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for fome time been employed in the east end of Long Hand, in procuring forage, grain, and other neceffaries for the British forces, and that thefe articles had been depofited for embarkation, at a little port called Sagg Harbour; the diftance of that place from New York, and the weakness of the protection, which confifted only of one company of foot, and an armed fchooner of twelve guns, afforded encouragement for fruftrating that fcheme of fupplying the wants of the army. The chief difficulty lay in paffing and repaffing of the found, which was continually traverfed by the British cruizers. This difficulty was however furmounted, and the expedition put into execution.Colonel Meigs, a daring and enterprizing officer, who had attended Arnold in the Canada expedition, and to whom danger as well as fatigue was become familiar. Ile had been taken prifoner in the attempt to ftorm the city of Quebec, and was now the conductor of this enterprize. Having paffed his detachment in whale boats through the found, and landed on the north branch of the island, where it is interfected by a bay that runs in far from the east end, and having carried their boats over the arm of land which was in their way, to prevent all difcovery from the royal cruizers, they embarked again in the bay, which Meigs croffed with 150 men, and landed on the fouth branch of the ifland, within four miles of Sagg Har bour. They arrived at the place on the morning of the 24th of May, before break of day, and notwithftanding the refiftance which they met with from the guard and the crews of the veffels, and the vigorous efforts of the fchooner, which kept up a continual fire of round and grape fhot, within 150 yards,diftance, they fully completed their defign; having burnt a do

zen

zen of brigs and floops which lay at the wharf, and entirely destroyed every thing on the fhore. They brought off with them about go prifoners, confifting of the officers who commanded with the men, the commiffaries, most of the mafters and crews of the fmall veffels, which they destroyed. There is a circunftance which is fomewhat curious, provided it is literally true, afferted by the Americans. They fay that the party returned to Guildford in Connecticut, in 25 hours from the time of their departure, having during that space not only effectually compleated the defign of their expedition, but having traverfed no lefs by land and water than 90 miles. miles. A degree of expedition that is a little incredible, and from which, if the fact is established, it would appear that Meigs poffèffes no fmall portion of that spirit which operated in the Canada expedition. In this manner did the people of Connecticut return the vifit of his Majefty's forces, and gained as much advantage as their friend General Tryon, with a great deal of lefs lofs, and in a far fhorter time. This was a fignature of enterprize in the behaviour of the colonists, which was ominous to the King's forces, and fhewed what the fpirit of fuch men would lead them to, if once they were compleatly armed, and in a proper ftate of difcipline.

The fpring was now over, and the feafon for action far advanced, but from fome improvidence and inattention very unaccountable at home, the army was restrained from taking the field through the want of rents and field équipage. Lord Cornwallis however made a shift with the old tents to encamp the forces at Brunswick on the hills that commanded the Rarison, and formed a communication from that river to

Amboy :

Amboy: The example being followed at the latter

place by General Vaughan.

This delay was of the colonifts. The winter

greatest importance to the campaign had been principally carried on by detachments of the militia, the greater part of whom returned home when the fervice was expired. Others, more generous, more patient of labour, or more fanguine in the common caufe, out-ftayed the allotted time merely from a confideration of the weakness of the army, and the ruin which must attend their deThe bufinefs of parture before it was reinforced. recruiting under the engagement of ferving during the war, or even for three years went on flowly. The term offervice it is faid, was contrary to the genius of the people, and the different provinces found the greatest difficulty in raising their complement of troops which had been allotted to them by the congrefs. Their laft refort for the prefent was to make draughts from the militia. Such an act of violence upon those who were contending for liberty on the most enlarged plan, and who confidered all the rights of freemen as facred, was both wearifome and dangerous. Every method was tried to avoid having recourfe to this difagreeable meafure, and final refource. In fome of the colonies the enlifting of apprentices, and of Irish indented fervants, was permitted, contrary to former refolutions and decrees, with a promise of indemnification to their mafters. Another thing which hindered the fudden recruiting of the army in the Jerfeys was, that the New England provinces, which abounded with men, were taken up with their own domestic affairs. An invafion was expected on the fide of Ca nada; Hudfon's River and Rhode Island afforded con tinual room for apprehenfion; nor did an expe

dition against Boston appear at all impoffible; especially as the great number of British prizes that were brought into that port, had befides rendered it an object of the first importance, and renewed and even increased, if poffible, the deteftation and abhorrence with which that people had been long regarded. In fuch circumfances, the advantages of an early campaign, and the benefit which the colonists derived from a delay are obvious. The fine weather brought reinforcements froin all the quarters to the Jerfeys. Thofe who fhuddered at a winter's campaign grew bold in fummer; and the certainty of a future winter had no greater effect than diftant evils ufually have. General Washington having received new reinforcements quitted his former station in the latter end of May, in the neighbourhood of Morristown, and advanced within a few miles of Brunswick, when he took poffeffion of the ftrong country along Middle Brook. A great part of the after events of the war in the Jerfeys depended upon this movement. Washington turned that advantageous fituation to every account of which it was capable. His camp winding along the course of the hills, was ftrongly entrenched and well covered with artillery; and it was alfo well fecured by the difficulties of approach, which the ground in its front threw in the way of an enemy.

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In this fituation he commanded a view of the British encampment on the hills of Brunswick, and of much of the intermediate country towards that place and Amboy.

The British plan of operations was at this time a little perplexed; Washington had taken fuch meafures as neither our miniftry at home, nor our com.. manders abroad, had fo much as thought of, even in

idea. They had been well informed of many confẹquences, which they looked upon as vifionary, which happened as they had been foretold, but they continued under the fame delufion and infatuation.-There were two schemes which occurred to the British General. The firft to penetrate from NewYork through the Jerjeys to the Delaware; to drive Washington before him, and clear thofe provinces of the enemy; reduce the inhabitants to fo effectual a ftate of fubjection as to establish a fafe and open communication between New York and the army. Af ter this to fecure the paffage of the Delaware, be come matters of Philadelphia, which would be the centre from which they would diftribute conquest and correction to all the colonies. This was undoubtedly by much the shortest method; but even then there were feveral very great difficulties in the way of the execution of this project. Washington was to be brought to a decifive action and alfo defeated, otherwife they could not proceed without leaving all be hind expofed to his army. This could not be done contrary to his inclination, and it was not probable that he would rifk a battle without fuch vifible ad, vantages as would either infure the victory to him or render our army incapable of pursuing this plan of operation. Should our army leave him behind and pafs the Delaware, they would have an enemy in front, and a ftrong army in the rear, which was far from being adviseable; and in cafe that this project fhould fail, it would be the ruin of the royal caufe in America. Our miniftry, who never have feen far before them, have fince confidered this as the most elegible plan, and blamed General Howe for not puṛ, ting it in execution; but according to all the concur

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