters, baď cloathing, the want of falt and other neceffaries, joined to a flovenlinefs that naturally prevailed in New England and the northern colonies, rendered ge neral, neral, and very fatal to their army: A grand movement was accordingly made by the whole, in a line of fmall detachments, and entrenched camps, which oc cupied every height and strong guard from Valentine's Hill, near Kingsbridge oh the right, to White Plains, and the upper road to Connecticut on the left. In this fituation, they found the whole line of the King's troops as they marched at à moderate distance. deep river Brunx covered their rear, whilst the open ground to the last afforded a fecure paffage to their ftores and baggage for the upper country. A garrifon was left to defend Fort Washington, the lines of Haerlem, and Kingsbridge. The General Howe, in this fituation of the enemy, thought it neceffary to proceed with caution and great circumfpection. The progrefs of the army was flow, the march clofe, the encampments compact, and well guarded with artillery, and the whole was conducted in the most regular and warlike manner. In fpite of all the caution of the General, the provincials conveyed parties over the Brunx, to interrupt their march, which occafioned many fkirmishes, in which the king's. forces were conquerors. But it had this effect upon the colonists, that it gradually inured them to hardfhips, and rendered war familiar to them. When the King's troops approached White Plains, their enemies quifted their detached camps along the Brunx, and joining their left, took a ftrong ground of encampment before the British on the former. When all things were prepared and ready for action, the army marched early in the morning in two columns towards White Plains, with their left wing, commanded by General Heister. Before mid-day, all the enemy's advanced parties retired back within their works, before fore the light infantry and the Heffian chaffeurs. The army formed with the right upon the road, from Mamaroneck, about a mile diftant from their centre, and the left to the Brunx, near about the fame diftance from the right flank of their entrenchments. The Americans had a party lodged in an advantageous post that was feparated from their right flank by the Brunx, and which alfo by its windings covered that corps in front from the left of the British army. As this post would have been of great confequence, in attacking that flank of the entrenchment, BrigadierGeneral Leflie, with the feveral brigades of British troops, the Heffian grenadiers, under Colonel Donop, and a battalion of that corps were ordered to diflodge the enemy. Previous to the attack, Colonel Rall, who commanded a brigade of Heffians on the left, had paffed the Brunx, and gained a poft, which enabled him to annoy the enemy's flank, while they were engaged with the other forces in the front. The paffage of the river was very difficult, but the troops performed it with readinefs and alacrity, and the 28th and 35th regiments having paffed first, formed with great steadinefs on the opposite fide under the fire of their enemies. On this occafion the public ac counts fay nothing of the lofs of our troops, but fuch as were upon the fpot have declared that our met fuffered feverely, and that the troops were greatly thinned by the fire of the enemy. They, however, afcended a steep hill, in defiance of all oppofition, and rushing upon the enemy, drove them from their works. The rest of the troops fhewed no lefs fortitude and fteadiness in fupporting these two regiments. The gaining of this important poft took up a confiderable time, which was prolonged by the enemy's ftill fupporting porting a fcattered engagement, under defence of the adjoining walls and hedges. In the evening the Heffian grenadiers were ordered forward within cannon fhot of the entrenchments, the 2d brigade of the British formed in the rear, and the two Heffian brigades on the left of the fecond. The right and centre of the army did not remove from the ground upon which they were formed. In that pofition the whole army lay upon their arms during the night with a full intention and in the fullest expectation to engage in the morning, and to attack the provincial camp.--General Washington, with great addrefs, before the morning had measured out more work for the British forces. He had drawn back this encamp-. ment in the night, and greatly strengthened his lines by additional works. For this reafon the attack was deferred, and it was thought neceffary to wait for the arrival of the fourth brigade, and of two battalions: of the fixth, which had been left with Earl Percy at New York. Upon the arrival of thefe troops, the neceffary difpofitions were made in the evening for attacking the enemy on the last day of October, but a very wet night and morning prevented the defign from being executed as was intended. General Washington, who knew the intention of our General, had not the fmallest intention of venturing an engagement, while it was poffible to avoid it. He knew that delay was in fome refpects a victory to him, and that fmall fkirmishes, that could not in the leaft affect the public fafery, would train his men to war and inure them to danger, better than a general engagement, which in one day might decide their own and the fate of their country. The enemies of Washington confeffed, that in the courfe |