a party of men, being on his march to join General Washington, who had affembled the Penfylvania militia to fecure the banks of the Delaware, was from the distance of the British cantonments betrayed into a fatal fecurity, by which, in croffing the uppermost part of New Jerfey, from the North River, he fixed his quarters, and lay, carelessly guarded, at fome distance from the main body. He was betrayed by an inhabitant for the fake of a reward, who informed Colonel Harcourt of the fituation he was in, who having made an excurfion at the head of a fmall detachment of light horfe, conducted his measures with fo much address and fecrecy, that the guard was evaded, the centries feized without noife, the quarters forced, and Lee carried off, though all that part of the country was in his favour, and that several guard posts and armed påtoles lay in the way. There feems to have been much carelefsnefs in the conduct of the General on this occafion, and but little judgment in thofe who formed the posts, and fet up the patrole. Had the pofts and patroles been placed as they ought to have been in the time of war and invafion, it would have been impofible for one horfeman to have gone over fuch a tract of country, to fay nothing of a detachment, without alarming the inhabitants, and affembling thofe that had arms. The fmalleft and the most fecret pollern way ought not to be neglected, from the margin of the fea-bank, to the centre of a country, and from the centre to the extremities of the whole. General Lee acted at this time with as little judgment as he did with care; for provided he had confulted the dictates of political wisdom and fagacity, he would have kept the ftricteft guard, to have fhewn the people an example, to put them in mind of the danger they

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they were in from a vigilant enemy, that watched every opportunity to take an advantage. By neglecting this practice, he, to his fad experience, fhewed an example of the truth of this obfervation.

In many cafes the making of a fingle officer prifoner would have been a thing of very little confideration or moment; but in the then ftate of America, when their forces were raw, a general deficiency of military skill prevailed, and the inexperience of the officers was even a greater grievance than the want of difcipline among the foldiers. In fuch a cafe the lofs of a commander, whofe spirit of enterprize was directed by great skill in his profeffion, acquired by active, as well as actual fervice, was of the utmost importance, and the more diftreffing, as there was little ground to hope that it could be foon fupplied.

As General Lee was confidered by thofe at home as the very chief of all the American officers, it was imagined that his being taken would have had a confiderable effect upon diftreffing the colonists, and putting an end to the war. The rejoicing among the tories and Jacobites on account of this event, was fcarcely prudent, decent, or becoming. Some perfonal animofity between Mr Lee and fome other officers in the army, as well as perfons of power at court, was fupposed to have contributed not a little to the triumph and exultation on that occafion. The taking of General Lee was alfo attended with a circumstance which has produced much inconvenience on both fides, and of much pain and calamity to many individuals. Not long before this accident, a cartel, or fomething of the like nature, had been established for the exchange of -prisoners between the Generals Howe and Washington, which had been carried into execution, fo far as

time and circumstances would admit. As General Lee was particularly obnoxious to government, it was faid, and fuppofed, that General Howe was confined by his inftructions from parting with him upon any condition, provided the fortune of war should put him into his power. General Washington not having at this time any prifoner of rank equal to Lee, propo. fed to exchange fix field officers for him; the number being intended to balance the difparity: or if this was refused, that he might be treated and confidered according to his station, according to the practice of all civilized and polished nations, and the precedent which the Americans had already fhewn with regard to British officers in their hands, until an opportunity offered for a direct and equal exchange. The pride of our ministry, and the present spirit of the British officers were raised to a degree a little too high to liften to any request of this nature from a rebel commander in chief. It was expected that in a little time the colonifts would be brought to the feet of the minifter, and General Lee would be dealt with as a flate prisoner, and treated as one of the chiefs in the rebellion. Profcriptions of a great extent were meditated, and there was nothing wanting but fuccefs to let the world fee how ministerial vengeance would be executed. General Washington therefore received for anfwer, that as Mr Lee was a deferter from his Majefty's fervice, he was not to be confidered as a prifoner of war; that he had not at all come within the conditions of a cartel, nor could he receive any of its benefits. General Lee had refigned his half pay at the beginning of the American contest, and was none of his Majefty's offi

cers.

He could only be confidered as a subject of gowernment, like the reft of thofe who were in arms in America,

America, and in no refpect came under the defcription of a deferter from his Majesty's fervice. In the proposals for a cartel no particular exceptions of perfons had been made, and General Washington treated this doctrine of the miniftry with the utmoft contempt.

In the mean time Lee was confined in the cloteft manner, and watched and guarded with all the strictnefs and jealoufy which a ftate criminal could have experienced in the most dangerous political conjuncture. This conduct not only fufpended the cartel, but induced retaliation on the other fide; fo that Colonel Campbell, who had hitherto enjoyed every degree of liberty confiftent with his condition, and had been treated with great humanity by the people of Boston, was now thrown into a dungeon, and treated with a rigour equal to the indulgence he had formerly experienced.---The officers who were prisoners in the fouthern colonies, though they were not treated fo feverely as Colonel Campbell, were however deprived of their parole liberty, and other conveniencies, which made their fituation uncommonly eafy. It was declared that their future treatment fhould, in every degree, be regulated by that which General Lee experienced, and that their perfons fhould be anfwerable in the utmost extent for any violence that was offered to him. According to the rules of justice, our miniftry could expect no other fort of conduct from the colonifts towards our officers, and whatever might happen to them, the blame must have refted upon them. felves.

According to the boafting of that time, General Lee was to have been brought over to England to be tried as a state prifoner; and there is no queftion that if the miniftry had not been embarraffed with regard to

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their own officers, which were prifoners in America, General Lee would have felt their vengeance to the utmost extent. But though he was particularly ill ufed for a time, the fituation of many British officers. preferved him from the vengeance that was intended for him.

It the midst of the feveral trying circumftances which happened about this time, the American congrefs fhewed a wonderful steadiness and refolution,Far from defponding, or giving way to any thing like unconditional fubmiffion, they made no overtures towards any fort of an accomodation. Pride, fhame, and the hope of fubduing the colonists, prevented the government to make any propofals of accomodation to the congrefs. The colonifts, as was neceffary in their prefent fituation, prepared to renew the war with all the vigour they were mafters of, and to repair their fhattered forces with the utmost diligence. It was imagined that by their loffes in the Jerfies, and in other parts of the continent, that they would never be able again to make any refiftance against the King's forces; and that the lofs of General Lee would totally break their fpirits. But all thefe events only roufed them the more, and called forth into exercise every latent principal of exertion that remained in their fouls.-They were now convinced that temporary armies were not competent for the great obje&t they had in view, and that though men engaged for a fhort and li mited time might repel a fudden invafion, yet when oppofed to the conftant attacks of a powerful enemy, and the continual efforts of regular forces, they were far from being fufficient. They found in experience, that they could not hope with an army of new men, changed every year, to make any effectual ftand against

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