apprehenfive that the attack would become general, and probably the iffue doubtful, he was under a neceffity of altering his march towards the fea coaft, by which he gained in his march, and they loft in proportion. It was fome time before the colonifts perceived that the British forces had departed from their expected line of direction. It was neceffity, not defign or forefight, as has been alledged by fome, which made the British general change the direction of his march. When he marched out of Philadelphia, he did not imagine that his retreat would be fo fuddenly obferved, or that General Washington would have been fo ready as to have gained the Rariton before he had paffed it; but in this he was deceived, and for this reafon he altered his march, and took the right-hand road leading to the fea coaft. The fleet was a fpecial object of his hope, which he expected would endeavour to be ready to receive his troops in cafe of any difafter: This was a special reason why he altered his courfe, and marched towards the coaft; for it is plain that he avoided as much as poffible to come to any general engagement with the colonists, while he was at a distance from the fleet. As foon as General Washington perceived that the British troops had altered their courfe, and were marching towards the fea coaft, he immediately changed his plan, and fent feveral detachments of his best troops, under the command of the Marquis de la Fayette, to harrass the army in its march, while he advanced at a proper distance with all his force. As the advanced parties of the provincials came near to the rear of the British forces, and the fituation became critical, General Washington ordered General Lee, with two brigades, to reinforce and take the command command of the advanced corps. This party confifted of about five thousand men, according to the account which General Washington gave under his own hand. Others who speak from conjecture, have fet forth, that this corps confifted of more than five thousand; but there is no certainty in this conjec ture. This Sir Henry Clinton in his march to a place called Freehold, judging, from the number of the provincials that hung upon his rear, that their main body was not far diftant, began to be in concern for the baggage, which had always been, for good reafons, a principal object of his attention. He wifely refolved to free that part of the army from this incumbrance and impediment; he therefore placed the baggage under the management of General Knyphaufen, who led the first column of the army. The other, which covered the march, was now difengaged and ready for action, and was compofed of the best troops in the army, commanded by the general himself. corps confifted of the third, fourth, and fifth brigades of British, two battalions of British, and the Heffian grenadiers, a battalion of light infanty, the guards, and the tenth regiment of light dragoons. Thefe were troops, that had been heretofore accounted invincible, and which none of the provincials durft fo much as face in the open field; with thefe brigades Gen. Clinton endeavoured to make the best defence he could, though it appears not that he was free of fear with regard to the event; for he had ordered Gen. Knyphaufen to march at break of day with all the carriages and baggage, and to direct their courfe to Middle-Town, which lay at twelve miles diftance on their way, in an high and strong.country. The com mander mander in chief, with the fecond divifion, continued fome hours on the ground in the neighbourhood of Freehold, both to cover the march of the baggage, and to afford time for the long range of carriages to get clear on their way. This caution and care was exceedingly neceffary as the event proved; for it was not long till the American force appeared advancing in their rear, and purfuing them with an intention to attack them. Upon the 25th of June, about eight o'clock in the morning, when the army began to march, fome parties of the provincials appeared in the woods and attacked the troops upon the left flank; these being only flying parties, were made to retire by the light troops. But as the rear-guard defcended from the heights of Frechold, into a valley about three miles. in length and one in breadth, feveral columns of the colonists appeared alfo defcending into the plain, who about ten o'clock began to cannonade the rear. At the fame time that this attack was made upon the rear, the general received intelligence that two flrong bodies of troops were marching to flank the army!; this, in the modern military stile, was called marching in force on both fides to attack them in the flanks. This greatly alarmed the general, for he perceived that it was their defign to attack the baggage, and as the carriages were then entangled in narrow defiles for fome miles, it feemed a matter of the greatest confequence to guard against this danger. As the affair appeared to be critical, the general devifed the only method that could have been at that time fallen upon to deliver himself out of that embarraffment. He refolved to make a vigorous attack upon that body which hung upon his rear and harraffed it, which he con cluded cluded would call back the flanking parties to the af fiftance of thofe that were thus engaged, and thereby give an opportunity to the baggage to efcape. For although General Washington was marching with his whole army, which was believed to be far greater than it really was, yet as the main body was sepårated from this advanced corps which attacked Lord Cornwallis in the rear, by two confiderable defiles, he did not imagine that he could pafs a greater body of troops through thefe narrows, during the execution of that measure which he intended, than what the force along with him was able to oppofe; whilft on the other hand, even with that divifion of the army, Washington's fituation would be fufficiently critical, provided he fhould come upon him, whilft he was ftruggling in the defiles. He was however doubtful of this matter, and to guard againft every poffible refult that might happen in cafe of a general engagement, he called back a brigade of the British infantry, and the feventeenth regiment of light dragoons from Knyphaufen's divifion, and left them orders to take a poft which would effectually cover his right flank, being the fide on which he was moft jealous of being attacked. In the mean time the Queen's light dragoons had engaged with fome of the American cavalry, under the Marquis de Fayette,and put them to flight, and had driven them back upon their own foot. The General then made difpofitions to attack the Americans in the plain; but before he could advance, they unexpectedly fell back, and pofted themfelves in a strong fituation, on the heights above Monmouth Houfe. The weather in this feafon of the year is in those parts always exceedingly warm; but upon this day it was fo violently hot as to be Kkk fcarcely fcarcely exceeded by the most fultry fummers of that continent. This was a very disagreeable circumstance to our army, which was already very much fatigued by their march, and the severe labour of clearing the way and repairing bridges. The most vigorous exertions were, however, at this time neceffary, and the circumftances of our army required a more than ordinary vigour to make good their march, and fave their baggage. The British grenadiers had now fufficient employment for all their valour and intrepidity: This body, with the village of Freehold on their left and the guards on their right, began the attack with great fury. The provincials were aware of their impetuofity, and guarded against the effects of it; and according to appointment, gave way after a fhort attack, and led their enemy directly upon the fecond line, which was ready to receive them. It was here the very flower of the British army was refifted in a manner they never expected: Their fierce attack was refolutely fuftained, and their fury fo much abated by the bold refiftance of the colonists, that they were forced to be witneffes of their enemies forming themfelves, when they thought they had totally routed ahem, in a new advantageous poft, from whence. they were not able to drive them. Our accounts of this engagement are very unfairly given, and the circumftances of this battle are defcribed with fuch a partiality to Sir Henry Clinton, and the valour of the British troops, that the writers themfelves, inftead of doing honour to the general and his men, afford sufficient hints to enable others to infer, that there was much more understood than they were willing to exprefs. They allow that, according to their own file, after the enemy was completely routed, they, |