with a very unufual degree of recollection as well as refolution, took a third pofition with fo much judg ment, that their front was covered by a marshy hollow, which scarcely admitted the poffibility of an attack. This does not well agree with a complete andtotal defeat. The truth of the matter is, that the whole manner and method of the colonists proceeding was but one plan. They perceived the intention of the British general, and knew the preffing circumftances he was in: that he intended to make a refolute and vigorous attack to fave his baggage, and if poffible to defeat that advanced party that hung upon his rear. They therefore provided against a defperate attack, by forming in two lines, and taking new posts, to which they retired regularly when they were feverely preffed. This both faved their men, and fatigued their enemy, and afforded new advantages, which the English forces could not obtain. By the refiftance which our men had met with from the first and fecond lines, but efpecially from the fecond, their vigour was fufficiently abated, and they found from experience that those men whom they had fo often determined to be cowards, were very different from what they apprehended.

General Clinton found, from the vigorous refiftance the provincials had made against his best troops, and from the poft they had now taken, that the iffue would be very doubtful, fhould he attempt to dif lodge them from the poft they were now in. After he had made fome difpofitions, as if he meant to attack them, by bringing up the fecond line, and making the light infantry and rangers turn to the left, he defifted from the attempt. His beft troops had now done

all

all that they were able to do; they were overpowered with heat, wearied with fatigue, and had been. feverely handled in the two former attacks; and the others that were now ready to have made the third, were neither of the fame character for intrepidity, nor in cafe of a repulfe, were they likely to have made a good retreat in their prefent fituation. He therefore thought it better not to prefs the affair any further. In this he behaved prudently, for as he had as yet been engaged with but a part of the American army, and the main force was advancing, he would have been obliged to have engaged fresh. troops, with an army already very much fatigued by the former actions. He had fo far gained his intention, with regard to the baggage, as the convoy was pow without the reach of danger. The American army made a bold attempt to cut off the retreat of the light infantry, which laid the general under the neceffity of making fome new arrangements, which, confidering the exceffive heat of the day, were exceedingly difficult to be effected, but were absolutely neceffary for the prefervation of the army. The British forces at length returned to the poft, from whence the provincials had at first retreated, after quitting the plain.

The event juftified the opinion of General Clinton, with refpect to the Americans defign on the baggage, and the propriety of his attacking the provincials at the time, and in the manner he did. Two brigades of the American light troops had paffed our army, one on each flank, with that view, and had made the attempt, but were repulfed by the fortieth regiment and the light horfe. Matters, however, were like

to

to turn very serious and critical, and Sir Henry Clinton began to perceive, fhould he perfift in the engage.. ment, that the iffue would be very doubtful, as the, colonists were advancing, and feemed eager in maintaining the dispute; he therefore thought it prudent to pursue the baggage as fast as he was able. Our accounts of this affair fet it forth in this manner, "Sir Henry Clinton having now fully attained his object, for the Generals Knyphaufen and Grant, with the first divifion and baggage, were arrived at Nut, Swamp near Middletown, could have no inducement, for continuing in his prefent fituation. The troops. had already gained fufficient honour, in forcing fucceffively from two ftrong pofitions, a corps of the enemy, which he was informed, amounted to near 12,000 men, and the merit of the fervice was much enhanced by the unequalled circumstances of heat and fatigue under which it was performed. The enemy. were much fuperior in force to the divifion immediately under his command; and if the equality had been even nearer, it would ftill have feemed imprudent to have hazarded an engagement, at fuch a diftance from the rest of his army, in a country not only hoftile, but which, from its nature, must have been ruinous to ftrangers, under any circumftance of defeat. And as the heat of the weather rendered marching by day intolerable, fo the moon-light added to the elegibility of the night, for that purpofe. Upon fome or all of thefe accounts, the troops hav ing repofed till ten o'clock, the army was again put in motion, and they marched forward to join their fellows."

When

When matters are faithfully compared, it does not appear that there were any fuch great numbers of American troops prefent at this engagement: That only the 5000 men that were fent to harrafs the march of our troops, were all the force that had yet been engaged. That thofe troops, by the order of Gen. Lee, had retreated, and were again rallied by the command of General Washington, and made fuch an impreffion upon our forces, as gave the General reason to believe, that, provided he should adventure the iffue of the action, it would at least be very doubtful. It was plain to the impartial part of our army, that the colonists upon this occafion, withstood, with much bravery, the very best of our troops, and feemed to behave like veteran foldiers. The grenadiers, the very chosen troops from all the regiments, together with the guards, who generally claim the post of honour, found in experience, that they could fupport their honour with difficulty, against the attacks of men who fought for the rights of human nature, more than for the empty honours of war. The former boafting of our officers and men, and the contempt in which they held the Americans, began now more to decrease, and our officers began to find that caution was now a very neceffary part of practice in carrying on the American war.

The lofs on our fide is reprefented as very inconfiderable in point of the number of the flain, but particularly grievous by the lofs of the brave Colonel Monkton, who had behaved with much military bravery in feveral former actions, and had been grievoufly wounded, both in the laft war and the prefent. After feveral narrow escapes in the field,

he

he was referved to be killed on this day, at the head of the fecond battalion of grenadiers. A very particular circumstance rendered this day and action remarkable, and unparallelled in the Hiftory of America. Fifty-nine foldiers perifhed, without receiving a wound, merely through exceffive heat and fatigue. Some of the Americans are faid to have fuffered in the fame manner, though bred in the country and inured to the climate. Of all the actions fince the commencement of the war, our troops were in this expofed to the greatest hardships, though they fuftained greater lofs of men in fome others. A good part of the management of this retreat, and conducting of our troops out of danger, depended upon General Grey, whom our accounts do not mention in the whole of this affair: He had fome narrow escapes, having his horfe killed under him, and the heads of fome foldiers, which had been taken off by cannonballs, lying befide him, when he recovered from the entanglement of his horfe. And there is much reafon to conclude that the lofs of this day has not as yet been fully ascertained. The account which the Americans give of the lofs on our fide is different from ours, and has fome internal marks of authenticity in them, not fo clearly to be perceived in our official representations. From the plaineft and best accounts it appears, that though our men behaved with much bravery, yet they were hard preffed, and with difficulty fupported their march, which they were obliged to do in the night, when they escaped by the favour of darkness.

The Americans claimed great honour to that detachment of their troops, which was engaged in the

action;